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ABSTRACT
Municipal Police Under Federal Control: A Mixed-Methods Analysis of
Title 42 U.S.C. Section 14141 Negotiated Settlements
by
Jason W. Ostrowe

Advisor: Professor Maria (Maki) Haberfeld
Passed as part of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, the Law
Enforcement Misconduct Statute 42 U.S.C. 14141 (§ 14141) authorizes the Department of
Justice (DOJ) to investigate, and enter into a court-enforceable structural reform agreement with
a law enforcement agency engaged in patterns or practices of systemic misconduct, violations of
federal law, and unconstitutional policing.
Under § 14141 authority, 33 investigations of municipal police have been conducted
since 1994 where the DOJ determined that a police agency was engaged in, or at unreasonable
risk of engaging in, a pattern or practice of unconstitutional policing. Publicizing this
determination, a DOJ issued findings letter is the resultant output of a § 14141 investigation,
detailing a variety of organizational deficiencies related to polices, practices, procedures, and
systems contributing to systemic misconduct and unconstitutional policing.
Using a mixed-methodological approach, this study sought to identify, describe, explore,
and analyze phenomena concomitant to DOJ findings of a pattern or practice of unconstitutional
policing for municipal police agencies under § 14141 authority. Through an embedded design,
the qualitative methodology consisted of analyzing DOJ’s findings letters for latent and manifest
content describing policies, practices, procedures, and systems in need of reform. Supporting the
iv

qualitative analysis, the quantitative portion consisted of analyzing variables integrating
disjointed incrementalism, deterrence, and the multiple streams framework theories. The
quantitative analysis was designed to better understand influences on patterns or practices of
police behavior, organizational decision-making across investigative outcomes, and between
generations of §14141 enforcement.
These analyses led to an explication of the meaning and contours of unconstitutional
policing, the creation of a compendium of policies and practices to address systemic problems in
municipal police agencies, and a four-step prescriptive model that can be used to forestall
systemic misconduct and unconstitutional policing, obviating the potential for § 14141
investigation, intervention, loss of autonomy, and federal oversight. In addition, an exploration
of policy options for the continued enforcement of § 14141 is presented based on the analysis of
past enforcement practices, and emerging conditions.
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Introduction
Federal intervention of municipal police by the United States Department of Justice
(DOJ) in accordance with the Law Enforcement Misconduct Statute 42 United States Code §
14141 (herein § 14141) signifies the failure of a law enforcement agency to meet its civic
requirement of constitutional policing. At a most basic level, police departments exist to carry
out the mission of protecting life and property, maintaining order, enforcing laws and
regulations, arresting offenders, and protecting the rights of citizens within their jurisdiction
while abiding by the Constitution and applicable law (Haberfeld, 2018). Police agencies 1 that do
not meet these standards are at risk of investigation, intervention, and regulatory oversight by the
federal government, thereby stripping away jurisdictional control and operational autonomy.
Considering the historical context, § 14141 empowers the DOJ to intervene in an area of
government operations that until recently, has been the exclusive domain of local governance by
tradition and intent. Indeed, the 1994 passage of § 14141 has been referred to by scholars of
police as an “unprecedented event in the history of American policing” (Walker, 2017, p. 1).
Section 14141 authorizes the DOJ to investigate law enforcement agencies suspected of
engaging in patterns or practices of systemic misconduct, unconstitutional policing, and
violations of federal law (DOJ, 2017a). Investigations producing affirmative findings that a
police agency is engaged in a pattern or practice of unconstitutional policing, empowers the DOJ
to enter into a court-ordered structural reform agreement with the offending police agency to
address and rectify underlying causes of that misconduct. To meet the sufficient standard of
proof to initiate this process, the DOJ conducts an investigation and detailed review of a police

When referring to police as an organization throughout this dissertation, the terms “department” and “agency” are
used interchangeably for linguistic purposes. Both of these terms have definitions that include; “an administrative
division of government” (Merriam-Webster, 2018), therefore, can be used synonymously in the context of a police
organization.

1
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agency’s policies, practices, procedures, and systems; attempting to discern the constitutionality
of the agency’s operations, with particular interest in practices related to:
Stops and searches; arrests without warrants or sufficient cause, or in retaliation for
exercising free speech rights, and discrimination based on factors such as race, ethnicity,
national origin, religion, disability, and sex-including sexual orientation, gender identity
and LGBT status. (DOJ, 2017a, p. 5)
Although § 14141 has been viewed by many scholars as an appropriate mechanism to
reform troubled and dysfunctional police departments (Armacost, 2003; Rushin, 2017; Stuntz
2006), § 14141 has also been criticized as being antagonistic to the principle of federalism
embedded in the U.S. Constitution and American tradition of governance (U.S. Const. amend.
X). Scholars who make this argument suggest that § 14141 is at odds with the traditional
relationship that the police should be accountable to local government and the people served by
that government (Ross & Parke, 2009). This position is supported by other scholars who have
studied implications of the federalist orientation of governance; arguing that in the U.S., “local
prerogative is part and parcel of government structure and philosophy” (O’Hara, 2012, p. 65).
Parallel to these scholarly criticisms, police practitioners whose law enforcement agencies have
been the subject of a § 14141 action have noted not only does an investigation of a police agency
undermine the historic tradition of local control and accountability, as well, federal intervention
under § 14141 results in national stigma, negatively effecting a police agency’s reputation, and
damaging agency credibility with the local community (Police Executive Research Forum,
2013).
The philosophical perspective regarding a limited federal role in local matters,
particularly as it relates to oversight of local police under § 14141, has real-world consequences.
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Indeed, as indicated by the former United States Attorney General (AG), who as head of the DOJ
was responsible for setting agency agenda and priorities, has written:
The federal government alone cannot successfully address rising crime rates, secure
public safety, protect and respect the civil rights of all members of the public, or
implement best practices in policing. These are, first and foremost, tasks for state, local,
and tribal law enforcement. (Sessions, 2017, pp. 1-2)
This policy position creates a degree of uncertainty in the viability of ongoing and
emerging § 14141 actions. The result of this uncertainty leaves police leaders, state and local
governments, as well as the general public with a challenge: Since the agency responsible for the
enforcement of § 14141 has taken a policy position that the investigation, intervention, and
regulation of local police is not a federal priority (Sessions, 2018), by default, it becomes the
responsibility of each law enforcement agency and their parent jurisdiction to monitor and selfregulate, ensuring that their policies and practices are within applicable law, and constitutional
guidelines.
The success of self-regulation presupposes that police leaders have the requisite
knowledge, awareness, capabilities, and motivation to identify and address deficient policies,
practices, procedures, systems, and conditions indicating that their police agency is engaged in,
or at risk of engaging in unconstitutional policing. This is flawed assumption, as the knowledge
required for self-regulation to become actionable requires that police leaders know where, when,
and precisely what to look for, most of which has not been explored relative to § 14141.
The confluence of recent events involving police in the United States, including a number
of high-profile controversial enforcement actions (e.g. Eric Garner, Philando Castile, Alton
Sterling, Walter Scott, etc.), perceptions of a lack of accountability for police engaged in use of
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force incidents (Hafner, 2018), and the uncertainty involving the current and future enforcement
of § 14141, presents an opportune moment to review not what has been done regarding § 14141
actions – that knowledge already exists – but to glean new knowledge regarding the problematic
policies, practices, procedures, and systems that existed in and about municipal police
departments prior to the initiation of a DOJ action under § 14141 and thereafter. Examining §
14141 interventions retrospectively affords the police profession, and public, the opportunity to
understand how a municipal police department can avoid patterns or practices of unconstitutional
policing through an analysis of problematic or deficient policies, practices, procedures, and
systems concomitant to police agencies under federal investigation and intervention. This
knowledge then can offer police leaders insights that will allow them to identify problematic
areas within their own agencies, and address those deficiencies to protect against patterns or
practices of unconstitutional policing, loss of reputation, credibility, autonomy, and potentially,
organizational demise.
In the 25 years since the passage of § 14141, the DOJ has conducted 69 investigations of
law enforcement agencies suspected of engaging in patterns or practices of systemic misconduct
leading to unconstitutional policing (DOJ, 2017a). Of these 69 investigations, 55 involved what
are defined as local police (Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2015). These 55 § 14141 investigations
were initiated against 51 discrete local police departments. 2 Municipalities with dedicated police
agencies, generally referred to as “city”, “village”, or “town” police, make up 98% of local
police departments in the United States (BJS, 2008). Local municipalities that are referred to as
“cities”, while having dedicated police departments subject to a § 14141 investigation, were the
focus of this study.
Four local police departments were the subject of two distinct § 14141 investigations, these include: Cleveland,
Miami, New Orleans, and New York. Hence, 51 police agencies make up 55 investigations of local police.

2
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Overall Research Goal
The 51 local police departments investigated under § 14141 authority comprise 0.28% of
the 18,000 law enforcement agencies in the United States, and 0.42% of the 12,000 local police
agencies nationwide (BJS, 2015). The mere fact that so few police agencies have been subject to
§ 14141 enforcement leads to two fundamental questions: What contributes to such a rare event?
And, how can this information assist other municipal police departments to practice
constitutional policing?
To address the two-pronged research problem presented above, this dissertation seeks to
identify, describe, explore, and analyze phenomenon concomitant to DOJ findings of a pattern or
practice of systemic misconduct resulting in unconstitutional policing within a municipal police
department, ex-ante. The purpose is to identify institutional, environmental, and systemic
conditions, as well as deficiencies in policies and procedures, that existed in municipal police
agencies prior to a § 14141 action by analyzing commonalities allowing for the proliferation of
unconstitutional policing. The knowledge created from this analysis can then be used to facilitate
the development of a compendium of policies and practices, and a prescriptive model to forestall
municipal police behavior, that when applied to a police agency, can prevent patterns or practices
of unconstitutional policing. Moreover, this research seeks to examine DOJ decision-making
relative to § 14141, and explore how organizational decision-making influenced investigative
findings and outcomes under § 14141 over time. In doing so, this research will explore policy
implications for criminal justice at the federal, state, local, and organizational levels.
Scholarly activities involving § 14141 are few, until this study was conducted, an
analysis of the conditions that preceded a § 14141 action was not undertaken. This dissertation
adds then to the body of knowledge regarding § 14141, while making a significant contribution
to the literature on police practices, oversight, federal intervention, public policy and
5

criminological theory, while revealing areas for future research, and new directions in the fields
of criminal justice policy, and public administration.
Problem Statement
In 2015, the President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing (President’s Task Force),
reported: “Trust between law enforcement agencies and the people they protect and serve is
essential in a democracy” (President’s Task Force, 2015, p. 5); reflecting priorities in
participatory governance, rule of law, and the administration of justice as critical components of
a just democratic society. This statement came after the President’s Task Force was initiated to
review, research, and develop solutions to many of the problems that trouble local police
departments in light of events that “have exposed rifts between local police and the communities
they protect and serve” (President’s Task Force, 2015, p. 5).
The language of the President’s Task Force implies that problems related to the
relationship between police and communities that are served by those agencies is either an
emerging phenomenon, or one that has gathered enough public attention to become actionable.
However, a closer examination of this relationship, particularly viewed through the prism of U.S.
history, suggests that neither suggestion is accurate. Indeed, a variety of governmental
commissions seeking to improve police operations, enhance constitutional policing and
legitimacy, and identify best practices have had different iterations in the United States as far
back as the early 1930s.
Scholars of police have identified the Wickersham Commission as one of the earliest
governmentally sanctioned investigatory bodies initiated to address the myriad problems
associated with policing in the United States (Walker, 1997). Since Wickersham, there have been
a number of commissions seeking to expose and address systemic police failures related to
corruption, misconduct, excessive force, failed oversight, and unlawful activities (e.g.
6

Christopher Commission, 1991; Knapp Commission, 1973; Mollen Commission, 1994; Rampart,
2000). These commissions were local in orientation and focus, addressing problems within a
specific agency and jurisdiction, reflecting the traditional notion of policing as a local institution
in America. Until the passage of § 14141, the federal government’s role in matters related to
local police was restricted and infrequent.
More recently, scholars have categorized the relationship between the federal government
and intervention of local police in the U.S. into three distinct periods beginning with what is
referred to as the “hands-off era” (Rushin, 2017, p. 9). This first era of federal intervention
encompassed the founding of the United States until the early 20th century, and was behaviorally
characterized by the prevailing view that law enforcement, police regulation and oversight, were
the responsibility of local governance. This perspective obviated the need for a federal role in
matters related to local law enforcement.
A shift in orientation away from the hands-off era began in 1931 with the “Wickersham
Commission”. Officially known as the National Commission on Law Observance and
Enforcement, the Wickersham Commission investigated police practices and made details of
widespread physical and constitutional abuses perpetrated by the police known to the public.
Findings from the Wickersham Commission were memorialized in the Report on Lawlessness in
Law Enforcement. This report detailed a variety of unconstitutional police practices and
misconduct commonly referred to as the “third-degree”; practices that included “physical
brutality, illegal detention, and refusal to allow access of counsel to suspects” (Walker, 1997, p.
ix). It is not surprising then that Wickersham has been referred to as “one of the most important
events in the history of American policing” (Walker, 1997, p. v).
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The time period following the Wickersham Commission until 1994, referred to as the
“build-up era” (Rushin, 2017, p. 45), was characterized by incremental changes in the
relationship between the federal government and local law enforcement. Many of these changes
were the result of judicial decisions that established regulations controlling police policies,
procedures, and practices through the application of case law. One of the most prominent
examples comes from the landmark U.S. Supreme Court case Mapp v. Ohio (1961). The court’s
decision in Mapp established the applicability of the exclusionary rule to local police,
consequently, providing a mechanism for individuals who were the subject of a specific type of
unconstitutional policing to seek relief through the suppression and exclusion of illegally
obtained evidence. Another remedy provided to victims of police misconduct during the build-up
era occurred when the federal government authorized “civilians to file federal civil rights
lawsuits against local police officers and police departments” (Rushin, 2017, p. 12) for under
color of law civil rights violations through Title 42 United States Code § 1983.
The passage of the 1994 crime bill, and in particular § 14141, began in earnest what is
now referred to as the “intervention era” (Rushin, 2017, p. 67). This time period, 1994 - present
day, is characterized by the legal authority of the DOJ to investigate, and initiate regulatory
intervention and oversight of law enforcement agencies across all jurisdictions of government
under the purview of U.S. law. Although the authority granted by § 14141 replicates that
practiced by the federal government to intervene in other public services including education and
corrections, the passage of § 14141 still is viewed as “an unprecedented expansion of the federal
government’s authority into a realm traditionally regulated by local and state governments”
(Rushin, 2017, p. 84).
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The initiation of a § 14141 action against a municipal police department, as such, is an
expression of federal authority that breaks from historical, and federalist norms. Considering that
the mechanism of investigation, intervention, court-ordered oversight, and forced change
authorized under § 14141 is so rarely used, it is perfectly valid to question the government
bringing a federal solution to what many perceive to be a local problem on philosophical,
effectiveness, or constitutional grounds. Indeed, these critiques do not appear to be unfounded.
Even the former head of the DOJ, who was responsible for overseeing the enforcement of
§ 14141 – before departing his position – issued a policy memo regarding the enforcement of §
14141 that greatly restricted and scaled-back current and future oversight actions, adding an even
greater level of uncertainty regarding § 14141’s future. The former AG’s reasoning for these
changes was grounded in the belief that § 14141 actions can cause more harm than good by
undermining democratic control and accountability through burdening local jurisdictions with
long-term financial liabilities that can greatly restrict operational autonomy (Sessions, 2018).
Further noting, that any jurisdiction subject to a § 14141 inquiry must be afforded “the respect
and comity deserving of a separate sovereignty” (Session, 2018, p. 2). In sum and substance, the
AG’s argument was that the constitutional concept of federalism justified the numerous internal
policy changes in the interpretation and application of § 14141 against local police.
Of the approximately 18,000 police agencies that are subject to U.S. law, very few have
been subject to a § 14141 action. This has led some police practitioners whose law enforcement
agencies have come under § 14141 investigation to resist what has been viewed as overweening
and meddlesome federal authority. Two such examples involve the Maricopa County Sheriff,
and Alamance County (N.C.) Sheriff, both of whom refused to share their records with the DOJ
during the course of a § 14141 investigation against their agency, as stated: “they [the DOJ] just
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want to come in and take over your law-enforcement agency. They march in the door and say
you are guilty of all these things” (Albright, 2015 as cited in Weichselbaum, 2015, final
paragraph). The issue articulated by the Sheriff’s, per se, raises important questions of equity,
fairness, and the ability of the federal government to implement § 14141 in a manner consistent
with a constitutional framework. Considering these critiques, it is worth noting that DOJ’s
current policy on § 14141 enforcement appears to acquiesce to both practitioner concerns and
scholarly criticisms (Sessions, 2017; Sessions, 2018).
Nevertheless, § 14141 has existed since 1994 and continues to do so. With approximately
63% of the U.S. population living in cities (U.S. Census, 2015), federal intervention of municipal
police has impacted millions of U.S. residents, yet, has the potential to impact millions more
through organizational modeling, and implementation of policing best practices. When viewed
from this macro perspective, the scale and scope of the Law Enforcement Misconduct Statute
becomes much larger than the 69 § 14141 investigations and numerous reform agreements with
local police agencies. Concerning this scale then, and how little is known of the circumstances
that support the government’s findings of a pattern or practice of unconstitutional policing, it is
fitting and appropriate that this dissertation identified, described, explored, and analyzed the exante conditions that contributed to a pattern or practice of unconstitutional policing, thereby
subjecting a municipal police agency to public scrutiny, legal and financial liability, and loss of
autonomy for federal intervention and external control.
The above review leads to some fundamental questions for exploration, including:
•

Out of what is essentially innumerable choice, how does the DOJ identify a specific
municipal police agency engaged in unconstitutional policing?

•

What policy deficiencies contributed to a pattern or practice of unconstitutional policing?
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•

What organizational characteristics and environmental conditions existed in municipal
police departments prior to a § 14141 investigation?

•

What themes emerge as patterns or practices of unconstitutional policing from DOJ’s §
14141 findings?

•

Have DOJ’s pattern and practice investigations changed over time?

•

As well: How can these findings support other police departments to practice
constitutional policing, while avoiding organizational failure that may lead to federal
oversight?

These questions frame the scope of the dissertation analysis.
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Literature Review
Title 42 U.S.C. § 14141
Often referred to as the 1994 crime act or crime bill (DOJ, 2010), after the Violent Crime
Control and Law Enforcement Act (VCCLEA) was passed into law, the federal government
announced:
[The VCCLEA] represents the bipartisan product of six years of hard work. It is the
largest crime bill in the history of the country and will provide for 100,000 new police
officers, $9.7 billion in funding for prisons and $6.1 billion in funding for prevention
programs….$2.6 billion in additional funding for the FBI, DEA, INS, United States
Attorneys, and other Justice Department components. (DOJ, 1994, para. 1)
Included in the VCCLEA, but not as a “significant provision of the bill” (DOJ, 1994,
para. 1), the police reform subsection known as the Law Enforcement Misconduct Statute 42
U.S.C. 14141, was the result of years-long effort to pass police accountability measures at the
federal level (Rushin, 2017). Although some scholars who have studied § 14141 directly relate
its passage to the events involving Rodney King and the LAPD in 1991 (Alpert, McLean, &
Wolfe, 2017; Douglass, 2017), the law’s genesis can be traced to findings made by the Kerner
Commission in 1968, and subsequent recommendations made by the United States Commission
on Civil Rights in the 1981 publication Who is guarding the guardians? A report on police
practices (DOJ, 2010). The momentum created by these commissions and their
recommendations helped to initiate necessary action on police accountability that coalesced after
the 1991 Rodney King incident, subsequent acquittal of four indicted LAPD officers, and the
rioting in Los Angeles that was followed by numerous hearings on police misconduct and
accountability held throughout the country in the early 1990s (DOJ, 2010; DOJ, 2017a).
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Following these events, § 14141 was passed by Congress in August 1994 as part of the
VCCLEA, and signed by President Bill Clinton on September 13, 1994 (Miller Center, 2018).
The law reads:
(a) Unlawful conduct[.] It shall be unlawful for any government authority, or any agent
thereof, or any person acting on behalf of a government authority, to engage in a pattern
or practice of conduct by law enforcement officers or by officials or employees of any
governmental agency with responsibility for the administration of juvenile justice or the
incarceration of juveniles that deprives persons of rights, privileges, or immunities
secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States. (b) Civil action by
Attorney General[.] Whenever the Attorney General has reasonable cause to believe that
a violation of paragraph (1)1 has occurred, the Attorney General, for or in the name of the
United States, may in a civil action obtain appropriate equitable and declaratory relief to
eliminate the pattern or practice. (U.S. Government Publishing Office, 2006)
The DOJ may initiate a § 14141 investigation when there is sufficient cause that a police
agency is engaging in a pattern or practice of systemic misconduct resulting in unconstitutional
policing or violations of federal law (DOJ, 2017a). Affirmative findings of unconstitutional
policing require a “reasonable cause to believe” (DOJ, 2017a, p. 15) standard that violations of
the Constitution or federal laws are not isolated events, but rather represent a pattern or practice
(DOJ, 2017a). Legal precedent is used to define and categorize a “pattern or practice” insofar as
the DOJ “does not need to find a set number of incidents” (Perez, 2013, p. 4), wherein a “pattern
or practice may be found by examples representing typical conduct, as opposed to isolated
incidents” (Perez, 2013, p. 4) that “appears to be part of usual practice, whether officially
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sanctioned by policy or otherwise” (DOJ, 2014, p. 3). Pattern or practice findings, therefore, do
not need to meet specific objective criteria for affirmation, and can be challenged in court.
The first § 14141 investigation commenced in May 1995 against the Torrance (CA)
Police Department (Childress, 2015; Rushin, 2017), and the most recent in December 2016
against the Orange County (CA) Sheriff’s Department (DOJ, 2017b). Between 1994 and 2017
there have been 69 § 14141 investigations, most of which supported findings of a pattern or
practice of unconstitutional policing, resulting in a specific legal settlement or agency agreement
between the law enforcement agency under investigation and the federal government (DOJ,
2017a). However, as indicated, 26 § 14141 investigations have been closed without formal
findings (DOJ, 2017a). Although accurate on its face, this statistic is misleading; 11 of those 26
investigations yielded technical assistance reports where the DOJ (2017b) memorialized and
made public, findings of systemic misconduct and organizational problems that did not, but had
the potential to rise to the level of a pattern or practice of unconstitutional policing if left
unaddressed. As well, one § 14141 investigation was dropped after initial findings of
unconstitutional policing (DOJ, 2017b).
Considering the federal government’s interpretation of § 14141 formal findings, it is
instructive to recognize that over the life of § 14141, 55 of the 69 § 14141 investigations have
resulted in some type of publicly available, verifiable, and memorialized agreement to reform
police practices that have led to, or were believed to have the potential to lead to patterns or
practices of unconstitutional policing.
The § 14141 process.
Prior to initiating an official investigation of a municipal police department, the DOJ
conducts what is known as a preliminary inquiry. These are confidential fact-finding actions that
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involve the monitoring and tracking of a specific police agency (PERF, 2013). At this stage, it is
not disclosed to the police agency in question that a § 14141 inquiry has been initiated (PERF,
2013). Consequently, complete and accurate data related to the number of preliminary inquiries
over the life of § 14141 are not publicly available. If at any time during the course of this
preliminary inquiry, the DOJ finds sufficient cause that a police agency is engaged in a pattern or
practice of systemic misconduct, unconstitutional policing, or violations of federal law, the
police agency is notified, concurrent with initiation of an official investigation.
A DOJ issued findings letter is the output of a § 14141 investigation wherein a pattern or
practice of unconstitutional policing has been revealed. The DOJ makes these findings letters
available to the police agency and the general public, detailing the results of their investigation
and describing policies, practices, procedures, systems, and operations in need of reform. Section
14141 investigations in which findings do not support that a police department is engaged in a
pattern or practice of unconstitutional policing, but significant operational deficiencies have been
noted, a non-binding technical assistance letter, or referrals to other federal assistance programs
may be offered to that police agency (DOJ, 2017a). Investigations that have led to technical
assistance have embedded findings in DOJ issued letters, whereas referrals to other federal
assistance programs do not elicit any publicly issued findings or comments.
A resultant § 14141 investigation, then, will generally follow one of three outcomes:
(1) An investigation that did not reveal any systemic misconduct or unconstitutional
policing; the DOJ will terminate the § 14141 action without the public issuance of findings or
enforcement action being taken against that police agency. 3

DOJ (2017a) has indicated that in some § 14141 investigations, “other forms of federal intervention are better
suited to address a particular law enforcement agency’s needs” (p. 7). These actions can include individual officer
prosecution, referral to the Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) or Office of Justice Programs
(DOJ, 2017a).
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(2) Investigative findings not supporting that a police department is engaged in a pattern
or practice of unconstitutional policing, but the DOJ has noted significant operational and
systemic deficiencies that have the potential for unconstitutional policing outcomes; non-binding
technical assistance may be offered.
(3) Investigative findings supporting that a police department is engaged in a pattern or
practice of unconstitutional policing, resulting in a specific type of negotiated settlement between
the DOJ and the offending police agency.
These three options do not necessarily suggest mutually exclusivity in § 14141
investigative outcomes. The DOJ retains the authority to initiate a new investigation, issue
multiple findings, pursue various outcomes over-time, or discontinue § 14141 actions after
adverse findings, and has done so with police agencies when deemed necessary and appropriate
(Childress, 2015; DOJ, 2010; DOJ, 2017a; DOJ, 2017b; Rushin, 2017).
After the DOJ has made known their investigative findings to both the police agency and
public, they then initiate a process towards reform, this process is described by the Civil Rights
Division as follows:
Where the Division has found evidence of a pattern or practice of police misconduct,
resolution generally will take the form of an order enforced by a federal court. These
orders are usually called ‘consent decrees,’ reflecting that the terms of the order were
negotiated and agreed to by the United States and the law enforcement agency that was
investigated. (DOJ, 2017a, p. 22)
Police departments that have been found to be engaged in a pattern or practice of
unconstitutional policing will have specific legal remedies taken against them initiating the
reform process; these include entering into a type of negotiated settlement, legal agreement,
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consent decree, or a memorandum of agreement (MOA). Police agencies can then choose to
litigate the findings or decide to settle the matter (Douglass, 2017). Six police agencies under §
14141 investigation have chosen the former option (DOJ, 2017a; Douglass, 2017), one of which
won at trial, however, that police agency along with the five other litigants ended up resolving
the § 14141 action against their agency in a negotiated settlement with the government at a later
time (Childress, 2015; DOJ, 2017a; Douglass, 2017).
Court enforceable actions, including consent decrees, and negotiated settlements are the
preferred remedy in § 14141 actions when an investigation reveals a pattern or practice of
unconstitutional policing (DOJ, 2017a). Alternatively, a MOA may be offered to a police agency
“when the issues to be addressed are relatively narrow and there is significant evidence that the
jurisdiction has the capacity to accomplish and sustain reform in a timely manner and without
ongoing court oversight” (DOJ, 2017a, p. 23).
Consent decrees, MOAs and court settlements are all considered “negotiated settlements”
(Harmon, 2009, p. 16), meaning a jurisdiction and the DOJ have agreed to adopt specific
remedial measures to address systemic failures. Specific types of negotiated settlements have
different force of law; for example, consent decrees and settlement agreements are contained
within, and enforceable by court order (Harmon, 2009), whereas MOAs are drafted as private
contracts between two parties, as such, the enforcement mechanism for a MOA is to sue for
breach of contract. However, the functionality of legal settlements and MOAs are the same; both
are the result of negotiation between parties that require institutional changes and reforms to
deficient policies, practices, procedures, systems, and organizational structures.
Considering their commonalities, and to standardize meaning for analysis, clarity, and
consistency, “negotiated settlement” will be used henceforth to include all § 14141 actions
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resulting in a MOA, legal settlement, court-enforceable agreement, settlement-agreement, or
consent decree. In a number of § 14141 actions involving municipal police, the DOJ sought to
terminate the negotiated settlement after a finding of a pattern or practice of unconstitutional
policing in favor of a transition agreement to more efficiently address remaining systemic
deficiencies and threats to constitutional policing within that law enforcement agency (DOJ,
2017a; DOJ, 2018). As such, transition agreements are in sum and substance the result of a §
14141 investigation where the government first established reasonable cause to believe that a
police agency was engaged in a pattern or practice of unconstitutional policing.
Differentiated from the standard meaning of a negotiated settlement, these transition
agreements may result from scenarios in which the police agency under investigation was found
to have made “significant reforms” (DOJ, 2018, p. 17) throughout the course of a § 14141 action.
When these reforms occur after a negotiated settlement has been reached, and the DOJ believes it
preferable to work with the police agency to continue reforms, they will seek permission of the
court to terminate the negotiated settlement (DOJ, 2018). This process helps facilitate a police
agency’s implementation of agreed-upon reforms while the government acknowledges “the
progress the agency has made toward effective constitutional policing” (DOJ, 2017a, p. 37).
Although the final agreement between the DOJ and the police agency in these transition
agreements was not a negotiated settlement or technical assistance, since the transition
agreement came after an investigative finding of unconstitutional policing, they too were
classified as negotiated settlements for the purpose of this study.
To assist with implementing the legal terms of a negotiated settlement, a monitoring team
is appointed to report, offer technical assistance, and lend their expertise to the offending police
agency, the DOJ, and assigned judge overseeing the negotiated settlement. A negotiated
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settlement will be terminated upon satisfactory implementation of institutional reforms after an
agreed-upon duration. At that point and moving forward, it becomes the responsibility of the
police agency to maintain and institutionalize those reforms without federal assistance.
As an alternative to entering into a negotiated settlement with a police agency, the DOJ
has on numerous occasions offered technical assistance when a § 14141 investigative finding
reveals operational or policy deficiencies contributing to systemic problems that do not rise to
the level of a pattern or practice unconstitutional policing (DOJ, 2010; DOJ 2017a). This type of
assistance has been described as “non-adversarial” (DOJ, 2018, p. 19), and seeks to address a
myriad of substantive-related organizational and operational issues through training, peer-to-peer
consultation, data analysis, strategic planning, and curriculum development (Bureau of Justice
Assistance, National Training and Technical Assistance Center, n.d.).
Academic Literature
Although federal authority to investigate and enter into a reform agreement with
municipal law enforcement agencies has been in force since 1994, a dearth of quantitative or
qualitative studies exist on its empirical effectiveness (Chappell, 2017). These deficiencies were
recognized as recently as 2017 in which calls were made for greater research on a practice that
has been “shrouded in secrecy” (Alpert, McLean, & Wolfe, 2017, p. 240). As a result,
criminologists have paid very little attention to § 14141 and its impact on police (Alpert, et al.,
2017). In addition to academics, legal scholars have noted the lack of research on this topic,
acknowledging that “very little scholarship in any discipline has empirically analyzed structural
police reform. And virtually no legal scholarship has done an empirical examination of the topic”
(Rushin, 2014, p. 3215). This is all the more troubling considering § 14141 has been referred to
by scholars in the legal community as “the most important legal initiative of the past twenty
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years in the sphere of police regulation” (Stuntz, 2006, p. 781), and “perhaps the most promising
mechanism” (Armacost, 2003 p. 457) to reduce systemic police misconduct.
The first academic study of § 14141 was conducted five years after the City of Pittsburgh
and the DOJ entered into a consent decree. As part of the settlement’s evaluative process, Vera
Institute of Justice (Vera) and the Office of Community Oriented Policing Services sought
lessons to be learned by performing “in-depth interviews with police officials, the monitor,
police officers, union members, OMI staff, human rights activists and community leaders”
(Davis, Ortiz, Henderson, Miller, & Massie, 2002, p. 8). Additionally, Vera surveyed hundreds
of Pittsburgh residents and solicited opinions from the general public to gain a better sense of
community awareness and perceptions of change in policing during the period of reform
implementation (Davis, et al., 2002).
Vera found that the Pittsburgh negotiated settlement was “generally viewed as a success
in terms of increasing police accountability and improving officer training” (Davis, et al., 2002,
p. 3). However, the researchers noted that there were complaints from officers regarding a
“decline in morale, an increase in paperwork, and a reluctance to engage in enforcement actions”
(Davis, et al., 2002, p. 3). With this first report, thus began the scholarship orientation of § 14141
that has since followed; implementation analyses and post-hoc assessments.
In 2005, Vera conducted a follow up to their original report on the Pittsburgh decree;
building off earlier findings, Vera sought to answer the central question: “Can local officials
maintain these reforms after the federal government and its monitor withdraw?” (Davis,
Henderson, & Ortiz, 2005, p. 2). To assess the lasting impact of this § 14141 settlement, Vera
used a variety of methodologies including qualitative focus groups with community members,
interviews with public officials, and reviews of police policies and operations. Vera’s assessment
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led them to conclude that a negotiated settlement “could engender substantial accountability
reforms in a short time and that the reforms would survive the life of the decree intact” (Davis, et
al., 2005, p. 41).
As of 2005, there were indications that federal intervention could work to bring about
short and long-term change in American police agencies. As promising as these findings first
appeared, a longer view of federal intervention has not produced such optimism. Indeed,
regarding sustainability, Alpert, McLean, and Wolfe (2017) have concluded that “there is some
anecdotal information about positive, short-term impacts of CDs [consent decrees], but there is
no convincing evidence that there are long-term improvements in the agency” (p. 243). Similar
concerns over post-termination sustained viability and agency backsliding have been raised by
numerous scholars who have studied § 14141 (Chanin, 2015; Keenan & Walker, 2005;
Simmons, 2008; Walker, 2012). Such backsliding served to justify the DOJ’s initiation of a
second § 14141 investigation against the Miami Police Department (Perez, 2013), and the
Cleveland Police Bureau, both specifically for failing to institutionalize and sustain agreed-upon
reforms (Gupta & Dettelbach, 2014).
A core problem identified by scholars of § 14141 agreements who have studied postreform implementation is that institutional changes in police organizations are not self-sustaining
(Chanin, 2015). This issue was manifestly acknowledged and made known to the general public,
not by police scholars, but when The New York Times reported of the follow-up to § 14141
Pittsburgh decree, announcing: “It Did Not Stick: The First Federal Effort to Curb Police Abuse”
(Stolberg, 2017).
More recent than Vera’s second report on the Pittsburgh consent decree, an assessment of
changes in the Los Angeles Police Department during consent decree implementation was
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undertaken by Stone, Foglesong, and Cole (2009). Using participant observation, analysis of
police data, surveys of police officers, and focus group interviews, the researchers concluded that
there was a “staggering scale of change” (p. 75), and after eight years since the initiation of the
consent decree:
The LAPD of today is a changed organization. Within Los Angeles, community
engagement and partnership is part of the mainstream culture of the Department. Not
everyone embraces it, and not everyone practices it, but the commanders we observed
take relationships with communities seriously as an essential part of their work. The
precise forms that accountability takes remain subjects of intense debate, but the fact of
accountability has entered the lifeblood of the organization. (p. 76)
As positive as these findings appeared at that time, the researchers advise caution in light
of fundamental questions regarding sustained improvements after decree termination.
Specifically, their criticisms were directed at the strength and durability of management systems
and oversight initiated under the decree. These concerns over sustainability echo those that
became realized in the Pittsburgh, Cleveland, and Miami § 14141 agreements (Gupta &
Dettelbach, 2014, Perez, 2013, Stolberg, 2017).
More recent than the report on the LAPD, and both studies of the Pittsburgh negotiated
settlement conducted by Vera, Chanin (2014a) conducted an analysis of the lasting effects and
continued compliance of § 14141 negotiated settlements for five police agencies (Pittsburgh,
Washington, D.C., Prince George’s County, Los Angeles, Cincinnati). Using a mixedmethodological design, the researcher found that the success of creating institutional change
within police departments was varied, concluding that “these findings highlight the challenge
jurisdictions face in working to institutionalize reform” (Chanin, 2014a, p. 109). This issue has
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been noted by other scholars as well, such as Skogan, (2008) who suggests that reforming a
police department, and holding police agencies responsible for institutionalizing changes are
more complex and nuanced tasks than academics, politicians and the informed public imagine.
Scholars have recently moved beyond measuring implementation outcomes and
institutionalized sustainability of § 14141. One recent example involves a study conducted by
Powell, Meitl, and Worrall (2017) in which the researchers sought to explore the relationship
between the number of lawsuits filed for civil rights violations against police officials before and
after a § 14141 action. For this study, § 1983 lawsuits were used as a proxy to measure the
success of a consent decree in reducing patterns or practices of unconstitutional policing. These
results suggest that a consent decree may reduce the likelihood of federal civil rights lawsuits
against a police agency, but by how much, and under what conditions remained unclear. As well,
there were two significant methodological limitations in the study design, one of which involved
their choice of a control, the other concern was related to the internal validity of the measure.
These criticisms notwithstanding, their technique offered scholars new insights into how a
consent decree can change police behavior, while adding to methodologies used to measure the
impact of § 14141 to initiate and sustain structural police reform.
Other examples of scholars moving beyond implementation studies of § 14141 involve
assessing the relationship between § 14141 and changes in police behavior related to levels of
enforcement activity (Chanin & Sheats, 2017; Rushin & Edwards, 2017). Concerning § 14141
intervention on officer behavior, for example, Rushin and Edwards (2017) found that “the
introduction of external regulation to a police department via a § 14141 action was associated
with a statistically significant increase in the frequency of several crime categories” (p. 758)
albeit temporarily, and immediately subsequent to § 14141 intervention. The researchers in this

23

study found support for the idea that police officers in agencies under a consent decree and
federal control, are more likely to engage in “‘de-policing’-retreating from active police work in
reaction to the negative publicity that has been placed on police agencies across the country”
(Shjarback, Pyrooz, Wolfe, & Decker, 2017, p. 42). These empirical findings support the
qualitative assessments that were made by researchers in both the Pittsburgh and LAPD
implementation studies regarding the perspective of rank-and-file officers, and their suggestion
that § 14141 will lead to less effective policing. Yet, other scholars disagree with the de-policing
phenomenon, for example, Chanin and Sheats (2017) using a more limited study sample than
Rushin and Edwards (2017), found no evidence supporting that de-policing is an unintended
consequence on police behavior in agencies subject to a § 14141 action.
Emerging literature on DOJ’s process.
Recently some scholars have begun to offer insights that describe DOJ’s § 14141
investigative process (Chanin, 2017; Chanin, 2014a; Rushin, 2017). Yet, how and why the DOJ
chose a specific police agency to investigate and proceed into a negotiated settlement remains an
open question. Noting this gap, Chappell (2017) asserts that “there is no systematic approach for
identifying problematic police departments” (p. 572). Indeed, in discussing methods to improve
outcomes for § 14141 negotiated settlements by identifying the most troubled police
departments, Harmon (2017) suggests that decision-making seems to have been mostly based on
a combination of informed judgments and intuition, commenting; “the Department of Justice is
more likely to notice and sue a department that seems to have a serious pattern of misconduct if
it is especially large or its problem is especially salient” (p. 620). Yet there are no studies that
seek to explore the ex-ante conditions that gave rise to a § 14141 investigation and subsequent
reform agreement.
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It wasn’t until 2017 that the process in which § 14141 actions proceed was publicly
detailed. In the report; The Civil Rights Division’s Pattern and Practice Police Reform Work:
1994-Present, the DOJ described much of what had been unknown to scholars and practitioners
regarding § 14141 enforcement. Although moving towards transparency, the DOJ did not specify
a rationale for their choices beyond qualitative descriptions, or explain how their decisions and
choices regarding enforcement were made. As described in their technical reports, § 14141
investigative processes follow the contours of structured reform described by Bertelli (2004), and
as such, merely comports with what is already known about traditional structural reform models.
Nor did the DOJ offer any explanation of how or why they chose a particular police agency for a
preliminary inquiry, preferring to keep the specifics of this process confidential.
Enforcement of § 14141 appears to have been beset by challenges related to the scope
and scale of law enforcement in the United States. Choosing among the multitude of agencies
that have the potential to be the next § 14141 investigation appears to be overwhelming to the
federal government; in their own words: “[The] Division’s police reform strategy is not, and
cannot be, premised on an effort to investigate every police department in need of reform” (DOJ,
2017a, p. 4). However, the DOJ must somehow identify among thousands of potential police
agencies to investigate for systemic violations, the agency has stated of this process:
[The] staff in the Civil Rights Division regularly examine information available to the
Division, including publicly available information and confidential information provided
to the Division by witnesses and complainants, to conduct preliminary inquiries into
whether law enforcement agencies may be engaging in a pattern or practice of police
misconduct…it regularly receives complaints from affected community members and
families, advocacy groups, prosecutors and defense attorney, judges, legislators, and
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police officers with knowledge of misconduct…the Division also conducts its own
research to identify potential subjects for investigation…reviewing investigative reports
by academics, review panels, and journalists; monitoring existing lawsuits involving law
enforcement agencies; tracking complaints received over time by the Division; and
consulting with persons and organizations likely to have relevant information about
policing issues around the country. (DOJ, 2017a, pp. 5-6)
While all of this is useful, it does not better inform researchers, the public, or police
practitioners how “hundreds of preliminary inquiries” (DOJ, 2017a, p. 5) lead to a negotiated
settlement with so few police departments while other police agencies remain uninvestigated,
dropped after a preliminary inquiry, or never rise to the level of requiring a preliminary inquiry.
Given the need to select among 18,000 agencies to investigate, the DOJ (2017a) has to
“prioritize, the national context” (p. 6), and determine “whether the allegations represent an
emerging or developing issue, such that reforms could have an impact beyond the primary
objective of eliminating constitutional violations in the specific law enforcement agency” (DOJ,
2017a, p. 6). From this policy statement, it can be inferred that decisions made regarding § 14141
pattern or practice investigations, are in part based off a general deterrence (Beccaria, 1764) and
incrementalist decision-making approach (Lindblom, 1979). That is, the DOJ seeks out police
agencies to serve as examples of unconstitutional policing, with an awareness that special
attention be paid to the complexity of the problems and proposed reforms both for a specific
police agency, and as a model for other police departments. This overall strategy is consistent
with what Harmon (2009) refers to as a “worst-first” policy (p. 4).
This has led some scholars to suggest that § 14141 “enforcement is driven by a
complicated mixture of politics, policy, and legal discretion” (Harmon, 2017, p. 622) still, “no
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consistent technique exists for identifying problematic police departments” (Powell, et al., 2017,
p. 579). Although the specifics of their decision-making remain opaque to the general public, the
DOJ has described the basic investigative process they follow, and has shed light on their
motivations for doing so. These insights allow researchers to further explore § 14141 decisionmaking, and better understand the conditions that may lead a municipal police agency into a
negotiated settlement from an ex-ante perspective – which has yet to be done.
Negotiated settlements.
Court orders that are used to initiate structural reform can come in a variety of legal
frameworks. These legal frameworks can broadly be described as negotiated settlements; two of
which – consent decrees and memoranda of agreement – are variations of the type of negotiated
settlement that are regularly used after a § 14141 investigation. These two particular types of
negotiated settlements have been found to have specific advantages over other types of legal
actions since “a city does not admit liability, but nevertheless agrees to adopt specific remedial
measures to end the matter and avoid litigation” (Harmon, 2009, p. 16). Court orders, including
legal settlements, consent decrees, and MOAs have been referred to as influential government
output that helps drive social change in the public sphere (Schlanger, 2006). These binding
agreements allow the federal government to initiate structural changes in a government agency
by force of law when necessary, whereas using alternative mechanisms, reforms may not have
been possible because of organizational resistance.
Using negotiated settlements and courts to initiate organizational change in public
agencies did not begin with § 14141. In a review of negotiated settlements related to employment
discrimination, Schwarzschild (1984) informs that “the federal courts have increasingly become
the forum for litigation over the policies of large public and private institutions” (p. 887), noting
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that the use of injunctive relief by the federal government “first became prominent in antitrust
cases” (p. 888). Since then, structural reform litigation has been widely used to initiate
institutional and organizational reform in “education, voting, housing, and prisons” (Harmon,
2009, p. 11).
Scholars have cited the landmark desegregation case Brown v. Board of Education (1954)
as an example of the impact that structural reform litigation can have on government practices,
institutions, and society (Schlanger, 2006; Schwarzschild, 1984). Soon after the Brown case,
structural reform litigation was viewed with great potential because it “authorized district judges
to assess the need for, order, and oversee sweeping changes not only to schools but the full range
of important governmental institutions” (Schlanger, 2006, p. 552). Viewed from this perspective,
constitutional violations perpetrated by local government institutions that are unable, or
unwilling to abide by constitutionally permissible practices, provide the government sufficient
and necessary justification for federal intervention.
Consent decrees in the criminal justice system.
Since the onset of civil litigation against jails and prisons in the 1960s, court orders and
consent decrees have been widely used in correctional contexts to address “nearly all aspects of
prison and jail life” (Schlanger, 2006, p. 564). These orders have been found to have had an
enormous impact “by direct regulation, their indirect effects, and the shadow they cast” (p. 563).
The potential for reform outside of a correctional context has been particularly appealing as a
mechanism for reforming municipal police departments because:
A remedy designed to reform the workings of a large organization is most effective when
the organization cooperates in carrying out the remedy, and the human beings who make
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up an institution are more apt to cooperate in carrying out a negotiated scheme than in
complying with an order imposed from above by a court (Schwarzschild, 1984, p. 899).
Scholars who study the impact of consent decrees on public organizations suggest that
“over time, structural reform litigation has created significant and recognizable change” (Bertelli,
2004, p. 29). As well, it is assumed these types of reform agreements will do so for police
organizations because “consent decrees remedy unconstitutional policing by providing specific,
detailed guidance to the subject police department on how to remedy its past unlawful practices
and provide for accountability” (Douglass, 2017, p. 329).
Practitioner Perspectives
Concerning federal intervention in local police matters, no consensus opinion has
emerged from police leaders whether those opinions were from leaders whose agency was
subject to § 14141 or otherwise. Some police leaders whose agencies have been through the §
14141 process viewed it opportunistically, from a perspective that a § 14141 action can be useful
for the police profession in identifying best practices that can then be applied to their specific
agency (PERF, 2013). Additionally, § 14141 has been viewed by some police leaders as the
necessary ingredient to secure the support of the public to initiate much needed organizational
reform (Kohler, 2014). Such was the case that occurred in Pittsburgh, wherein the Police Chief
used federal oversight and intervention as a strategy to force “reforms that he supported and that
otherwise could be stymied by police labor unions” (PERF, 2013, p. 2). Similarly, police leaders
have suggested that using the § 14141 process as leverage can be useful to “get resources your
department needs” (PERF, 2013, p. 34), which then may lead to a better police organization
(Prince George County Chief Magaw, 2015, reported in Kelly, Childress, & Rich, 2015).
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Other police leaders who view § 14141 positively have used the provision for the purpose
of external review. Police Chief Charles Ramsey, who on two occasions with different municipal
police departments, requested that the DOJ conduct an investigation and consider federal
intervention, believing that the § 14141 process will benefit organizational performance (PERF,
2013). Similar to actions taken by Chief Ramsey, Chief Raul Martinez of the Miami Police
Department requested a § 14141 investigation after a series of controversial police shootings
(Perez, 2013), and Chief Michael Chitwood of the Portland, Maine Police Department requested
an investigation of his department’s policies and procedures to help remedy ongoing operational
dysfunction (Brown Cutlar, 2003).
Opinions regarding the utility of § 14141 have not stopped at police leadership; political
leaders such as the Mayor of New Orleans, Mitch Landrieu, and the Mayor of Portland, Sam
Adams, have reached out to the DOJ for assistance with their police agencies for guidance in
constitutional policing under § 14141. Mayor Landrieu later pushed-back against the DOJ’s
findings because of expected costs (Robertson, 2013), while Portland’s political and police
leadership demonstrated a willingness to collaborate and remedy organizational deficiencies
(Perez & Marshall, 2012). As well, the City of Austin, Texas, represented by the City Manager,
and Chief of Police requested a § 14141 review after a local newspaper reported an unflattering
analysis of the Austin Police Department’s use of force (Futrell & Knee, 2005).
Arguments against federal intervention both by police and political leaders have revolved
around three particular issues found problematic to the police agency and parent jurisdiction; loss
of autonomy, costs, and stigma. An example of this occurred at the completion of the New
Orleans investigation wherein the City of New Orleans claimed that DOJ’s required changes
would cause “catastrophic damage” to the city budget (Robertson, 2013). New Orleans was not
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the only city that raised what was perceived to be excessive financial costs as a justification for
pushback against § 14141 intervention, for example:
In cities like Detroit and New Orleans, officials have railed at the high cost of the Justice
Department’s reform plans, including the multi-million-dollar fees paid to the monitors
who make sure local officials comply with federal mandates. Elsewhere, some local
officials have simply refused to accept what they view as meddlesome dictates, preferring
to fight the demands for change in federal court. (Weichselbaum, 2015, p. 2)
Another criticism that police leaders have articulated regarding § 14141 enforcement
involves the stigma associated with federal oversight, which “takes a long time to overcome in
the community” (PERF, 2010, p. 3). Even with § 14141 associated stigma, some police leaders
have suggested that while it is important to accept the inevitability of federal intervention under
§ 14141, their critique was that as a matter of fairness, police leaders should be “appraised of an
investigation and become involved earlier rather than later in the process” (PERF, 2010, p. 3),
suggesting that a loss of autonomy, and exclusion from the § 14141 process is more problematic
to the police agency than the associated stigma. These critiques notwithstanding, for some police
leaders, federal intervention has simply been described as “cumbersome, expensive, overly
adversarial, and time-consuming” (PERF, 2013, p. 37).
Rank-and-file police officers supported by their union representatives have frequently
opposed federal intervention and police reform efforts for a myriad of reasons. Keenan and
Walker (2005) point to the use of statutory law by police unions to create legal barriers to
proposed organizational and work changes. Skogan (2008) points to a number of reasons why
reform efforts involving the police fail, including generalized internal resistance and
organizational support including that of the rank-and-file. Simmons (2008) makes a point to
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acknowledge that excluding those closest, and most responsible for implementing proposed
reforms is contrary to democratic inclusion. This last critique, ipso facto, justified rank-and-file
and union resistance to reform in many of the early § 14141 investigations of municipal police.
Police scholars have noted that union resistance to federal oversight and blocking
important reform efforts have had a noteworthy history in the U.S. (Emmanuel, 2016; Walker
2008; Walker, 2016), pointing out that resistance by unions typically involves filing motions in
federal court to block federally-initiated reforms (Bernstein, 2012). In contrast, other police
unions have “voiced their displeasure with their exclusion from DOJ’s reform process”
(Simmons, 2008, p. 523). Some other police unions, including the Fraternal Order of Police,
have sought to play a more active role in the negotiation process (Khan, 2016). The importance
of this active role has been noted by Simmons (2008) who argues that excluding those closest to
the reforms is “contrary to the general principal of democratic theory that those affected by
government policies should be able to participate in the decision-making process” (p. 520).
In the review of the LAPD agreement conducted by Stone, Foglesong, and Cole (2009),
researchers found that “ubiquitous among police officers of every rank, that the consent decree
has burdened the police with increased paperwork and recordkeeping” (p. 13). Often the basis for
union resistance is the belief that reform agreements and oversight will make officers “less active
and aggressive in fighting crime” (Davis, et al., 2005, executive summary). These perspectives
were noted by the president of the Albuquerque Police Officers Association who claimed that
“many beat cops – some already skeptical of the push for more transparency and accountability –
see an inefficient system of red tape that keeps them off the streets while they fill out paperwork
for various oversight authorities” (Wing & Domrzalski, 2017, pp. 6-7).
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Finally, there have been many police leaders who have expressed frustration at the lack
of assistance from the current DOJ in matters related to local law enforcement and the
collaborative reform of local police (Eder, Protess, & Dewan, 2017). Although not requesting
investigation and oversight under § 14141, police leaders in Spokane, Washington; Fort Pierce,
Florida; Tucson, Arizona; Tulsa, Oklahoma; and St. Louis County, Missouri have gone on record
to suggest that collaborative policing efforts between the federal government and local police,
with guidance in matters related to constitutional policing, are out of step with a growing
consensus that rebuilding community trust is essential to crime reduction (Elder, et al., 2017),
supporting the idea that federal assistance in local police matters can benefit police
organizations, police leadership, rank-and-file, and the public being served.
Criticisms
Despite the historical use of negotiated settlements to initiate change in the area of civil
rights, not all scholars have viewed this tool without criticism (Douglass, 2017; Ross & Parke,
2009). In a review of consent decrees and federal involvement in local government
organizations, Scott (2017) points out that “the history of direct federal involvement in reforming
state and local institutions, across a variety of occupational realms, is not one of unqualified
success” (p. 611). Indeed, there are many issues that scholars of consent decrees, and federal
regulation of the police have raised, some of which are fundamental to the meaning of ordered
liberty rather than disagreements over how well a law is being implemented. A critique of §
14141 in this spirit is offered by Ross and Parke (2009) who warn that there are “several reasons
for caution and skepticism” (p. 202). Their warning is not based on the effectiveness of
implementation, rather it is directed at the role the federal government plays in local matters,
particularly “in a country founded on the principle of federalism” (p. 203).

33

Scholars have also raised concerns over § 14141 negotiation transparency as exemplified
by a shifting of power away from the people and their elected representatives to the courts and
the federal government, in addition to the information asymmetry that exists between the police
as a profession and the general public (Douglass, 2017). Observing that the process of federal
intervention and negotiation by its very nature happens in secret behind closed doors, Ross and
Parke (2009) suggest; “[results in] the government failing to represent the public as a whole” (p.
203). Further supporting this argument, Chanin (2017) points out that the process of negotiating
in the early stages of a consent decree are particularly problematic, characterized by
disproportionate power structures, exacerbating unequal negotiations between the DOJ and local
jurisdiction, suggesting; “the DOJ’s early reputation for heavy-handedness and an unnecessarily
adversarial approach to the investigation process” (p. 260) was not unjustified.
These inequalities in negotiations and perceived power shifts have frequently engendered
animosity between the local jurisdiction and the federal government as local police departments
are forced into federal compliance (Powell, Meitl, & Worrall, 2017). Indeed, the power structure
that exists between the federal government’s resources and that of a local police agency make the
negotiation process between the two parties “uneven from the start” (Ross & Parke, 2009, p.
206). Embedded within this resource asymmetry argument is a cost-effectiveness criticism,
similar to that offered by Scott (2017), who argues that enforcing compliance with a local agency
is costly for both the federal government, and agency being sued. As such, “the taxpaying public
might reasonably expect a more significant return on investment” (p. 609) than what is being
realized.
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Gaps in the Literature
A review of the extant literature reveals that until recently, scholars have taken a post-hoc
approach to studying § 14141 actions. Conducting an implementation study of § 14141 implicitly
acknowledges that a police agency was engaged in a pattern or practice of unconstitutional
policing, yet the very meaning of this term has not been fully operationalized. Understanding,
defining, and practicing constitutional policing is an acute problem in the United States where
policing is decentralized (Douglass, 2017). As asserted by PERF (2015), constitutional policing
is at its most fundamental, “legal policing” (p. 1), however, this term is too “often used in a
limited context” (p. 3), as “discussions about constitutional policing occur only ‘after the fact’”
(p. 3). The lack of clarity in the meaning of constitutional policing, and questions regarding what
type of credible measures should be used to assess this construct, have plagued the study and
utilization of § 14141 since its passage (Harmon, 2017).
Implicit in PERF’s (2015) argument over the meaning of “legal policing” and “after the
fact” analysis is that greater internal scrutiny may help preclude organizational and operational
deficiencies before they cascade into unconstitutional practices. As evidence of this point of
view, PERF (2015) comments that “forward-thinking police leaders are reviewing their policies
and practices to ensure that they not only promote community policing and crime reduction, but
also advance the broad constitutional goal of protecting everyone’s civil liberties and providing
equal protection under the law” (p. 3). This statement and perspective can be interpreted as a call
by PERF to help provide police leadership with the requisite knowledge to assist in ensuring
constitutional policing.
All of this supports the notion that there is both a significant knowledge gap regarding §
14141, and a practical need to have that gap filled, as there is not any literature that attempts to
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explore, examine, or analyze conditions that existed in a municipal police department prior to a §
14141 investigation. As such, the tools and knowledge that forward-thinking police leaders, and
scholars could use to promote constitutional policing, remain unstudied and elusive.
Final Thoughts on the Literature
What stands out most in the literature is the lack of research that attempts to describe,
explore, or explain the conditions surrounding a police department that may have led to a §
14141 action, and what can be done with that information. Consider § 14141 actions as a process
for a moment; that process consists of a predecision (preliminary inquiry-investigation), decision
(investigative findings), agreement (negotiated settlement), implementation (monitoring and
reporting), compliance (agreement termination), and results (sustainability). This process has
been studied and reported in the literature with one exception, the earliest part, that is, the
predecision to decision. This lacuna made for an apt, compelling, and necessary study; as has
been noted by scholars of § 14141: “[T]here remains a descriptive gap in the literature on the
process by which the DOJ currently identifies cities engaged in a pattern or practice of police
misconduct” (Rushin, 2014, p. 3218).
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Theoretical Framework
Theory Integration
Exploring and understanding the enforcement of § 14141 by the federal government
against municipal police presents a unique problem in criminal justice, public policy, and public
administration. It is an enforcement action taken against a government agency at one level, by a
government agency within another level of government for the purpose of constitutional and
legal compliance, while also involving complex agency decision-making and purposeful
selection of a specified municipal police agency.
Since an established criticism of § 14141 enforcement against municipal police is that
federal intervention of local police contravenes constitutional directive, ipso facto, it was
imperative that the examination of § 14141 against municipal police encompassed a range of
methodology and theory to address this problem. In doing so, three theories were applied to
assist in answering this study’s research questions. As such, multiple streams formed the
overarching theoretical framework, and thereby supported by disjointed incrementalism and
deterrence.
These three theories have been selected to support core components of this dissertation.
These components involve the identification of variables within a framework contributing to §
14141 selection, a description of how the agency responsible for identifying and investigating
police agencies applies its legal mandate over-time, and a description of how § 14141 findings
can be used as prescriptive measures in the law enforcement community to prevent
unconstitutional policing, and potential federal intervention.
Multiple Streams
Public policy theory provides a lens in which the world of governmental decision-making
and organizational rationality can be explored. John Kingdon’s (1995) multiple streams (MS) is a
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public policy framework that allows scholars to understand the phenomenon of organizational
decision-making, and the variety of factors that influence policy and agenda decisions, ex ante.
Rationale.
At its core, the MS framework is a policy process model that explores governmental
decision-making among infinite choices in “organized anarchies” (Kingdon, 1995, p. 84). In its
original construction, MS describes how specific policy options, which may have lain dormant,
rise to agenda status when its three streams converge, whereby some action is taken to promote a
specific policy choice over an alternative. As applied to government decision-making at the
organizational level, this same construct applies. The DOJ, as part and parcel of the federal
government, does not make decisions in a vacuum. Actionable, decision-making in public
organizations is suffused with both rationality and values. Using terminology from public policy
theory, organizational decision-making regarding which items, or in the case of this study,
municipal police departments, become actionable under § 14141 is not wholly rationalcomprehensive or post-positivistic (Smith & Larimer, 2013). Rather, decision-making at the
organizational level is a combination of the two.
Implicit in Kingdon’s framework is that policy choices are imbued with values, and those
values support decisions based on objective conditions. To illustrate; a focusing event can
illuminate problems within a public organization. A close examination of that focusing event
may lead to the discovery of a faulty policy. Problems and faulty policies are quantifiable in MS
through a rational-comprehensive lens by measuring size, scope, impact, and cost-benefit.
Values support which problems or faulty policies are worth paying attention to over others.
When applying MS to § 14141 actions using the above reasoning, this study will show
that the DOJ pays special attention to problems and policies that generate widespread attention,
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are technically feasible, have value acceptability, conform to the political environment and
national mood. All of these; problems, policies and politics, are accounted for in the MS
framework. As such, this framework was used to explore and explain how the convergence of
the three streams in the context of municipal police agency practices, and environmental
conditions, facilitates the initiation of a § 14141 action. This knowledge, then, can be used by
police leadership to initiate necessary policy change within their agencies.
The MS framework “theorizes at the systemic level” (Zahariadis, 2007, p. 66) and uses
“predecisions” (Kingdon, 1995, p. 1), meaning the entire system (Zahariadis, 2007), as the unit
of analysis. In doing so, MS provides a lens to examine government decision-making policy
retrospectively, which made it particularly applicable for this dissertation. The strength of the
MS framework has been noted by scholars such as Larkin (1996), who has asserted:
There is no shortage of examples in numerous federal policy fields to illustrate the
operation of Kingdon’s theory…the criminal justice field, however, is a particularly
inviting subject. The reason is that, short of sending the nation to war, the most intrusive
action that the federal government can take against any person is to imprison or execute a
convicted defendant for a crime. Judicious implementation of sound criminal justice
policy also is a cornerstone to any successful political society, since there is no more
elementary duty that government has than to protect public safety. And there is no
shortage of controversial criminal justice issues potentially subject to illumination by
Kingdon’s theory. (p. 9)
Although Kindgon’s framework is most well known as a theory of the policy process in
terms of agenda setting, MS has been widely used to explore decision-making within national,
sub-national, and international government contexts (Cairney & Jones, 2016), and is considered
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a “flagship framework for explaining agenda setting, policy making, and policy implementation”
(Rawat & Morris, 2016, p. 627). As an example of its prominence, the MS framework has been
applied in a variety of policy fields including transportation, the environment, energy, law
enforcement, arms-control, health and transportation (Rawat & Morris, 2016). In the field of
criminal justice, researchers have applied the MS framework to explore the rise and fall of prison
privatization (Culp, 2005), drug policy process in Australia (Lancaster, Ritter, & Colebatch,
2014), “three strikes” legislation (Saint-Germain & Calamia, 1996), antiterrorism policy and the
death penalty (Larkin, 2012), police privatization in the United Kingdom (White, 2014), and the
adoption of emergency management policies in Canada (Henstra, 2010). As this dissertation
focuses its analysis on decision-making by the DOJ in matters related to unconstitutional
policing at the municipal level, MS provided a particularly suitable fit for guiding the project
forward.
Structural Elements and Processes.
Described as theorizing “from the macro to the micro” (Zahariadis, 2007, p. 68) by
subsuming three independent streams flowing through a system, to which, when there is
convergence, presents an opportunity for a policy decision, or policy output. The three streams
are the problem, policy, and political streams (Kingdon, 1995), each with their own
operationalization. The policy output resulting from the convergence of the three streams is
described by Kingdon (1995) in a temporal order; a “problem is recognized, a solution is
developed and available in the policy community, a political change makes it the right time for
policy change, and political constraints are not severe” (p. 165).
Convergence of the three streams brings together two additional structural elements
leading to a policy output; policy windows and policy entrepreneurs. These two structural
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elements describe processes of the MS framework. As informed by Kingdon (1995), policy
windows are limited-time opportunities that allow for the initiation of policy action at critical
moments. These windows are opened by “compelling problems or by events in the political
stream” (Zahariadis, 2007, p. 74), and are coupled by the appropriate policy makers and
stakeholders (Kingdon, 1995). The successful union of these elements results in specific type of
output. The policy output for this research is DOJ’s § 14141 investigative outcome, presented in
a publicly issued findings letter that identifies and describes the extent to which a police agency
is engaged in patterns or practices of unconstitutional policing. The conceptualization of the MS
framework, as applied to this dissertation is presented as an iterative process in Figure 1.
As such, Kingdon’s multiple streams formed the overarching framework that allows for
both an exploratory and explanatory analysis of § 14141 enforcement against municipal police
agencies engaged in unconstitutional policing, assisting to answer research questions 5 and 6:
How does the DOJ identify a specific municipal police agency engaged in unconstitutional
policing? How can § 14141 support police departments to practice constitutional policing?
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Problem Stream
• Focusing Events
• System Indicators
• Feedback (News
Reports)

Policy Window
• Coupling
• Decision-making
• Opportunity
• Negotiation

Decision & Output
• Negotiated Settlement
• Technical Assistance

Political Stream
• Administrative
Turnover
• National Mood

Policy Stream
• Value
Acceptability
• Technical
Feasibility

Policy Entrepreneurs
• DOJ Investigators
• Community
Groups
• Command Staff
• Police Union
Representatives
• Oversight
Commissions

Figure 1: Multiple Streams Theoretical Framework Applied to § 14141
Operationalization: problem stream.
Three core elements make up the problem stream, these include; focusing events,
indicators, and feedback. In the MS framework, focusing events are crises that can bring an issue
to the forefront for policymakers and governmental agencies; examples include “a crisis or
disaster that comes along to call attention to the problem, a powerful symbol that catches on”
(Kingdon, 1995, pp. 94-95). As well, a focusing event is known as a “Triggering Event”,
described by Chanin (2014b) thusly:
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It is not uncommon for a seemingly random occurrence-for example, a critical op-ed
newspaper article written…an inmate taken to a local hospital with severe injuries
inflicted by police officers-to bring attention to government policies or behaviors that
potentially violate constitutional law. (p. 281)
Considering these descriptions, the operationalization of a focusing event for this study
was the identification of a high-profile event(s) involving a specific municipal police agency in
the three years prior to a § 14141 investigation. This event must have been: either explicitly
recognized by the DOJ, alluded to by the DOJ in their § 14141 documents, or publicly reported
in such a way that in the aggregate, represents a singular problem to that municipal police
agency. This operationalization is supported by DOJ’s policy and decision-making language
regarding high-profile events insofar as “individual incidents may suggest a systemic problem,
and often, therefore, comprise part of the information the Division relies upon to justify opening
an investigation” (DOJ, 2017a, p. 10).
The second core element in the problem stream is referred to as indicators. Indicators
consist of activities and events used to “assess the magnitude of a problem and to become aware
of changes in the problem” (Kingdon, 1995, p. 91). Indicators can take the form of any number
of activities; using Kingdon’s (1995) studies, some examples of indicators include “highway
deaths, disease rates, immunization rates, consumer prices, commuter and intercity
ridership...infant mortality rates, and many others” (p. 90). As noted by Zahariadis (2007)
“indicators can be monitored either routinely or through special studies” (p. 79), and as Kingdon
(1995) describes, there is a “need for indicators, particularly quantitative measures” (p. 93).
One way that municipal police departments monitor indicators for both individual and
organizational performance is through early warning systems, also referred to as early
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intervention systems (EIS) (Walker, Milligan, & Berke, 2005). These systems have been
described as a “data-based police management tool designated to identify problematic behavior
and allow early intervention…to promote best professional police practices, accountability and
proactive management” (Cutlar, 2008, p. 42).
As a type of performance management system, scholars have recognized the importance
of intervention systems in measuring and promoting organizational effectiveness, greater
efficiency, and transparency for agencies at various levels of government, including the police
(Hatry, 1978; Wholey & Hatry, 1992). Indeed, the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights endorsed
the adoption of performance management systems, including early intervention systems, for
police departments nationwide in 1981, and by the year 2000, approximately 40% of municipal
police departments with a population greater than 50,000 were estimated to have implemented,
or planned to implement such a system (Alpert & Walker, 2000).
As described by the DOJ, early intervention systems should be designed to track and
monitor a variety of indicators and particularly those involving misconduct, and specific
behaviors that may necessitate intervention, including; complaints against officers, internal
disciplinary actions, uses of force, civil lawsuits, sick leave, vehicle accidents, and other data
relevant to “evaluate and audit the performance of all levels” (Cutlar, 2008, p. 44) of a police
department. Since EISs subsume a variety of regularly measurable misconduct indicators, DOJ
findings of a deficient EIS was operationalized as the presence of indicators in the problem
stream.
The third element in the problem stream is feedback since government officials receive
information about policies and operations through feedback from the external environment
(Kingdon, 1995). This is done through a variety of mechanisms that are sometimes systematic,
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and other times informal. One such example of the use of systematic feedback “comes in the
form of media portrayals [because]….the press thrives on the public interest and consistently
portrays events and issues of great social importance” (Worrell, 1999, p. 325). As
operationalized in this study, feedback involved the presence or absence of news media reports
of misconduct by a municipal police department in the national news media during the three
years prior to the commencement of a § 14141 investigation against that specific municipal
police agency.
Operationalization: policy stream.
The policy stream is described by Zahariadis (2007) as containing various elements,
including “a ‘soup’ of ideas that compete to win acceptance” (p. 72). Within this soup exist
policy communities that “are composed of specialists in a given policy area” (Kingdon, 1995, p.
117). A variety of policy proposals “are considered in various forums and forms, such as
hearings, papers and conversations” (Zahariadias, 2007, p. 72). Moreover, these policy proposals
are brought before a variety of groups and forums for the purpose of “educating the general
public” (Kingdon, 1995, p. 128), and informing a “more specialized public, peculiar to a
particular issue” (Kingdon, 1995, p. 128).
The success of policy proposals within this stream involve the consideration of a variety
of policy options, however, few survive because of what is referred to as “selection criteria”
(Zahariadis, 2007, p. 72). Two core constructs of selection criteria include “technical feasibility
and value acceptability” (Kingdon, 1995, p. 131). Value acceptability refers “not only notions of
the proper role and size of government, but also concepts of equity and efficiency” (Kingdon,
1995, p. 143).

45

In detailing the process of identifying policies and practices for remedy, the DOJ (2017a)
has stated that they seek “community input regarding remedies” (p. 17), and that this “input has
informed the provisions of the Division’s reform agreement” (p. 17). Furthermore, the DOJ
(2017a)
also seeks the input of rank-and-file officers and police unions and affinity groups
[because]…all stakeholders must feel invested in the remedies presented….Communities
must be invested for the long-term sustainability of the reform. Individual officers who,
day-to-day, will carry out the reforms must be invested.…And police and local leadership
must be invested to provide leadership and support. (p. 18)
The DOJ’s position involving policy communities in their § 14141 actions reflects Kingdon’s
(1995) comments regarding the importance of value acceptability within the policy stream.
In addition to value acceptability, the DOJ takes into consideration whether it is believed
that a policy proposal can be successfully implemented because “without that belief in its
technical feasibility, the proposal is not likely to survive to the point of serious consideration”
(Kingdon, 1995, p. 132). Technical feasibility, as expressed by the DOJ (2017a), is part their §
14141 policy consideration process insofar as “consensus opinions in the law enforcement
profession regarding best practices for preventing police misconduct” (p. 20) are critical to a
policy’s successful acceptance and implementation. By actively engaging with national police
experts, as well, considering how to best “assist the agency in developing a plan to implement
reforms and address any barriers to implementation, including by providing technical assistance”
(p. 21), the DOJ is better able understand the limits of a municipal police agency to implement
required reforms because of their technical feasibility.
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In consideration of these processes within the policy stream, and the reliance on technical
feasibility and value acceptability as core criteria for implementing organizational change in a
municipal police department, the policy stream was operationalized as specific policies grouped
into clusters identified in § 14141 investigative findings letters that are in need of reform. The
aggregation of these policies into clusters are thus the reflection of selection criteria’s highly
restrictive two core elements; technical feasibility and value acceptability.
Operationalization: political stream.
The political stream contains three elements that contribute to understanding changes in
policy, these include; the national mood, pressure group campaigns, and administrative turnover
(Kingdon, 1995). Zahariadias (2007) points out that among these three elements, “the
combination of the national mood and turnover in government exerts the most powerful effect on
agendas” (p. 73). In Kingdon’s (1995) words; “swings of national mood and the shifts of
administration…brought about by election results can be sufficient to overcome organized
opposition, and to define the political stream as leaning towards changes” (p. 152).
In consideration of Kindgon’s national mood and administrative turnover as the two most
important aspects of the political stream, polling data – specifically three questions related to
confidence in the police, confidence in the criminal justice system, and perceptions of police
honesty by Gallop Inc. over the life-course of § 14141 were used to conceptualize and measure
the national mood as it relates to attitudes towards the police. Presidential office-holder and their
associated political party were used to operationalize and measure influences of administrative
turnover in the political stream.
As opposed to the political party of municipal leadership at the local level, political party
of the president was selected as the most appropriate level of analysis in the political stream for
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three reasons. First, in keeping within the established conceptualization of the MS framework as
articulated by Kingdon (1995), presidential officeholder is theorized to exert the strongest
influence on agendas, and therefore, a policy output. Second, although having been applied at
different levels of government in previous studies, the MS framework, as conceptualized and
applied in this study, focuses its exploratory decision-making from the federal level onto the
local level of government, not vice versa. The implication of which is that the political
environment at the federal level has direct influence on policy decisions, which is the specific
area requiring exploration in this study. Finally, the analysis of decision-making in this study is
from the perspective of the DOJ – a federal agency whose leadership is directly appointed by the
president, and as such, the most powerful actor in Kingdon’s framework, consequently, the
political party of the leadership of a municipality under § 14141 lacks appropriate relevancy at
the federal level of analysis, and thus, is unsupported by MS as applied in this study.
Operationalization: policy entrepreneurs.
In the MS framework, policy entrepreneurs are represented by a variety of interested
parties and actors who assist in the movement of the two core elements in the policy stream,
value acceptability and technical feasibility, with the convergence of an issue or decision during
a policy window. Elements within this process are unspecified and unmeasured variables within
this study as the policy output subsumes the two values that allow for a policy output. Moreover,
qualitatively, DOJ (2017a) acknowledges the influence of interested parties in their § 14141
investigative processes, yet, these parties’ role in § 14141 investigations remain unspecified
since the DOJ does not make known through their findings letters the extent to which policy
entrepreneurs influenced the outcome of a § 14141 investigation. As such, the influence of these
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entrepreneurs is not specifically operationalized, but rather treated as a process since its
specificity is unknown.
Operationalization: policy windows.
Similar to policy entrepreneurs, policy windows are an unmeasured descriptive process in
Kingdon’s framework resulting from the convergence of the problem stream, political stream,
and timely movement of core elements in the policy stream by policy entrepreneurs. Policy
windows consist of time-limited opportunities for an agenda to move through the framework
allowing for a policy output. As indicated by Kingdon (1995) windows open and close for a
variety of reasons including general elections, focusing events, and most consequentially, the
president. The influence of policy windows then, beyond mere description, is best represented by
the confluence of elements in the problem and political streams that must come together apropos
for an output. For this study, all policy outputs are affirmative, that is, a DOJ § 14141 decision
has successfully made it through the streams framework, and implicit in that output is that the
streams successfully navigated the policy window. As such, policy windows are not specifically
measured but are a subsumed process as indicated by a successful policy output.
Operationalization: policy output.
As conceptualized, the MS process finalizes with a policy output. In Kingdon’s
framework a policy output is the adoption of a specific policy resulting from the successful
confluence of the three streams by entrepreneurs during times of opportunity (windows). The
application of the MS framework to DOJ’s decision-making in this context is an affirmative one.
That is, decisions by the DOJ not to pursue a § 14141 action post-investigation are not
considered, consequently, each policy output represents the successful union of the different
elements and processes of the MS framework. However, since the policy output in this study
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consists of two categories, the differentiation of the output was used to explore the different
variables within the various streams and processes on MS’ final policy output for each municipal
police agency.
Disjointed Incrementalism
Disjointed incrementalism by Lindblom (1979) is a theory of the policy process that
focuses on decision-making within an organizational context. Having been referred to as “a
theory of organizational behavior” (Atkinson, 2011, p. 14), disjointed incrementalism is an
expansion of Lindblom’s (1959) earlier work on incrementalism rooted in Simon’s (1947)
“bounded rationality”. Initially described as “muddling through”, incrementalism by Lindblom
(1959) “viewed policy making as a fragmented process of small steps that individuals engender
only slight changes in existing policies” (Culp, 2005, p. 416), because decision-makers “must
respond to problems in the absence of certainty regarding outcomes or agreement over core
values” (Atkinson, 2011, p. 10). This requires decision-making “premised on what is practical
and possible” (p. 10).
As opposed to small changes over the status quo, disjointed incrementalism offers a
“realistic model of policy making that comport with the diffuse authority and responsibility
structures of bureaucracy” (Culp, 2005, p. 417). Disjointed incrementalism is characterized by
the following:
•

Limitation of analysis to a few somewhat familiar policy alternatives.

•

An intertwining of analysis of policy goals and other values with the empirical aspects of
the problem.

•

A greater analytical preoccupation with ills to be remedied than positive goals to be
sought.

•

A sequence of trials, errors, and revised trials.
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•

Analysis that explores only some, not all, of the important possible consequences of a
considered alternative.

•

Fragmentation of analytical work to many (partisan) participants in the policy process.
Although well-known and popular since its initial formulation, disjointed incrementalism

has been criticized as being a “spent intellectual force” (Bendor, 2015, p. 194) in large part
because of its inability to account for rapid, large, or unforeseen changes from the status quo
(Dror, 1964; Etzioni, 1989; Lustick, 1980; Rajagopalan & Rasheed, 1995). Etzioni (1989)
suggests that incremental decision-making is “not so much toward a goal as away from trouble”
(p. 123), claiming that disjointed incrementalism “amounts to drifting to action without
direction” (p. 124). Dror (1964) has referred to Lindblom’s (1959) original formulation of
incrementalism as “pro-inertia and anti-innovation” (p. 155). Rajagopalan and Rasheed (1995)
point out that continual change in the environment, and incremental policy change, when
unequal, can create a ‘strategic drift’ requiring non-incremental change, because “under
conditions of high-rate change, ignorance can produce agreement upon a catastrophic policy”
(Dror, 1964, p. 155).
Overall, criticisms of disjointed incrementalism revolve around the framework being
insufficiently proactive, insufficiently goal oriented and ambitions, excessively conservative,
useful in too limited a range of decision contexts, and too hostile to analysis (Weiss &
Woodhouse, 1992). Yet these same researchers claim that criticisms of disjointed incrementalism
are “by and large invalid” (Weiss & Woodhouse, 1993, p. 255), and have gone to lengths to
argue that its descriptive power endures as Lindblom’s (1959) original formulation was as an
alternative to the impossibility of the synoptic model of decision-making.
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Despite these criticisms, disjointed incrementalism has been used in the field of criminal
justice to explain prison privatization (Culp, 2005), decarceration in Massachusetts (Stolz, 1984),
criminal justice policy-making at the federal level (Stolz, 1985), and offered as an efficient
means of criminal justice planning to deal with the “field’s most troublesome characteristics”
(Smith & Klosterman, 1980, p. 403). As such, disjointed incrementalism was used to analyze
DOJ decision-making while supplementing analysis from Kingdon’s multiple streams.
Operationalization of disjointed incrementalism.
Decision-making by DOJ regarding policy alternatives is embedded in their language, as
an example, in § 14141 cases the DOJ (2017a) “considers whether the allegations represent an
emerging or developing issue” (p. 6). Tellingly, DOJ (2017a) emphasizes that:
The model of reform reflected…has changed over time as the Division has learned from
its own experiences enforcing Section 14141, responding to feedback from law
enforcement and community stakeholders, and incorporated developments in the social
science of police reform. (p. 20)
This statement is indicative of disjointed incrementalism, that is; limited policy
alternatives, analysis and values intertwined, remedy of ills, learning from trial and error,
exploration of some alternatives, and diffusion of policy work to partisans. Moreover, § 14141
actions during the first decade after the law’s enactment are referred to as “the first-generation
model of police reform” (DOJ, 2017a, p. 40), and more recent § 14141 actions as the “current
generation” (DOJ, 2017a, p. 40), clearly demarcating a philosophical and practical approach
between two eras. Disjointed incrementalism then is well-suited to explore DOJ’s decisionmaking regarding a § 14141 action. As such, disjointed incrementalism was operationalized as
changes in unconstitutional policing themes, length of investigation over-time, productivity,
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efficiency, investigative outcome, and output over the life-course of § 14141, and assisted in
answering research questions 3, 4, and 6: Have DOJ’s pattern and practice investigations
changed over-time? What organizational characteristics and environmental conditions existed in
municipal police departments prior to a § 14141 investigation? How can § 14141 support police
departments to practice constitutional policing?
Deterrence
Deterrence theory traces its roots to utilitarian notions of crime and punishment as
formulated by Beccaria (1764) and espoused by Bentham (1789). The underpinning of
deterrence theory is the rational actor model which “assumes that offenders exercise rational
judgment and are reasonably aware of the potential costs and benefits with criminal acts” (Pratt
& Cullen, 2005, p. 415).
Deterrence theory posits that when present, three key elements of punishment – certainty,
severity, and celerity, will discourage criminal behavior. These three elements manifest in a
utilitarian calculus that dictates general, specific, and marginal effects on behavior (Harmon,
2009; Nagin, 2013). Despite evidence suggesting its empirical weakness relative to other modern
criminological theories (Pratt & Cullen, 2005), some scholars argue that deterrence theory’s
nuances and complexity have been misapplied and understudied, and therefore not sufficiently
understood (Nagin, 2013). Even with these scholarly disagreements, deterrence theory remains
popular among scholars and practitioners for its unambiguous conceptualization, and
applicability to social science, criminal justice, and public policy (Braga & Weisburd, 2012;
Kelling & Wilson, 1982; National Academy of Sciences, 2017; Wilson, 1975).
Deterrence theory has also been used as a framework by economists to explore questions
related to optimal levels of enforcement and crime, as was initially done by Becker (1968). Since
then, models of deterrence using an economic framework have emerged to explain the behaviors
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of rational actors related to crime, enforcement, and punishment. One such model has been
offered by Polinsky and Shavell (2000), known as the public enforcement of law. These scholars
apply their economic model to a variety of aspects of the enforcement process, one such is
referred to as “The enforcement authority’s problem” (p. 49). As described in this context, the
goal of enforcement “is to maximize social welfare by choosing enforcement expenditures e (or,
equivalently, the probability of detection p), the level of the fine, f, the length of the
imprisonment term, and the standard for imposing liability” (Polinsky & Shavell, 2000, p. 49).
Related to police organizations, and to serve as a deterrent against unconstitutional
policing practices, Harmon (2009) interprets this model as; “expected cost of § 14141, E, to any
municipality is at least p, the probability perceived by the municipality that its police department
will be subject to a full investigation…multiplied by c, the cost a municipality expects to incur as
a result of that investigation” (p. 24). As applied, raising the costs or probability of a § 14141
action against a specific police agency will increase that agency’s expected costs above
efficiency, thereby serve as a deterrent to an offending police agency. Using this model of
deterrence, sufficiently raising the probability of intervention related to systemic misconduct
relative to the costs borne by a police department under a § 14141 action, a rational police
agency would be deterred from engaging in unconstitutional policing through punitive
expenditures, loss of autonomy, and potential organizational demise. This operationalization of
deterrence was used as a framework, along with MS and disjointed incrementalism, to explore
the many policy implications of a § 14141 action on a municipal police department.
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Operationalization of deterrence.
It can be inferred from public comments that enforcement of § 14141 as it relates to
choosing a specific police agency to investigate is influenced by the principles of deterrence, as
expressed by the DOJ (2017a):
The Division considers whether the allegations represent an issue common to many law
enforcement agencies as well as whether the allegations represent an emerging or
developing issue, such that reform could have an impact beyond the primary objective of
eliminating constitutional violations in the specific law enforcement agency. (p. 6)
Financial costs associated with a § 14141 action vary depending on the size of the
organization and complexity of DOJ’s findings, however, little of this aspect of § 14141 is
known. What is known, however, is that the “local jurisdiction generally bears the costs of
supporting the monitoring team” (DOJ, 2017a, p. 23), approximating $1 million per year (PERF,
2013). This figure does not include the costs associated with actual organizational reform, which
appear to be substantial. As an example, Kelly, Childress, and Rich (2015) reported that the total
cost of § 14141 reform in the LAPD – which lasted over 12 years – was estimated by the Los
Angeles Chief Legislative Analyst to approximate $300 million.
Since costs associated with § 14141 action appear to be substantial, and quite possibly
onerous to the police agency and their parent jurisdiction, the application of § 14141 within a
deterrence framework suggests that enforcement may be directed towards municipal police
agencies with specific attributes including larger size, greater resources, and more financially
supportive jurisdictions. Municipalities with these characteristics may be better suited to
withstand the costs associated with a § 14141 investigation than smaller or resource deprived
municipal police agencies and their parent jurisdictions. As well, since § 14141 emphasis is on
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the reform of patterns or practices of unconstitutional policing practices, and often those patterns
or practices involve civil rights, the demographic make-up of jurisdictions is an important
variable to consider as the DOJ may be employing their authority as a specific deterrent against
certain types of unconstitutional policing, and specific constitutional violations.
As such, the deterrence framework above was operationalized as resources, measured as
a police-to-civilian-served ratio, contextualized within an external control and resource
dependence (Pfeffer & Salancik, 2016) perspective to explore the inducement of organizational
change in the deterrence model. The variable resources was selected to represent a dimension of
deterrence in this study rather than municipal expenditures because as conceptualized and
applied to municipal police, resources and expenditures are differentiated variables through the
concepts of effectiveness and efficiency. That is, in the context of municipal police and
application of §14141, the DOJ is interested in the “overall goal of achieving effective, [emphasis
added] constitutional policing” (DOJ, 2017a, p. 22). Organizational effectiveness in policing
directly relates to the police meeting their operational goals, whereas, efficiency refers to police
organizations that get more for their money (Skogan, 1976).
In their pursuit of ensuring effective and constitutional policing for the municipal police
agencies under their purview, the DOJ makes no mention of improving municipal police
efficiency, but rather routinely targets police effectiveness (DOJ, 2010; DOJ, 2017a).
Consequently, the effective application of a municipal police department’s resources is more
important to constitutional policing than the efficient application of those resources. By
extension, how much a municipality spends on a police department per officer is less relevant to
how well a police department meets the mission of the agency with the resources they have been
provided, and officer-to-civilian ratio better reflects this construct than expenditures.

56

In addition to ratio of police-to-civilian-served ratio, size of the police department was
operationalized in terms of sworn employees because larger police departments can serve as an
example of reform in a general deterrence framework, while better absorbing the costs associated
with a § 14141 investigation than small police agencies. Included with the size of a police
agency and ratio of sworn employees, overall population statistics, and demographics measured
as a municipality’s percent of the non-White population were both operationalized within the
deterrence framework to assist in answering research questions 4 and 6: What organizational
characteristics and environmental conditions existed in municipal police departments prior to a
§ 14141 investigation? How can § 14141 support police departments to practice constitutional
policing?
Theory Integration Representation
Using multiple streams as the driving theoretical framework and integrating it with other
theories is consistent with much prior research (Rawat & Morris, 2016), and for this study, it was
essential. Without multiple streams, understanding decision-making lacks model and form;
without disjointed incrementalism, an evaluation of changes in decision-making over-time lacks
direction; without deterrence, a suggestion that municipal police should be called to action to
implement necessary change lacks incentive. As well, by applying these three theories, all
aspects of the main research problem are couched in well-established, and venerable theories that
integrate the social sciences through the fields of public policy and criminal justice. As
conceptualized, influences of disjointed incrementalism, and deterrence on the MS process are
presented in Figure 2, visually representing the influence of disjointed incrementalism from one
investigation to the next, the theory’s influence on investigative outcomes over-time, as well as
the influence of a deterrence orientation from one outcome to a subsequent investigation.
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Figure 2. Influences on the MS Process: Disjointed Incrementalism and Deterrence
Research Questions
In attempt to both fill the knowledge gap posed by the literature review, and address the
problem statement, the following research questions guided this study:
1. What pattern or practice themes emerge from DOJ investigative findings?
Prior to a municipal police agency entering into a negotiated settlement or technical
assistance subsequent a § 14141 investigation, the DOJ publicly issues a findings letter
specifying the results of their investigation, and describing remedies to be undertaken to rectify
organizational and systemic police dysfunctionality. Two affirmative outcomes – negotiated
settlement or technical assistance – result from DOJ’s conclusion that a municipal police agency
suffers from systemic problems so great that they are actively engaged in, or at risk of engaging
in, patterns or practices of unconstitutional policing. This differentiation is crucial, as it is the
demarcation of unconstitutional, and constitutional but problematic police behavior.
Since § 14141 investigative findings letters vary in length, detail, and analysis, it was
suspected that these differences were related to a number of variables including whether a §
14141 action commenced during the first or second-generation of DOJ’s enforcement of the
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statute, over-time changes in the interpretation and emphasis on behaviors that constitute patterns
or practices of unconstitutional policing, as well as both the unique variations associated with a
discrete police agency, and their parent municipality.
DOJ’s § 14141 investigative findings letters contain two types of content – manifest and
latent. The manifest content is characterized by overt policy, practice, and procedural
deficiencies that were specifically attributed to systemic problems, and for many investigations,
unconstitutional policing practices. In contrast, latent content is subtler, nuanced, and intricate –
only to be discerned through a careful analysis and interpretation of the data contained therein.
Determining the themes embedded in these investigative findings letters through thematic
analysis allowed for a clear attribution of patterns or practices of organizational police
dysfunctionality, and the contours of unconstitutional policing.
2. What patterns or practices did DOJ find contribute to unconstitutional policing?
Identifying and specifying DOJ’s patterns or practices of unconstitutional policing,
through a differentiation of the two categories of investigative outcome, allowed for an analysis
and interpretation of the relationship that exists in how the DOJ identifies a specific municipal
police agency for investigation, commonalities in what the DOJ seeks to reveal through their
investigations, what they find, and how these findings change over-time. The analysis contained
herein assisted in addressing both parts of the research problem, that is, identifying what
contributes to patterns or practices of unconstitutional policing, and how municipal police
leaders can use that knowledge to prevent systemic problems, misconduct, investigation, and
potentially, federal intervention.
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3. Have DOJ’s pattern or practice investigations changed over-time?
Understanding how organizational decision-making, and the influence of rationality
apply to the identification, investigation, and enforcement of patterns or practices of
unconstitutional policing, its interpretation, and how that may change over-time was necessary to
address the second part of the research problem. Exploring the phenomena of over-time change
regarding § 14141 investigations offers municipal police departments knowledge comporting not
only to their current needs, but the knowledge necessary to forecast needs as a reaction to
emerging DOJ enforcement practices, and the mutable interpretation of unconstitutional policing.
Determining how the DOJ exercised their § 14141 authority in the past, and examining the
changes that occurred in the enforcement of § 14141 over the life-course of the law, facilitated
the development of a model to forestall unconstitutional policing.
4. What organizational characteristics and environmental conditions existed in municipal
police departments prior to a § 14141 investigation?
Employment characteristics, and environmental conditions were necessary to
contextualize § 14141 investigations at the municipal level, and to help understand the
interactions or effects that organizational resources, organizational size, jurisdictional
demographics, and population size have on patterns or practices of unconstitutional policing, and
why the DOJ may have identified a specific municipal police agency for reform with respect to
these variables. As well, these data facilitated the operationalization of a municipal police agency
to meet the minimum jurisdictional population for this study – information that was used to assist
in an understanding of the implications of resource deprivations, and targeted enforcement
within the deterrence framework.
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5. How does the DOJ identify a specific municipal police agency engaged in unconstitutional
policing?
A theoretical framework of the policy process was applied to identify, describe, explore,
and analyze concomitant variables within all § 14141 municipal police agencies investigated for
patterns or practices of systemic misconduct. Through an application of the theoretical
framework, and by differentiating § 14141 actions by investigative outcome, it was hoped that a
clearer picture would emerge of the specific variables that led to a finding of patterns or practices
of unconstitutional policing. This analysis then assisted in answering the first prong of this study
apart from the research question: What contributes to such a rare event?
6. How can § 14141 support police departments to practice constitutional policing?
This question was formulated to address the second prong of the research problem;
accordingly; how can the information produced from the first prong of the research problem
assist other police departments to practice constitutional policing? This knowledge then can be
used to improve municipal police performance through the creation of a compendium of police
practices, serving as a remedy to systemic police dysfunctionality and unconstitutional policing
prescriptively. Moreover, the application of the knowledge created in this study can then be used
to explore policy options regarding future enforcement of § 14141, serving as a guide for
municipal police leaders, while incentivizing those leaders to study, learn about, and initiate
necessary change in their agencies proactively, rather than by legal decree, obviating a loss of
autonomy, national stigma, or subjecting a police agency to possible demise.
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Variables Examined in Hypotheses
Dependent variables.
The dependent variable of interest in this dissertation was DOJ’s § 14141 investigative
outcome, that is, the binary categorization of police agencies under negotiated settlement
differentiated from police agencies under technical assistance. By definition and design, this
dichotomy distinguishes municipal police agencies found to have engaged in a pattern or practice
of unconstitutional policing (i.e. negotiated settlements, n = 24), from those municipal police
agencies found to have systemic problems that did not rise to the level of a pattern or practice of
unconstitutional policing (i.e. technical assistance, n = 9). Moreover, to assist in explaining
rational decision-making through the process of disjointed incrementalism, DOJ’s investigative
output, that is, the length of their § 14141 findings letters, measured as the number of pages for
each findings letter, served as a dependent variable for related analyses. This was selected as a
secondary dependent variable to assist in assessing changes in the complexity, nuance, and depth
of DOJ’s findings over-time.
Descriptors from findings letters.
•

Thematic findings – derived from a thematic analysis of DOJ’s findings letters, measured
according to presence or absence in each findings letter, not by frequency or intensity.
Thematic findings that were comprised of subthemes were categorized as present if at
least one subtheme was derived from the analysis. Accordingly, at this level, the presence
of multiple subthemes within a single theme was counted as the presence of one theme.

•

Subthematic findings – derived from a thematic analysis of DOJ’s findings letters,
measured according to presence or absence in each findings letter, not by frequency or
intensity. At this level of analysis, all subthemes were scaled to the thematic level and
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measured by their presence or absence in each findings letter. Any theme that did not
have subthemes was measured as a scaled theme.
Independent variables.
Independent variables for this dissertation were grouped according to their supporting
theory and analytical strategy. The following categories of variables are presented in the same
order as their associated hypotheses:
Disjointed Incrementalism.
•

Generation – measured dichotomously as first or second-generation § 14141 investigation
based on pre or post 2005 initiation.

•

Investigation length – time period from the reported initiation of a § 14141 investigation
to the issuance of a final findings letter, measured in months.
Deterrence.

•

Resources – measured as a ratio of the number of sworn officers to population. Then
categorized dichotomously as greater than or less than the national average.

•

Size – number of sworn officers for each municipal police department. Classified into
one of seven of BJS’ (2015) sworn employee categories, and further categorized
dichotomously as greater than, or less than 500.

•

Population group – total population of a municipality classified into one of seven of BJS’
(2015) population groups. Further reduced and categorized dichotomously as greater
than, or less than 250,000 persons.

•

Percent non-White – percentage of municipal population identified as any other race, or
ethnicity than White-only. Dichotomously categorized as greater than, or less than 54%.
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Multiple streams – problems.
•

Focusing events – measured as the presence or absence of an operationalized focusing
event in the three years prior to the initiation of a § 14141 investigation. Gleaned from
the manifest analysis of DOJ issued findings letters, related archives, and publicly issued
technical reports.

•

Indicators – measured as the presence or absence of DOJ recognized insufficiencies,
deficiencies, and non-existent police early intervention systems. Gleaned from an
analysis of DOJ issued findings letters. These systems are designed to monitor, track, and
alert police supervision and leadership to a variety of problematic police officer behavior
indicating individual, and organizational misconduct.

•

Feedback – measured as the presence or absence of national news reports of police
corruption or misconduct related to each municipal police agency in three years prior to
the initiation of a § 14141 investigation.

•

Accompaniment – measured as the interdependence of focusing events and feedback in
the three years prior to the initiation of a § 14141 investigation.
Multiple streams – policies.

•

Policy clusters – the categorization of five clusters of policies including; use of force,
stop, search and arrest, response to special populations, civilian complaint systems, and
internal discipline system policies. Measured as the presence or absence of insufficiencies
and deficiencies gleaned from a manifest analysis of findings letters.
Multiple streams – politics.

•

Political party of the president – § 14141 investigation categorized by political party,
Democrat or Republican, based on the month and year of investigation commencement.
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•

National mood – an aggregated over-time measure of three polling data questions related
to attitude towards the police. Measured each year over the life-course of § 14141 as
more positive, or less positive than historic positive drawn from Gallop Inc. data between
1994-2017 specific to confidence in the police, confidence in American institutions, and
honesty of police officers.

Covariate.
•

In state – measured dichotomously as the presence or absence of more than one § 14141
investigation of municipal police within a state.

Hypotheses
Section 14141 investigations of municipal police resulting in publicly issued findings
letters have been categorized into one of two outcomes – negotiated settlement or technical
assistance. Implicit in this categorization are organizational, and aggregated individual behaviors
that differentiate a finding of unconstitutional from constitutional but problematic policing –
allowing for identification, analysis, and interpretation. As such, the first hypothesis is offered:
H1: Thematic findings will differ between municipal police agencies under negotiated
settlement, and those under technical assistance.
Moving beyond a differentiation of findings between the two types of investigative
outcomes, police agencies found to engage in patterns or practices of unconstitutional policing
were expected to have a greater number of findings than those police agencies under technical
assistance. The basis for this expectation was supported by DOJ’s conceptual and legal reasoning
behind the identification of unconstitutional policing. Police agencies found to engage in a
pattern or practice of unconstitutional policing engage in specific unconstitutional behaviors, and
in greater amounts than those agencies that have not been found to engage in a pattern or practice
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of unconstitutional policing. At a more granular level, comparing subthemes across investigative
outcomes, then, should allow for greater nuance, detail, and analysis. To quantify these
differences, and to better identify these differences behaviorally, the second hypothesis is
offered:
H2: Municipal police agencies under negotiated settlement will have more scaled
subtheme findings than those under technical assistance.
As applied to organizational decision-making, disjointed incrementalism (Lindblom,
1979) posits that small adjustments over the status-quo are preferable to decision-making that
attempts rational-comprehensiveness, or other methods that do not allow for small adjustments
and corrections. Throughout the course of § 14141 investigations of municipal police, DOJ’s
output appeared to change in length, complexity, nuance, and analysis. One scholar has referred
to this phenomenon as exemplifying the government’s “learning curve” (Walker, 2017, p. 10) in
the implementation of the provision. Explicitly, the DOJ has recognized the incrementalism of
their § 14141 decision-making through the differentiation of investigations into two distinct
generations – those commenced through 2005, and after (DOJ, 2017a). One manner to assess the
effects of disjointed incrementalism relative to § 14141 should then be evident through DOJ’s
output, that is, their findings letters. As such, the third hypothesis is offered:
H3: Second-generation output will be significantly longer than first-generation output.
Furthermore, when applying disjointed incrementalism to § 14141 investigations, the
expectation is that over-time change would produce greater efficiency; a product of shorter
investigation lengths through trial and error, organizational learning, institutional memory, and
necessary adjustments that would then be revealed through changes in investigation length

66

between the two generations of § 14141 enforcement. As such, the following hypothesis is
offered:
H4: First-generation § 14141 investigations will have lasted longer than secondgeneration investigations.
The product of efficiency in their investigative process, and ability to conduct
investigations of larger, more complex organizations would be expected from over-time changes
in the application of § 14141 by the DOJ against municipal police. Disjointed incrementalism
then would be revealed through shorter investigation times with a greater number of findings,
therefore, marked by a greater ability to assess unconstitutional policing in larger police
agencies. As such, the following hypothesis is offered:
H5: The length of an investigation will be negatively associated with the number of DOJ
scaled findings, controlling for the size of a police department.
Moreover, the application of disjointed incrementalism to § 14141 investigations
suggests there would be a change in orientation in the types of police practices that the DOJ
sought to investigate because of ills to be remedied, and intertwining of policy goals and values
(Lindblom, 1979) are mutable. Indeed, considering the effects that administrative turnover is
posited to have within the political stream (Kingdon, 1995), and therefore, on the enforcement of
§ 14141 (DOJ, 2017a), the following hypothesis is offered:
H6: DOJ’s investigative findings will differ over time.
The application of a deterrence orientation to the enforcement of § 14141 by the DOJ
suggests that certain municipalities, and their police agencies are targeted for enforcement action
under this authority as a means of both addressing the most highly offensive municipal police
agencies engaged in unconstitutional policing, and to serve as an example to prevent other
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municipal police agencies from engaging in unconstitutional policing. Applying an economic
framework of deterrence; organizational resources and size, as well as environmental conditions
would be expected to differ between police agencies engaged in constitutional and
unconstitutional policing. As such, the following hypothesis is offered:
H7: Environmental and organizational characteristics will differ between police agencies
found to engage in unconstitutional policing, and police agencies without such findings.
Under a deterrence framework, municipal police agencies that suffer from resource
deprivations would be expected to have more organizational problems as indicated by the
number of findings. As well, § 14141 as applied through a resource dependence perspective, the
size of a police agency is less relevant than a police agency’s resources. As such, the following
hypothesis is offered:
H8: Municipal police agency resources will be negatively associated with the number of
scaled findings, controlling for the size of a police department.
The MS framework as applied to § 14141 decision-making was used to support an
exploration of the variables that may lead to the identification of a police agency engaged in
unconstitutional policing, ex-ante. Each of the three streams have their own variables, some of
which are theorized to act independently, while others, dependently. Within the problem stream,
Kingdon (1995) suggests that focusing events require accompaniment of a previous agenda to
rise to actionable status, however, other scholars have found that accompaniment is not required
to change the agenda status of a decision in the problem stream when focusing events are
particularly unique or large (Worrall, 1999). To test whether a focusing event, that is, a large and
widely publicized triggering event, is a precondition to a finding that a municipal police agency
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was engaged in a pattern or practice of unconstitutional policing, as suggested by the MS
literature, the following hypothesis is offered:
H9: Municipal police agencies experiencing a focusing event are more likely to have been
found to engage in unconstitutional policing than those that have not experienced a
focusing event.
Similar to focusing events in the problem stream that may require accompaniment,
indicators within the problem stream can assist in bringing problems to the attention of decisionmakers, helping to allow the problem rise to actionable status (Kingdon, 1995). To test whether
indicators within the problem stream, operationalized and measured as a deficient intervention
system, serve as a precondition to a finding that a municipal police agency was engaged in a
pattern or practice of unconstitutional policing, the following hypothesis is offered:
H10: Municipal police agencies found to have deficient intervention systems will be more
likely to engage in unconstitutional policing than municipal police departments without
such deficiencies.
As an alternative to the independence of focusing events in the problem stream, Kingdon
(1995) suggests that focusing events require accompaniment to become actionable. In the context
of § 14141, feedback, in the form of national media reporting is such example of accompaniment
that along with a focusing event, facilitates a problem becoming actionable by the DOJ. To test
whether feedback has independent influence on raising an issue to agenda status, the following
hypothesis is offered:
H11: Municipal police agencies with focusing events are more likely to have
accompaniment in the form of feedback, than police agencies without focusing events.
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Within the policy stream, policy proposals reflect the two core criteria of value
acceptability and technical feasibility, that is, what should be done, and what is doable. As
applied to § 14141 investigations, it stands to reason that police agencies found to engage in
unconstitutional policing would have a greater number of policy problems (i.e. insufficiencies,
deficiencies, and necessary, but non-existent policies) than police agencies that were not found to
engage in unconstitutional policing, implying that policies, and investigative outcomes are
directly related. As such, the following hypothesis is offered:
H12: Municipal police agencies under negotiated settlement will have a greater
number of policy deficiencies than those under technical assistance.
In the MS framework, policies within the policy stream are described to move through
the framework directly to policy entrepreneurs where they are then coupled through a policy
window. As described by Kingdon, this stream does not act in unison with the others.
Consequently, to better establish a connection between problematic policies and DOJ’s
descriptive findings of a municipal police agency, which would suggest a relationship between
deficient policies and overall organizational dysfunctionality, it is expected that deficient policies
would be related to the level of organizational problems since policies are the most independent
of the three streams in relation to the policy output. As such, the following hypothesis is offered:
H13: The number of deficient policies will be positively associated with the number of
thematic findings.
Within the political stream it is argued by Kingdon (1995) that administrative turnover is
the most important element that effects an agenda and decision-making. Applied to the
enforcement of § 14141, administrative turnover is operationalized as changes in presidential
administration. By extension, it is expected that changes in the presidential officeholder would
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exert the strongest influence on a DOJ § 14141 agenda, and therefore on enforcement action
against municipal police. As such, the following hypothesis is offered:
H14: The number of observed § 14141 investigations occurring during the tenure of each
president will differ from expected observations.
In the MS framework, administrative turnover is accounted for by changes in presidential
administration, however, an alternative interpretation considers administrative turnover between
political parties of the president, rather than the officeholder of president since a president must
pay special attention to their political party and base of support when making political
appointment decisions (Aberbach & Rockman, 2009). It is expected then that administrative
turnover, as operationalized by political party of the president, would have the greatest influence
on a §14141 investigation. Therefore, the following hypothesis is offered:
H15: Investigative outcomes will differ between political parties.
In addition to the above stated hypotheses, during the course of research and analysis of
variables, information was revealed warranting special consideration relating to possible
differences in this study’s organizational and environmental variables when disaggregated by
investigative generation. Since differences in these variables between the two generations was
not initially considered, yet important for deeper analysis of over-time changes in § 14141
targeted enforcement, the following exploratory hypothesis was offered:
He: Organizational and environmental characteristics for municipal police will differ
between first and second-generation investigations.
N.B.: The above exploratory hypothesis is listed as the last hypotheses as is customary, however,
due to its analytical relevance it was tested between H6 and H7 as it bridges disjointed
incrementalism and deterrence theories.
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Methods
Research Design
This dissertation used a mixed-methodological embedded design to address the research
problem. An embedded research design is useful “when the primary method is qualitative or
quantitative but the researcher adds the other component to gain additional insight” (Bachman &
Schutt, 2014, p. 353). Researchers recognize that using a mixed-methodological approach can
provide a more robust understanding of the research problem than could be accomplished with
only one approach (Caruth, 2013; Creswell, 2008). Although both types of data are used in an
embedded design, one type of data serves as a supplement for the other type because both “are
useful for gaining a broader perspective on the topic at hand and for studying different groups, or
levels, within a single study” (Hanson, Creswell, Plano Clark, Petska, & Creswell, 2005), and
when a “single data set is not sufficient, that different questions need to be answered, and that
each type of question requires different types of data” (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2011, p. 91). In
the field of criminal justice, scholars such as Brent and Kraska (2010) have argued the benefits
of using a mixed design as a viable third methodological choice, particularly for its compatibility
with various types of data.
Designing this mixed-methodological study involved similar procedures used in
traditional research methods, however, due to the nature of the problem, three additional steps
were necessary (Hanson, et al., 2005, pp. 226-227), these included:
1. Deciding whether to use a specific theoretical lens that underlines a researcher’s study
and subsequent methodological choices (Crotty, 1998).
2. Deciding how data collection will be implemented and prioritized.
3. Deciding the point at which data analysis and integration will occur.
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Rationale for a mixed-methodological approach.
The rationale for applying this methodology was the result of three distinct but
interrelated factors; (a) the research problem, (b) the theoretical framework, and supporting
theories used to examine the research problem, and (c) the pragmatist philosophical perspective
driving the research questions.
Kingdon’s MS framework, accompanied by Lindblom’s disjointed incrementalism, and
deterrence are particularly well-suited to a qualitatively-driven embedded design. In considering
that the three streams have a variety of qualitative and quantitative variables that come together
to produce an outcome, MS embraces both the rationalist and post-positivistic traditions of
science, while both incrementalism and deterrence are well-aligned with the philosophical
perspective of pragmatism. This flexibility allows the theoretical framework to comport
seamlessly to the collection and interpretation of both types of data, and is in keeping with
positivist-quantitative, and hermeneutist-qualitative traditions of scientific inquiry (Caruth,
2013).
Use of a comparison group in the research design.
To enrich the findings, and better understand the nuanced differentiation of constitutional
and unconstitutional patterns or practices at the organizational level, municipal police
departments subject to a § 14141 investigation resulting in technical assistance rather than a
negotiated settlement were used as a comparison group. Municipal police departments
investigated under § 14141 authority resulting in an agreement for technical assistance were all
found to suffer from systemic, policy, and structural issues detrimental to the municipal police
agency and public. Yet, for these investigations, the DOJ noted that the specific police agency
either was not engaged in a pattern or practice of unconstitutional policing, or made no explicit
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findings regarding the constitutionality of a police agency’s patterns or practices. The DOJ’s
justification for technical assistance in lieu of a negotiated settlement in these cases suggests that
a police agency’s patterns or practices, aggregated and at the organizational level, may lead to
unconstitutional policing if left unaddressed. Findings for these unconstitutional policing “nearmisses” were embedded in the letters/technical assistance reports issued near, or at, the
completion of a § 14141 investigation. An example of a technical assistance determination from
the DOJ in a letter issued to the Harvey Police Department:
We have completed our investigation. We do not make findings that there is a pattern or
practice of constitutional law violations and are closing our investigation. However, we
do conclude that there are serious deficiencies in the operation of the Harvey Police
Department that create an unreasonable risk that constitutional violations will occur.
(Smith, 2012, p. 1)
Analyzing these unconstitutional near-misses, aggregated with the negotiated settlements
into a study population, and disaggregated by investigative outcome (i.e. negotiated settlement or
technical assistance), allowed for a clear, documentable, and officially sanctioned distinction
between municipal police agencies found to have engaged in patterns or practices of
unconstitutional policing, from municipal police agencies that have not. Moreover, including §
14141 investigations with two distinct outcomes captures all of DOJ’s investigative outcomes in
which a findings letter was produced under § 14141 authority against municipal police. This
design supported a robust analysis, facilitating the creation of knowledge while supplementing
the understanding of the differentiation between police behavior at the systemic and
organizational level that constituted unconstitutional policing, thereby, offering a means to
identify and apply that knowledge for prescriptive remedy.
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Data Collection
Reflecting the choice of research design, data collection occurred in steps wherein
qualitative data collection and interpretation were the emphasis for the first part of the study, and
thereafter supported by quantitative data analysis of variables attributable to disjointed
incrementalism, deterrence, and the multiple streams framework. All analyses within this
dissertation were conceptualized and conducted as a single-coder study. Consequently, the
qualitative portion of the mixed-methods design relies exclusively on single researcher
interpretation and analysis. Subsequent quantitative analyses subsume aspects of the qualitative
data interpretation. As such, protocols were developed from the methodological literature to
ensure the highest levels of trustworthiness. These protocols, and insufficiencies related to solocoder interpretation are addressed in subsequent sections.
Study population – municipal police subject to § 14141.
All municipal police agencies subject to a § 14141 action resulting in a negotiated
settlement or technical assistance were identified. These data were open source, available
through documents that live on DOJ’s website and in their technical reports (DOJ, 2010; DOJ,
2017a; DOJ, 2017b). DOJ issued technical reports and their website archive contained
information related to the opening and closing of a § 14141 investigation, allegations of
misconduct, investigative outcome, and disposition when applicable. This information was
available for all negotiated settlements which was then collected and recorded, however,
information for § 14141 investigations resulting in technical assistance have only been published
by the DOJ through June 2010. To identify all § 14141 actions involving a negotiated settlement
or technical assistance, two secondary sources (Childress, 2015; Rushin, 2017) were crossreferenced with existing § 14141 memos, letters, and lawsuits from the DOJ, Civil Rights
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Division, Special Litigation Section’s website archive to verify inclusion for analysis (DOJ,
2017b). This technique resulted in the identification of 55 § 14141 investigations resulting in a
negotiated settlement or technical assistance between 1994 and 2017. The remaining 14
investigations that did not lead to a negotiated settlement or technical assistance were excluded
from analysis; reflecting a decision by the DOJ not to further pursue § 14141 reform postinvestigation is indicative of insufficient support that the subject police agency was engaged in,
or at risk of engaging in, a pattern or practice of unconstitutional policing (DOJ, 2017a). For
these 14 investigations, the DOJ did not publicly memorialize, nor has made publicly available
any documents, findings, or justifications for their decision not to pursue further § 14141
enforcement against the investigated police agency. In these non-finding § 14141 investigations,
the DOJ will simply notify the agency and close the investigation (DOJ, 2017a).
After identifying the 55 § 14141 investigations that led to a negotiated settlement or
technical assistance, police agencies that did not meet the operationalization of a municipal
police department were excluded from analysis. Using the BJS (2015) definition of local police,
a differentiation between specific types of local police agencies including municipal police, was
critical for the purposes of specificity, measurement, and analysis. Accordingly, the term
“municipal”, which refers to “those governments designated as cities, villages, boroughs (except
in Alaska), and towns (except in the six New England states, Minnesota, New York, and
Washington” (U.S. Census: Federal, State, & Local Governments, n.d.), was narrowed to refer
only to place-names of cities. The rationale for the operationalization of the term “city” was
rooted in the U.S. federalist structure insofar as each state has the legal authority to dictate the
terms of municipal incorporation. As such, there is discontinuity between place-names and
government structures across the 50 states.
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Analyzing jurisdictions that adhere to place-names of “city” standardized the term for
consistent analysis. Of the 55 § 14141 investigations leading to a negotiated settlement or
technical assistance, 39 involved place-names of cities. Moreover, laws regarding differentiation
of the terms “city,” “town,” and “village” vary by state, however, these definitions typically
involve; (a) minimum populations, and (b) legal incorporation (U.S. Census, 2013). The current
distinction between these terms is one of population size (National League of Cities, 2017), and
the specification of principal cities by the U.S. Census Bureau (2012) does just that by defining a
principal city as the largest incorporated place with a population of at least 10,000 persons.
Principal cities with a population at least 10,000 persons but fewer than 50,000 are referred to as
micropolitan statistical areas, and those with a population at least 50,000 persons are referred to
as metropolitan statistical areas (U.S. Census Bureau, 2012). In addition to operationalizing the
meaning of the term “city”, the U.S. Census (2012) definition of a principal city was used as the
population floor for inclusivity of a municipal police department, which therefore included
populations comprised only of micropolitan and metropolitan statistical areas.
Applying the U.S. Census Bureau’s (2012) population standards of a principal city to the
39 § 14141 investigations led to the exclusion of two municipal police agencies due to
insufficient population – Villa Rica, Georgia, population 4,134 (U.S. Census, 2000) and Ville
Platte, Louisiana, population 7,430 (U.S. Census, 2010b). One dual-jurisdiction police agency
serving both a town and city was excluded due to that agency bearing responsibility for police
services in two different jurisdictional structures across two adjacent states with different placenames, although classified under one investigation by the DOJ (2017b). Colorado City Marshal’s
Office provides police service for Colorado City, AZ – which is designated as a town (U.S.
Census, 2010b), and Hildale, UT – which is designated as a city, yet falls below the established
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population floor at 2,726 persons (U.S. Census, 2010b). This law enforcement agency was not
included in the initial tabulation of municipal police agencies subject to 14141 due to its unique
organizational structure and jurisdictional responsibilities.
Two municipal police agencies were included although they did not meet the strict
criteria of a § 14141 investigation leading to a negotiated settlement or technical assistance. First,
the Columbus Division of Police was the subject of a § 14141 investigation beginning March
1998, with DOJ findings of a pattern or practice of unconstitutional policing made public in
October 1999 (DOJ, 2017b). The DOJ then brought a lawsuit against the City of Columbus
where it was revealed that both parties agreed to enter into a consent decree (U.S. v. City of
Columbus, OH, 1999). This lawsuit was resolved in 2002 at the request of the DOJ without
formally entering into a negotiated settlement. This resolution reflects more broadly a negotiated
settlement than technical assistance or no finding, as such, it was classified as a negotiated
settlement. Similarly, the Chicago Police Department was the subject of a § 14141 investigation
beginning December 2015. In January 2017, the DOJ released findings of a pattern or practice of
unconstitutional policing, and along with the City of Chicago announced an agreement to enter
into a consent decree (DOJ, 2017c). With the changeover in presidential administration in
January 2017, both the DOJ and the City of Chicago agreed to discontinue that agreement
(Hinkel, Sweeney, & Ruthhart, 2017). The interim agreement of this investigation best reflects a
negotiated settlement rather than technical assistance or no findings, and was therefore classified
as such. These exclusions, and special inclusions resulted in 37 § 14141 investigations involving
34 discrete municipal police agencies at this stage of the methodology. 4

Three municipal police agencies were the subject of a § 14141 negotiated settlement or technical assistance on two
separate occasions, these agencies include: New Orleans, LA; Cleveland, OH; & Miami, FL. Hence, 34 police
agencies account for 37 § 14141 investigations of municipal police at this stage of the methodology.

4
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Investigative outcome.
To reflect the binary outcome of a § 14141 investigation, each municipal police agency
was categorized according to their final investigative outcome. Consequently, municipal police
agencies under technical assistance were coded as “0”, and negotiated settlement as “1”, thus
reflecting municipal police agencies having not been found to engage in patterns or practices of
unconstitutional policing to those that have.
Collection of findings letters and decision rules.
Upon completion of a § 14141 investigation wherein a pattern or practice of
unconstitutional policing has been found, a DOJ issued findings letter is sent to the offending
police agency and made publicly available for review. All municipal police agencies subject to a
negotiated settlement under § 14141, including the two special cases of Columbus and Chicago,
had available findings letters with two exceptions, the Buffalo Police Department, in which a
MOA from 2002 and amended MOA from 2007 were available, and Highland Park Police
Department, in which a consent decree and MOA were available. Because the findings letters for
these two municipal police departments were not available, and were critical data for consistent
analysis across all cases, both were excluded from the study.
The DOJ issued multiple findings letters to two different municipal police agencies at
different times during the course of a § 14141 investigation. The Detroit Police Department had
three findings/technical assistance letters issued by the DOJ over the course of four months
before entering into two separate but concurrent consent decrees. In this case I chose to use the
third and final findings letter for date of investigation completion but aggregated the findings
from the three letters as one for analysis.
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The Easton Police Department had four separate findings/technical assistance letters
issued by DOJ before entering into a MOA, in this case I decided to use the fourth and final
findings letter for analysis, and as the end of investigation date. The rationale for this decision
was based on the manifest language used in the findings letter, suggesting that the § 14141
investigation was ongoing; for example, “As you know, the Civil Rights Division of the
Department of Justice (“DOJ”) has been conducting an investigation [emphasis added] of the
Easton Police Department pursuant to the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of
1994, 42 U.S.C. § 14141” (Cutlar, 2010, p. 1). Additionally, in this case, the fourth and final
findings letter best represented the aggregated findings of DOJ’s investigation.
The DOJ’s first investigation of the Cleveland Division of Police began in 2000 leading
to two separate findings, one related to the initial investigation with interim findings issued in
July 2002, resulting in a negotiated settlement. That investigation was subsequently closed in
February 2004, however, during the course of the first Cleveland investigation, The DOJ issued
additional findings against Cleveland in June 2003 on a separate matter unrelated to the initial
investigation. This second, but concurrent investigation led to a distinct negotiated settlement
between the DOJ and Cleveland in May 2004. In this case, since both findings were from the
same agency, and the second investigation was concurrent with the initial investigation, both
findings letters were included in the analysis, however, in this special case, similar to Detroit,
both § 14141 actions against Cleveland were classified as one investigation and analyzed
accordingly.
The DOJ initiated a new § 14141 investigation of the Cleveland Division of Police in
March 2013 resulting in a negotiated settlement. Since this investigation occurred after DOJ’s
first negotiated settlement terminated in 2005, it was classified as a discrete investigation and
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analyzed accordingly. Similar to DOJ’s two § 14141 investigations against Cleveland (2000 &
2013), both resulting in distinct negotiated settlements, the DOJ conducted two discrete § 14141
investigations against Miami (2002 & 2011), the earlier resulting in technical assistance, and
more recent, a negotiated settlement. These four § 14141 investigations against two police
departments were classified as four distinct municipal police agencies for subsequent
measurement and analysis for two reasons. First, the DOJ treated both investigations against
Cleveland and Miami as distinct investigations with unique findings. Second, because the two §
14141 investigations against Cleveland and Miami occurred in different decades, the variables
related to these investigations reflected changed environments, organizational attributes, and
conditions. As such, these two police departments were treated as four distinct agencies for
analysis, resulting in 35 investigations of municipal police at this stage of the methodology.
With these above-mentioned exclusions, special cases, and inclusions, the final yield was
n = 24 investigations leading to a negotiated settlement against municipal police agencies having
DOJ issued findings letters available for analysis.
Section 14141 investigations that produced less than reasonable cause to believe that a
police agency was engaged in a pattern or practice of unconstitutional policing, but where the
DOJ as part of their investigation noted operational deficiencies, systemic problems, or
insufficiencies with policies or procedures, a technical assistance letter with embedded findings
was issued to that police agency and made publicly available. There were 11 police agencies
whose § 14141 investigation ended with a mutual agreement for technical assistance without a
resultant negotiated settlement pursuant to that particular investigation.
Of the initial 11 § 14141 investigations of municipal police resulting in technical
assistance, two police agencies were the subject of a second § 14141 investigation at a later time.
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For both the New Orleans Police Department and Miami Police Department, this second § 14141
investigation resulted in a negotiated settlement. Since both of these second investigations were
treated as discrete from their initial investigation by the DOJ, and resulted in a different outcome
from their first § 14141 investigation, New Orleans and Miami were treated as investigations
unique to technical assistance outcomes. This resulted in a pool of 11 investigations of 11 police
agencies.
Findings/technical assistance letters for these 11 municipal police agencies were publicly
available and able to be collected with two exceptions – New Orleans Police Department and
Eastpointe Police Department. Concerning New Orleans, a § 14141 action resulting in technical
assistance from 1996 was verified through a DOJ issued technical report (DOJ, 2010), however,
as reported by Childress (2015), the DOJ has indicated that they are unable to locate any specific
documents related to this investigation. As well, my search of DOJ archives revealed no
documents or memorialized history of this investigation other than verification of its occurrence
in a DOJ document (DOJ, 2010). Concerning the Eastpointe Police Department, a DOJ technical
report (DOJ, 2010) indicated that the Eastpointe investigation resulted in a technical assistance
letter, however, DOJ archives, and secondary sources (Childress, 2015; Rushin, 2017) used to
triangulate the data did not reveal the existence of a technical assistance letter or memorialization
of the investigation. Since the existence of these letters was critical to consistency and not
available, both of these investigations were excluded from analysis.
These exclusions yielded n = 9 municipal police agencies investigated by the DOJ under
§ 14141 resulting in technical assistance with findings letters suitable for analysis. Including
investigations leading to a negotiated settlement, and special consideration given to the two
police agencies with available findings letters subject to two distinct § 14141 actions (Cleveland
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& Miami), 33 municipal police agencies made up the study population of N = 33 § 14141
investigations involving municipal police with findings letters suitable for inclusion and analysis.
The complete list of all municipal police agencies included in this study can be found in
Appendix A.
Investigative output.
After collection of all N = 33 investigative findings letters of municipal police, the second
dependent variable was collected. DOJ’s investigative output, that is, the number of pages in
DOJ’s publicly issued findings letters was recorded as a continuous variable for each
investigation. Due to the issuance of multiple findings letters in some of the N = 33 § 14141
investigations of municipal police, three cases required special consideration. First, the Detroit
Police Department was the subject of multiple findings letters during DOJ’s investigation, and
since these letters covered different qualitative aspects of Detroit’s operations, they were
classified together as one investigation for the purposes of analysis.
To maintain analytical consistency, the investigative output (number of pages) from the §
14141 action against Detroit was aggregated and recorded as one investigative output. Similarly,
the first investigation against the Cleveland Division of Police (2003) yielded two separate
findings and consent decrees, and since these two investigations ran concurrently, both findings
letters were analyzed in the aggregate. Consequently, the output from the DOJ investigation of
Cleveland from 2003 is the aggregation of both letters. Conversely, the Easton Police
Department was the subject of multiple findings letters from the DOJ over a five-year period.
Differentiated from the output against Detroit and Cleveland, each investigative output from
DOJ against Easton was not aggregated for analysis, only the final letter was analyzed and its

83

output recorded since this final § 14141 investigative findings letters best represented the
aggregation of DOJ’s findings from previous investigations and letters.
Qualitative Data Integration
In the embedded research design, one type of data supports the other type of data. This
study is qualitatively driven, with the quantitative data providing descriptive and analytical
support. As such, the initial step in analysis involved a qualitative review of DOJ’s findings
letters.
Content analysis is an analytical technique that uses a set of procedures to make valid
inferences from text (Weber, 1990). This technique can produce qualitative, quantitative, or both
types of data. The most common approach to content analysis is thematic analysis (Franzosi,
2004). Thematic analysis has been described as “a method for identifying, analyzing and
reporting patterns (themes) within text” (Braun & Clarke, 2006, p. 79) by coding data into
segmented and categorized themes (Ayres, 2008).
Thematic analysis was performed on all findings letters involving a municipal police
agency subject to a § 14141 negotiated settlement or technical assistance. Each findings letter
was analyzed for latent themes related to unconstitutional policing; the search for which “goes
beyond the semantic content of the data…to identify or examine the underlying ideas,
assumptions, and conceptualizations – and ideologies – that are theorized as shaping the
semantic content of the data” (Braun & Clarke, 2006, p. 84). As well, findings of deficient
policies, focusing events, and the presence or absence of an insufficient EIS were recorded and
categorized. These types of data are referred to as manifest content, described by Potter and
Levine-Donnerstein (1999) as “that which is on the surface and easily observable, such as the
appearance of a particular word in a written text” (p. 259).
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Thematic analysis was the qualitative methodological choice in this study for three
specific reasons: (a) DOJ’s findings are based on the failure of a police agency to practice
“constitutional policing” – the interpretation of which lacks specificity and clarity. Latent
thematic analysis allows for the identification, and exploration of organizational behaviors that
give meaning to that term and the underlying ideas behind it; (b) thematic analysis allows the
researcher to identify with specificity, unacceptable patterns or practices within municipal police
departments, and to quantify, classify, and analyze those patterns and practices, and (c) to
compare DOJ’s § 14141 actions between police agencies found to engage in patterns or practices
of unconstitutional policing as a counterpoint to agencies with problematic practices or policies
that have not risen to the level of a pattern or practice of unconstitutional policing.
The thematic analysis and related coding were conducted as solo research. Although
uncommon, there is precedent for solo thematic coding in dissertation research and published
reports (Fereday & Muir-Cochrane, 2006). Essential to all interpretive research, but specifically
to solo research is establishing a “process to demonstrate credibility and trustworthiness”
(Fereday & Muir-Cochrane, 2006, p. 81). Such a process of establishing trustworthiness in
thematic analysis has been put forth by Nowell, Norris, White, and Moules, (2017), this involves
establishing: (1) credibility; (2) transferability; (3) dependability; (4) confirmability; and (5)
audit trails. Although these scholars indicate that “there is not clear agreement about how
researchers can rigorously apply the method [of thematic analysis]” (Nowell et al., 2017, p. 2),
this five-step process provided a template for establishing trustworthiness and credibility. As
such, their five-step process was used throughout the thematic analysis.
Procedurally, in conducting the thematic analysis, I adhered to the step-by-step outline
recommended by Braun and Clarke (2006). This included the following six-steps: (1) familiarize
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yourself with the data; (2) generate initial codes; (3) search for themes; (4) review themes; (5)
define and name themes; and (6) produce the report. The initial review was conducted manually
on paper copies; beginning with step two, I digitized all documents, and used Excel Office
Professional Plus 2016 for code and extract organization, as well as thematic review.
Familiarize yourself with the data.
As recommended by Braun and Clarke (2006), after collection of the complete data set, I
read through all 1,356 pages of text contained therein, making notations on the data items, and
searching for patterns and meanings across the entire data set. As suggested by Nowell, et al.,
(2017), I engaged with the data in a prolonged manner, as demonstrated, initial review of the
data began in early March and continued through late June. To memorialize this process, work
towards code and theme development, and help establish an audit trail, a reflective journal was
kept throughout the preliminary coding process with thoughts, reflections, and ideas for
triangulation. Preliminary codes with examples were recorded on the data and in the reflective
journal heuristically. All raw data with initial notes were kept secure and well-organized in
archives.
Generate initial codes.
The approach for coding the latent data was inductive; that is, “without trying to fit it into
a preexisting coding frame” (Nowell et al., 2017, p. 8). During this second phase, preliminary
codes were developed from within-and across-case comparisons as suggested by Ayers (2008),
and memorialized agency by agency through the creation of a preliminary scheme with ideas
gleaned from the first phase of analysis. This was done by reviewing all 1,356 pages of the data
set and accompanying notes contained therein identifying terms, conditions, findings, and
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conclusions from the data that could serve as appropriate codes for subsequent analysis and
theme development.
At this stage, the development and identification of codes was still preliminary but
oriented towards specificity for each extract. This preliminary process produced 159 unique
codes applied to 1,034 coded extracts for the n = 24 investigative findings letters. The reason for
the high number of codes during this phase was in keeping with Braun and Clarke’s (2006)
suggestion that the researcher should “code for as many potential themes/patterns as
possible…code individual extracts of data in as many different ‘themes’ as they fit into – so an
extract may be uncoded, coded once, or coded many times” (p. 89). As well, the duplicative
nature of many of the codes (e.g. Investigations-internal-partiality; Investigations-internal-failure
to conduct; Investigations-internal-bias, etc.) facilitated the production of the high number of
preliminary codes arranged around similar findings. The same process of preliminary coding was
conducted for the n = 9 investigations leading to technical assistance yielding 69 unique codes
applied to 359 data extracts.
The next step was to review, refine, and consolidate the preliminary codes, and continue
the process of establishing trustworthiness (Nowell, et al., 2017), which for this step included;
development of a coding framework, ongoing documentation, reflexive journaling, triangulation,
and the use of “professional experience” (Ayers, 2008, p. 868). Each unique code was placed
within a broader code through the creation of coding framework with exemplar extracts,
descriptions, and references. This process yielded 39 unique codes for the entire dataset: See
Table 1 for an example of the coding framework. The complete coding framework that resulted
from this step for the thematic analysis can be found in Appendix B.
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Table 1
Preliminary Coding Framework Exemplar Extract – Complaint Deficiencies.
Code

Description of code

Exemplar extract

Triangulation

Complaint
deficiencies

Describes deficiencies in
policies, procedures,
practices, and systems
specific to the civilian
complaint making
process; not the internal
investigation of those
complaints.

CDP’s civilian complaint system, as a whole, is
disorganized and ineffective. CDP was only able
to produce a fraction of the case files we
requested, and the files produced were often
incomplete and lacked basic information about
dispositions and outcomes. CDP does not have
systems in place to track its performance or
decision-making regarding civilian complaints
(Gupta & Dettelbach, 2014, p. 48).

Rushin (2017)
Walker (2017)

Similar to development of the preliminary codes, code development at this stage was
inductive, however, I regularly referred to prior-research to triangulate and serve as a consistency
check a posteriori. Exclusive of DOJ documents and technical reports, four publications exist
that address specific and summary findings of § 14141 actions that proved useful in further code
development, and were used to cross-reference and triangulate my analysis (Childress, 2015;
Rushin, 2017; Walker, 2017; Douglass, 2017). Additionally, as described by Boyatzis, (1998)
reliability of codes can be demonstrated as “consistency of judgement over time, events, and
settings…when a person makes the same observation at two different times or in two different
settings” (p. 147). This research required consistency of judgment over different time periods,
and across investigative findings. Considering the N = 33 investigations involved 33 municipal
police agencies from 1994 to 2017, there was substantial cross-over in themes across
investigations, and between investigative outcomes. The development of a preliminary codebook
and reflective journaling served to demonstrate consistency of judgement across cases.
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Searching for themes.
Step three analysis began after all preliminary codes were reviewed and collated into
broader codes. The goal of this phase was to identify “candidate themes” (Braun & Clarke, 2006,
p. 89) by “sorting the different codes into potential themes and collating all the relevant coded
extracts with the identified themes” (Braun & Clarke, 2006, p. 89). Since this process was
inductive, I did not attempt to fit the codes into any type of preexisting thematic frame or theory,
and ensured that the candidate themes were closely linked with the data as recommended by
Nowell, et al., (2017). Detailed notes were kept throughout this process in the reflective journal
to maintain trustworthiness (Nowell, et al., 2017).
This process produced 18 candidate themes, which included a “miscellaneous” theme for
coded extracts that did not yet fall within a theme. Continuing to follow the methodology
described by Braun and Clarke (2006), I organized the candidate themes into theme-piles and
creating a visual representation of the themes within the reflective journal. This was an iterative
and reflective process in which the codes from each candidate theme were reviewed and finely
analyzed to ensure appropriate theme association: See Table 2 for an example of the output of
this process.
Table 2
Thematic Analysis Candidate Theme and Code Association.
Code
Deficient accountability systems

Candidate Theme

Complaint deficiencies
Deficient internal investigations
Insufficient individual accountability

Lack of accountability
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Reviewing themes.
During this step, analysis and refinement of the 18 candidate themes began with a review
of the candidate themes with necessary revisions. This process was in keeping with established
practices of data reduction for thematic analysis (Boyatzis, 1998; Braun & Clarke, 2006; Nowell,
et al., 2017) wherein codes that formed a coherent pattern were grouped as themes or subthemes, and those that did not were reviewed to ensure adequate support within the dataset. As
recommended by Braun and Clarke (2006), review and analysis took place at two levels, the first
involved rereading all the coded data within each associated theme to ensure consistency,
coherence, “and clear and identifiable distinctions between themes” (p. 91). This first level of
review resulted in some recoding, modification, and refinement as was necessary and expected
(Braun & Clarke, 2006).
The second level of analysis during this phase involved a review of all codes within
associated themes across the dataset to ensure consistency of interpretation and robustness for
final theme consideration. The process of returning to the data was in keeping with
trustworthiness criteria (Nowell, et al., 2017). During the analysis it became clear that some
candidate themes were more suitable to subthemes, while others lacked support across the entire
dataset for theme or subtheme consideration. In addition, two new codes were developed (King,
2004) from the “miscellaneous” theme, one of which became its own theme, the other a
subtheme.
This iterative and reflective process yielded a total of 8 themes with 18 associated
subthemes from the 1,356 pages of data, and 159 preliminary codes. The reduction of data
cohered to Attride-Stirling’s (2001) suggestion that during thematic analysis, the data should
become more manageable and succinct.
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Defining and naming themes.
Following Braun and Clarke’s (2006) methodology, this step began by conducting a
detailed analysis of each theme, which was done both qualitatively and quantitatively. For the
qualitative portion, each theme, subtheme, and associated coded extract were reviewed for
internal consistency by referring to DOJ’s (2017a) The Civil Rights Division’s Pattern and
Practice Reform Work: 1994-Present report a posteriori by comparing summary reports to
thematic findings. Similar to the procedure during preliminary code development, a qualitative
analysis write-up for each theme and subtheme was memorialized with examples from the
dataset: See Table 3 for an example of the output of this process. This same process, with
relevant interpretation and memorialization, was completed for all eight themes, and 18
subthemes. A full and finalized theme and subtheme codebook can be found in Appendix C.
Table 3
Theme and Subtheme Codebook – Example
Theme

Subtheme

Interpretation

Example

Organizational
orientation
and culture

-

Organizational outlook and enduring
legacy. Widespread and endorsed
strategies and practices geared
towards a specific end. Can be
characterized by legitimate means
towards illegitimate ends.

-

-

Focus on
enforcement,
activity, and
arrests

-

FPD supervisors are more concerned
with the number of citations and
arrests officers produce than
whether those citations and arrests
are lawful or promote public safety.
(DOJ, 2015, p. 22)

The quantitative analysis of each theme involved frequency scoring by counting the
presence or absence of each theme and subtheme for the dataset (Boyatzis, 1998). To facilitate
different types of analyses, the n = 24 negotiated settlements, and n = 9 technical assistance
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letters with thematic findings were then reviewed and analyzed according to, (1) temporal order
by year at first presence to analyze over-time changes in § 14141 findings, (2) highest to lowest
frequency observations to understand any hierarchy of meaning within the data (Braun & Clarke,
2006), and by (3) simple scaling of the subthemes and themes by frequency counts (Boyatzis,
1998).
After quantitative analysis of each theme was completed, each theme, subtheme and
coded extract were reviewed twice, and scrutinized as recommended by King (2004) to aid in
ensuring trustworthiness. The final phase, producing the report (Braun & Clarke, 2006) was the
final output of this process, and is included in the thematic analysis section of this dissertation.
Quantitative Data Integration
The quantitative data were collected from a variety of sources contingent to the type of
data sought and supporting theory. The following sections identify the sources of those data,
methodology in collection, and coding of applicable variables.
Disjointed incrementalism variables.
Disjointed incrementalism variables were collected from the following open sources:
DOJ issued findings letters, DOJ’s website archive, and DOJ technical reports (DOJ, 2010; DOJ,
2017a; DOJ, 2017b; DOJ, 2018), news reports (Childress, 2015), and scholarly publications
(Rushin, 2017). The collection of variables from the preceding sources is described below.
Investigative generation.
DOJ § 14141 investigations of municipal police were categorized according to the
generation in which the investigation commenced. As indicated by the DOJ (2017a),
investigations through 2005 are categorized as first-generation, and thereafter, have been
categorized as second-generation. The commencement date of each § 14141 investigation was
gathered from multiple and triangulated sources for accuracy (Childress, 2015; DOJ, 2010; DOJ,
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2017a; DOJ, 2017b; Rushin, 2017). This generational dichotomy resulted in n = 16 firstgeneration, and n = 17 second-generation § 14141 investigations of municipal police. To reflect
the binary distinction between first and second-generation investigations, first-generation
investigations were coded as a “0”, and second-generation as “1”.
Investigation length.
The length of a § 14141 investigation was determined by the reported and documented
month and year that an official § 14141 action was commenced using multiple, and triangulated
sources to verify initiation date (Childress, 2015; DOJ, 2010; DOJ, 2017a; DOJ, 2017b; Rushin,
2017). The variable investigation length was calculated from this date to the identified month
and year when a final findings letter was issued by the DOJ. Investigation length was measured
as the number of total months between these two dates. All N = 33 § 14141 investigative
findings letters had the date of issuance identified on their first page with three exceptions;
Pittsburgh, Columbus, and Washington D.C. For these cases, I was able to obtain the findings
letter issuance date through other primary (DOJ, 2010) and secondary sources (Childress, 2015;
Rushin, 2017), and used that date accordingly. Both the investigation commencement date, and
findings letter issuance date for all N = 33 investigations can be found in Appendix A.
Deterrence variables.
Deterrence variables were collected from a variety of open source documents and public
archives including municipal police employment data from the Federal Bureau of Investigation,
Uniform Crime Reporting – Crime in the United States Law Enforcement Personnel report for
each year that the DOJ initiated an investigation against a police agency. Population statistics
were collected from the U.S. Census Bureau website. Both sources served to assist in the
creation of other deterrence variables including size and percent non-white. The methodology for
collection and coding is described below.
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Resources.
The nearest decennial census year for each of the 33 § 14141 investigations was used to
create a ratio of total sworn personnel per 1,000 population as a measure of police resources.
This process led to the creation of the variable resources, and is the same ratio reported in the
UCR cities and counties group by size reports (FBI-UCR, 1994-2015). The variable resources
was measured at the ratio level, and further as a binary variable. Since 2.8 sworn police officers
per 1,000-person population was the mean of the study population, the variable resources was
coded as “0” for municipal police agencies with fewer than 2.8 sworn employees per 1,000person population, and “1” for those with 2.8 or greater.
Size.
Accounting for the variable size of a municipal police agency involved reducing the
number of sworn employees by dividing the total number of sworn employees by 10 to make the
data more manageable, facilitate interpretation, categorization, and analysis. Size of a municipal
police agency was treated as both a continuous, and categorical variable, depending on the type
of analysis conducted. To assign police agencies into categories with validity, I used seven of
BJS’ (2015) Local Police Departments, 2013: Personnel, Policies, and Practices categories
accordingly; (category) size of police agency by full-time sworn employees: (1) 10-24; (2) 2549; (3) 50-99; (4) 100-249; (5) 250-499; (6) 500-999; (7) 1,000 or more. BJS (2015) accounts for
police agencies with 0-1, 2-4, and 5-9 sworn employees, however, these categories were not
included since these sized agencies had no representation in the study population.
For analysis as a binary predictor variable, the seven categories of the variable size, were
collapsed into two: Categories 1-5 which include municipal police departments with up to and
including 499 sworn employees were coded as “0”. The remaining two categories, 6-7, which
include municipal police agencies with 500 or more sworn employees were coded as “1”. This
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binary categorization was chosen because municipal police agencies with 500 or more sworn
employees represent 1% of all local police agencies in the United States (BJS, 2015). As such,
the binary distribution of the variable size by code was “0” for the bottom 99% of local police
agencies, and “1” for the top 1% of local police agencies based on the number of sworn
employees.
Population group.
BJS’ (2015) Local Police Departments, 2013 report served as a reference for
categorization of the variable population group. Since the inclusion of a municipality for this
dissertation had to meet the 10,000-person threshold, two of BJS’ population categories were
excluded since their populations fell below the minimum threshold for operationalization as a
municipality. The remaining seven population categories were assigned accordingly; (category)
population served at time of nearest census year: (1) 10,000-24,999; (2) 25,000-49,999; (3)
50,000-99,999; (4) 100,000-249,999; (5) 250,000-499,999; (6) 500,000-999,999; (7) 1,000,000
or more.
For analysis as a binary predictor variable, the seven categories of the variable population
group were collapsed into two: Categories 1-4 which include municipalities with up to 249,999
persons were coded as “0”. The remaining three categories, 5-7, which included municipalities
with 250,000 or more persons was coded as “1”.
When coded as a binary variable, both size and population group reflect their aggregated
categories that are less than 1% of all local police. That is, BJS (2015) indicates that 0.9% of all
local police agencies in the U.S. have 500 sworn employees or more (categories 6 & 7), and
0.8% of all local police agencies in the U.S. serve populations of 250,000 or more persons
(categories 5, 6, & 7). Adding an additional category to either variable makes the percentage of
police agencies categorized as a binary variable inconsistent. Hence, the binary codes of “0” and
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“1” reflect a dichotomy that differentiates the aggregation of categories representing 99% of
local police, from 1% of local police for both variables.
Percent non-white.
Population statistics were collected from the U.S. Census Bureau’s website. Specifically,
population data from each municipality reflected the nearest decennial census year to the date
that a § 14141 investigation was initiated against a particular police agency. These data were
collected in the form of total population, and percent population non-White by subtracting the
White-alone percentage from 100. Since Latino or Hispanic origin are considered ethnicities, and
not races (U.S. Census Bureau, 2010a). I created a demographic variable municipality percent
non-white by calculating the non-White population of each municipality from the Not-Hispanic
or Latino category of individuals who self-identified as White-alone in each census report. This
was done to tease out the White population from the Hispanic and Latino population who
identify themselves as racially White, but ethnically Latino or Hispanic. The variable percent
non-white, then, reflects the census demographics of a municipality that self-identifies as any
race or ethnicity but for White-alone. This variable was then coded as “0” for municipalities that
were less than 54% non-White, and “1” for municipalities that were 54% or greater non-White,
reflecting the mean percent non-white in the study population.
Multiple streams variables.
Multiple streams variables were collected from various open-sources including DOJ
issued findings letters, news search queries, polling data, and governmental archives. The
methodology, collection, and coding of all variables for multiple streams data is described in the
following section.
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Problem stream.
The problem stream has three distinct elements each having a different
operationalization, and as such three sources were used for relevant analysis. All of the following
data were retrieved from open sources:
(1) Focusing events: To determine the presence or absence of a focusing event in the
study population, I established one condition and three discrete criterion – of which one must
have been met – to determine applicability as a focusing event for a particular investigation.
First, to better understand the relationship between focusing events and DOJ’s decisionmaking relative to a § 14141 investigative outcome, the condition required that the event(s)
occurred within three years prior to the commencement of the established § 14141 investigation
date (Childress, 2015; DOJ, 2010; DOJ, 2017a; DOJ, 2017b; Rushin, 2017).
Second, one of following three required criterion must have been met for categorization;
(a) a focusing event must have been specifically referenced in a DOJ findings document, for
example: “Since the August 2014 shooting death of Michael Brown, the lack of trust between the
Ferguson Police Department and a significant portion of Ferguson’s residents, has become
undeniable” (DOJ, 2015, p. 6); (b) the focusing event(s) are alluded to in DOJ’s findings
document but not specifically cited, for example: “There have been a number of widely
publicized incidents involving use of force by the police, leading to understandable public
concern” (Smith & Durkan, 2011, p. 3); or (c) an event is not specifically mentioned or alluded
to in an investigative findings document but publicly reported in such a way that in the
aggregate, represents a type of singular event, for example: “Federal official first looked at
Schenectady police after four of its officers were sent to prison on federal drug charges”
(Childress, 2015, Schenectady Police Department, para. 1).
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Using this methodology, 14 of the 24 § 14141 investigations resulting in a negotiated
settlement had attributable focusing events, and 4 of the 9 § 14141 investigations resulting in
technical assistance had attributable focusing events. Focusing events for each investigation were
coded as “0” for absence, and “1” for presence, by municipal police agency.
(2) Indicators – early intervention systems are designed to track and monitor individual,
and organizational performance (DOJ, 2017a). Identification and analysis of municipal police
agency deficiencies with EISs have been a been a consistent feature of DOJ’s § 14141
investigative findings over the life-course of the provision. The DOJ has prioritized addressing
issues related to EISs in municipal police agencies because these systems are designed to identify
aberrant and problematic police behavior to “prevent patterns of misconduct from emerging”
(DOJ, 2017a, p. 31) while providing an overall assessment of a law enforcement agency (King &
Dassin, 2009). Although EISs vary according to the needs and size of a police department
(Walker, Milligan, & Berke, 2005), certain components are considered core to all police
agencies, and are designed to capture generalized misconduct, therefore, make up an aggregate
of indicators in the problem stream, these components include, but are not limited to; rates of use
of force, citizens’ complaints, civil litigation, and use of sick time (DOJ, 2017a). As such, an
adequate and functional EIS served as a measure for the variety of indicators in the problem
stream.
As part of the analysis of the § 14141 findings letters, I searched and identified when
present, manifest content that specifically referred to a municipal police agency having
insufficiencies, deficiencies, or lack of an EIS. Police agencies in which the DOJ did not address
EIS as problematic were categorized as “0”, for absence of an identified problem, and where the
DOJ specifically referred to a police agency as having a problematic EIS as “1” for presence of
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an identified problem. This methodology resulted in 20 of 24 police agencies under negotiated
settlement with noted issues related to EIS, and 8 of 9 police agencies under technical assistance
with noted issues related to EISs, and therefore an inadequate indictor system.
(3) Feedback: ProQuest Majors Dailies search of the five most popular and influential
news organizations in the United States, including: The New York Times, The Washington Post,
Los Angeles Times, The Wall Street Journal, and The Chicago Tribune for reports related to
municipal police agency misconduct and corruption. Using national media reporting on crime,
terrorism, and other criminal justice issues as a methodology to analyze and discern public
attitudes has been used scholars such as Enns (2016), and Worrell (1999). Indeed, Rushin (2017)
acknowledges that “one way to judge the perceived importance of legal measures is to analyze
media coverage” (p. 95), and this technique is well suited for that purpose since the “DOJ has
relied on media coverage of police misconduct” (Rushin, 2017, p. 104) to guide decisions
regarding which police agencies to investigate.
Using the name of the municipality as the primary search term, along with the secondary
term, “police”, I identified all news articles related to a police agency within the three-yearperiod prior to the established date of a § 14141 investigation. The term “police” was included in
the secondary search term as a modifier to better distinguish news articles related to municipal
police rather than other government agencies. Since § 14141 investigations vary in duration, and
may take over a year (DOJ, 2017a), a standardized search period for all municipal police
agencies of three years prior to the announcement date of a § 14141 investigation was utilized
coinciding with the timeframe for identification of a focusing event.
After the initial search was conducted, ProQuest’s sorting feature allowed me to filter
through, and include news reports related to each municipal police agency subject to § 14141 by
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geographic location, and by terms commonly associated with police malfeasance and
dysfunction. These filterable search terms varied from one news search to another due to the
nuances, details, and intricacies of the misconduct related to each police agency and associated
news story, however, when filtering I searched for, identified, and tagged for inclusion, any
ProQuest subject that explicitly mentioned, or is commonly associated with police misconduct,
unlawful police practice, police brutality, or police corruption. Some examples of ProQuest
subjects that were tagged for search inclusion; false arrests, civil liberties, firings, official
misconduct, review boards, shootings, scandals, litigation, investigations, obstruction, arrests,
raids, minorities, firearms, deadly force, search and seizure, protests, riots, corruption,
misconduct, brutality, and excessive force.
This search technique produced a final yield of news articles in the five major
newspapers that met the following three criteria; three-year timeframe prior to the initiation of an
official § 14141 investigation, name of the municipality and police agency under investigation,
and news articles with applicable subject terms. I then reviewed the final yield of articles to
identify any news reports implicating a specific municipal police agency in misconduct,
brutality, corruption, or unlawful practices.
Using this methodology, 17 of the 24 § 14141 investigations resulting in a negotiated
settlement had feedback, and 4 of the 9 § 14141 investigations leading to technical assistance had
feedback. Municipal police agencies without national news media feedback were coded as “0”,
and those with feedback were coded as “1”.
(4) Accompaniment:
The accompaniment variable was not collected from a public source, per se, rather it was
the measure of interdependence between the MS variables focusing events and feedback.
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Policy stream.
Manifest content from the findings letters, or what Braun and Clarke (2006) refer to as
semantic data, exists at the explicit level. As part of the thematic analysis, all findings letters
from the N = 33 § 14141 investigations were reviewed and analyzed for manifest content
describing insufficient, deficient, or necessary but non-existent policies. Once identified, these
data were recorded and categorized as present or absent for each municipal police agency. After
identification and recording, five policy clusters were formed using a process described by
Boyatzis (1998). The resultant policy clusters were then reviewed a posteriori against previous
research (Childress, 2015; Douglass, 2017; Rushin, 2017; Walker, 2017), and DOJ publications
(DOJ, 2010; DOJ, 2017a; DOJ, 2017b) to aid in ensuring trustworthiness (Nowell, et al., 2017).
Each of the five policy clusters contained multiple policies specific to each agency under §
14141 investigation, with cross-over between different findings letters and police agencies. For
each police agency under investigation, noted policies within the cluster dictated if the cluster
was rated as present or absent. In keeping with this thematic clustering methodology (Boyatzis,
1998), frequency, intensity, or scaling were not calculated. An example of the output for the
variety of polices clustered under the variable use of force policies can be found in Table 4.
Table 4
Multiple Streams – Policy Stream, Policy Cluster Variable.
Policy cluster

Use of force policies

Included policies
Use of force – general
Use of force – pepper spray
Use of force – reporting
Use of force – chokeholds
Use of force – canines
Use of force – investigations
Use of force – firearms
Use of force – tasers
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This process resulted in the following five distinct policy clusters; (a) use of force
policies; (b) stop, search, and arrest policies; (c) civilian complaint system policies; (d) internal
discipline system policies; and (e) response to special populations policies. With the exception of
the special population cluster, all policy clusters represented specific, and explicitly named
policies by the DOJ in need of reform. As such, four of the five policy clusters did not require
special criteria or definitions for inclusion; mere reference as a policy deficiency in a § 14141
investigative findings letter was enough to satisfy inclusion. An example of mere reference to an
internal discipline policy deficiency from the Austin Police Department:
We recommend that the APD complete the development of a discipline matrix….Such a
matrix should detail the levels of discipline available – e.g., retraining, verbal counseling,
letters of counseling, forfeiture of leave time, suspension, demotion, and termination – to
address violations of policy. The matrix should specify for each type of policy violation
what level of discipline shall be utilized for sustained violations of policy. (Cutlar, 2008,
p. 39)
Special populations were defined using federal policy language that specifies protection
of rights of identified groups of individuals on the basis of race, ethnicity, gender, LGBTQ
status, individuals in mental health crisis, and juveniles (DOJ, 2017a). Early intervention system
policies were excluded from the policy cluster analysis since the quantification of this variable
was included in the problem stream, operationalized as indicators.
For the purposes of clarity and efficiency; insufficient, deficient, or non-existent polices,
as indicated in this section, are referred to as “policy deficiencies” or “deficient policies”
throughout the remaining dissertation. Municipal police agencies without noted deficient policies
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were coded as “0” for each policy cluster, and agencies where deficiencies were noted for each
policy cluster were coded as “1”.
Political stream.
The conceptualization of the political stream involved developing a measure of the
national mood towards the police, and tracking administrative turnover in the federal
government. Since Kingdon (1995) broadly describes the national mood as “changes in public
opinion…in discernable ways” (p. 146), three specific questions related to attitude towards the
police, and criminal justice system were collected and aggregated to develop a composite
measure of the national mood regarding the police. Although Gallop Inc. asks and reports a
specific question related to confidence in the police, prior research using time-series polling data
to draw inferences regarding criminal justice topics suggests that aggregating various polling
measures can produce a more valid and reliable dimension of a criminal justice construct then a
single measure (Enns, 2016).
Guided by scholarship measuring the construct of confidence in the judicial system by
Enns (2016), I identified six Gallop Inc. questions related to public attitudes regarding the police
and criminal justice system. Although not a direct question related to police, the question
regarding confidence in the criminal justice system was included since numerous § 14141
investigations noted deficiencies related to a municipal police agency’s interaction with the
larger criminal justice system as a root cause of organizational police dysfunction (e.g.
Baltimore, Cleveland, Ferguson, New Orleans, Meridian, Missoula, etc.). Of the six polling
questions, three were asked intermittently during the life-course of § 14141, therefore, excluded
from analysis. The three remaining questions asked by Gallop Inc. that were used to form a
composite measure of the national mood towards the police were:
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•

“Now I am going to read you a list of institutions in American society. Please tell me how
much confidence you, yourself, have in each one – a great deal, quite a lot, some or very
little? The police” (Gallop Inc., 2018a, p. 22).

•

“Now I am going to read you a list of institutions in American society. Please tell me how
much confidence you, yourself, have in each one – a great deal, quite a lot, some or very
little? The criminal justice system” (Gallop Inc., 2018a, p. 21).

•

“Please tell me how you would rate the honesty and ethical standards of people in these
fields – very high, high, average, low or very low. Police officers” (Gallop Inc., 2018b, p.
31).
Of the three polling questions, both confidence in the police, and honesty were asked and

reported every year over the life-course of § 14141, however, the question related to confidence
in the criminal justice system was asked every year from 1994 to 2017 with the exception of
2001. To make up for these missing data, I used K-nearest neighbors mean imputation (Schmitt,
Mandel, & Guedj, 2015) for each of the four possible responses from the 2001 Gallop Inc.
question. This method was chosen over using overall-mean imputation, other imputation
methods, or deletion since the use of polling data for the national mood was intended to identify
over-time changes in support, not an aggregated measure of support for the criminal justice
system.
Although four categories of responses were asked for all three questions, Gallop reported
an additional category of “none” for all three questions (Gallop Inc., 2016; Gallop Inc., 2018a; &
Gallop Inc., 2018b). The five categories of responses were then collapsed into three, since this is
the method that Gallop Inc. (2016) uses to report their social series data. As such, responses for
the three questions were aggregated into positive responses (very high, high, a great deal & quite
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a lot), neutral responses (some & average), and negative responses (low, very low, very little &
none).
The three Gallop Inc. questions and their positive responses, conceptualized as an overtime measure of the national mood towards the police were tested for consistency using
Cronbach’s alpha, α = .717. The responses for each of the three questions were aggregated into a
single measure for positive, neutral, and negative national mood. Using this methodology, the
overall average positive national mood in attitude towards the police was 46% throughout the life
course of § 14141. Years in which the national mood was higher were coded as “1”, and years in
which the mood was lower were coded as “0”. There were four years in which the average
positive mood was the historical average of 46% (2006, 2011, 2013, & 2016). For these years, I
determined the code based on changes in the negative mood, that is, when the negative mood
was up and neutral was down, these years were coded as negative (2013 & 2016), and when
negative mood was down and neutral was up, these years were coded as positive (2006 & 2011).
Considering the dichotomous nature of the data after coding, and in the context of attempting to
capture over time changes in the positive national mood towards the police, I determined to
classify the national mood for the four years at historic average according to their trend to more
precisely capture the mood than categorizing the historic average by an absolute binary cutoff.
Data regarding administrative turnover, conceptualized as the officeholder of Presidency
of the United States and their political party, were collected from the University of Virginia,
Miller Center, The Presidency archive. For the time period from 1994 to 2017, each president’s
inauguration, and end date were cross-listed against DOJ’s § 14141 investigation commencement
date. Each of the N = 33 investigation commencement dates that fell within a president’s tenure
was attributed to that president and their political party. Section 14141 investigations that were
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commenced under a Democratic administration were coded as “0”, and those commenced under
a Republican administration as “1”.
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Thematic Analysis
Descriptive Statistics
Descriptive statistics are provided in Table 5 for variables related to the N = 33
investigations of municipal police. These data include variables measuring the police
organization (size & resources), the municipal environment of the police agency (population
category & percentage non-white), and DOJ investigative characteristics (length of investigation
& investigative output). The descriptive statistics are presented as aggregated into a study
population, and disaggregated by investigative outcome, revealing noteworthy information
related to § 14141 investigations of municipal police, including the following points, many of
which are further explored in this this study:
•

The mean size of municipal police departments appears to substantially differ based on
investigative outcome.

•

Mean population category, and police resources appear to substantially differ based on
investigative outcome.

•

Larger population categories of municipal police, and greater resources appear positively
related.

•

The distribution of municipal police agencies by size is highly positively skewed, and to a
greater extent for police agencies under negotiated settlement than under technical assistance.

•

Length of an investigation, and percentage of population non-white do not appear to vary
based on investigative outcome.

•

The range of municipal police departments, by size, appears substantially larger for agencies
under negotiated settlement than those under technical assistance.

•

Investigative output appears to differ based on investigative outcome.
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Table 5
Descriptive Statistics – Study Population and by Investigative Outcome.
Population

Variable

M

SD

Mdn

Mode

Min

Max

Skew

Population category

4.2

1.88

5

5

1

7

-0.4

Percentage non-white

54

25.64

58

33.1

9

97

-0.05

152.3

257.21

99.9

9.9

1.6

1203.4

3.11

Resources (sworn per
1,000)

2.8

1.2

2.6

-

0.6

6.1

0.75

Length (Investigative
months)

18.8

12.2

15

9

5

51

1.26

Output (pages)

41.1

44.7

29

2

2

164

1.91

Population category

4.5

1.96

5

6

1

7

-0.71

Percentage non-white

55

22.46

60.1

67

10

89.5

-0.23

194.7

290.35

107.8

-

1.6

1203.4

2.64

Resources (sworn per
1,000)

2.9

1.24

2.6

-

0.6

6.1

0.44

Length (Investigative
months)

18.8

12.28

15

15

5

51

1.35

Output (pages)

47.6

50.56

34

164

2

164

1.5

Population category

3.4

1.51

3

3

1

6

0.14

Percentage non-white

53

34.30

49

-

9

97

0.20

Size (sworn x 10)

39.2

49.78

16

-

5.1

141.8

1.65

Resources (sworn per
1,000)

2.1

0.6

2.3

-

1.3

3

-0.06

Length (Investigative
months)

18.8

12.74

11

10

9

42

1.26

Output (pages)

23.8

13.47

23

20

6

50

0.57

Size (sworn x 10)
N = 33

Negotiated
settlement
n = 24

Technical
assistance
n=9

Size (sworn x 10)

Note. (-) No mode
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Thematic Analysis
•

RQ1: What pattern or practice themes emerge from DOJ’s investigative findings?
Thematic analysis of the N = 33 findings letters yielded eight main themes, and 18

subthemes. The themes were tabulated using a process described by Boyatzis (1998) where the
presence or absence of a theme was counted for each police agency, rather than the frequency or
intensity of that theme. The eight themes with their representation in the complete dataset, and as
a percentage of investigations of municipal police agencies with findings is presented in Table 6.
Table 6
Eight Main Themes: Analysis Breakdown. N = 33 Investigations of Municipal Police
# of
investigations
with thematic
finding

% of
investigations
with thematic
finding

% of total
thematic findings

Conditions of ambiguity

21

64%

12%

Institutionalization

28

85%

16%

Lack of professional currency

32

97%

18%

Leadership and management failure

15

45%

8%

Organizational myopia

27

82%

15%

Organizational orientation and culture

9

27%

5%

Routinized misconduct

20

61%

11%

Tactical discretion, weapon competency,
equipment insufficiencies

25

76%

14%

Total

177

Theme
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100%

Noteworthy in the initial analysis presented in Table 6 is that almost all § 14141
investigations of municipal police (97%), the DOJ determined that there was a lack of
professional currency embedded within the police agency. Furthermore, two other
organizational-wide themes, institutionalization and organizational myopia, were found by the
DOJ as deficiencies in 85% and 82% of all municipal police agencies under study. These three
themes comprised approximately half (49%) of all themes discovered among the N = 33
investigations of municipal police. In contrast, a different organizational-wide theme,
organizational orientation and culture, was the least present among the themes with just 27% of
investigations of municipal police yielding this result and the only main theme, along with
leadership and management failure, in which less than 50% of investigations of municipal police
were found. All remaining themes were present in more than 50% but less than 80% of
investigative findings letters.
Theme one - conditions of ambiguity.
DOJ’s § 14141 findings letters frequently referenced situations in which officers,
including both rank and file, were unsure, had contradictory information, received vague
direction, or were confused regarding how to implement specific processes, policies and
procedures. This confusion was often described as a lack of understanding and clarity rooted not
in training deficiencies, rather inadequacies in policies, general guidance, clear communication,
and officer direction. The DOJ attributed these ambiguities to causal systemic agency problems,
generalized misconduct, and improper policing. An example of conditions of ambiguity from the
Investigation of the Cleveland Division of Police:
The use of force policy has changed, but the policy in place at the time of our
investigation was confusing, at times conflicted with the law, and did not provide
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sufficient guidance to officers. Indeed, many officers reported to us that they did not
understand the policy and, more generally, did not understand what level of force they
were permitted to use under what circumstances. (Gupta & Dettelbach, 2014, p. 45)
Conditions of ambiguity were frequently organization-wide, rooted in a generalized lack
of understanding of basic police functionality. As an example, from the Investigation of the
Albuquerque Police Department: “We observed that there was no consistent understanding of the
department’s community policing program within the ranks. Even commanders had inconsistent
understandings of the agency’s program” (Samuels & Martinez, 2014, p. 40).
Conditions of ambiguity were often a direct cause of other systemic problems, in
particular, the DOJ noted the relationship between vague directions and officer reporting
requirements for use-of-force incidents, this type of ambiguity was found to allow systemic
misconduct to proliferate when insufficiently monitored. From the Findings Letter Re: Use of
Force by the Washington Metropolitan Police Department: “We found widespread variances in
how MPD officers understand and define the kinds of force they need to report” (Yeomans,
2001, p. 2). These types of procedural inconsistencies do not allow for municipal police agencies
to accurately or reliably use critical information for internal accountability. Taken together,
conditions of ambiguity whether in policy, organizational functionality, or reporting
requirements, create an undercurrent of systemic problems for police agencies that contribute to
unconstitutional policing practices.
Theme two - institutionalization.
Institutionalization as defined by O’Hara (2012), occurs when “an organization
increasingly bases its approach to customers or clients on what best serves the comfort or
preference of employees” (p. 20). Embedded within many of the findings letters, municipal
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police agencies under § 14141 investigation were consistently cited for demonstrating behaviors
and actions appearing to best serve their members, often out of manifest partiality, and other
times borne out of agency preference and convenience. Municipal police agencies that
demonstrated these attributes tended to do so in two distinct ways. As such, institutionalization
has two subthemes.
Subtheme one - internal partiality.
In DOJ’s findings letters, internal partiality is typified by an agency’s bias in outlook,
behavior, and orientation favoring police officers in events involving police-citizen encounters
and any subsequent investigation. An example of this type of institutionalization was
exemplified in the City of Pittsburgh Investigative Findings Letter wherein it was noted that the
police agency “gives greater weight to the statements of its police officers, while discounting the
statements of witnesses for the complainant…[and] does not fully collect all evidence during its
investigations [of police misconduct]” (Patrick, 1997, p. 2). This internal partiality towards
police officers runs deep in many organizations, and may in fact lead to unjustified exonerations,
and a lack of accountability for police wrongdoing; for example, the DOJ found it
deeply troubling…that some of the specially-trained investigators who are charged with
conducting unbiased reviews of officers’ use of deadly force admitted to us that they
conduct their investigations with the goal of casting the accused officer in the most
positive light possible. (Gupta & Dettelbach, 2014, p. 5)
Further, the DOJ routinely pointed out that the partiality of internal investigations can
become compromised when “investigations of alleged criminal misconduct [are] conducted by
officers in the same command as the officers who allegedly engaged in the misconduct, creating
a potential conflict of interest” (DOJ, 2002, p. 5). This conflict of interest was thematically
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apparent in many DOJ issued findings letters, particularly when police supervisory officers were
charged with conducting investigations in which they witnessed, or were part of a misconduct
allegation (Rosenbaum, 2003), undermining what should otherwise have been an impartial
investigative process.
Subtheme two - misaligned policy and practice.
Many of DOJ’s findings indicated that a municipal police agency was not adhering to its
own policies, in these circumstances policies are clear and appropriate, yet the police agency
accepts practices from its employees that routinely ignore those policies, adhering to accepted
alternatives for organizational and officer convenience. With misaligned policy and practice
findings, operational convenience and organizational practicality, rather than systemic
misconduct is implied. An example of misaligned policy and practice from the Investigation of
the Miami Police Department:
Although DO 2.7 (Firearms Procedures) requires officers to qualify every year with every
kind of firearm the MPD allows them to use, we learned from command staff and officers
that the MPD does not enforce this requirement. We learned that, in practice, officers can
remain qualified for up to eighteen months to two years before having to requalify.
(Rosenbaum, 2003, p. 8)
Failing to adhere to organizational standards, when those standards are necessary and
appropriate, was noted as a contributor to unconstitutional policing in the investigation of the
Ferguson Police Department, as stated: “Perhaps the greatest deviation from FPD’s use-of-force
policies is that officers frequently do not report the force they use at all. There are many
indications that this underreporting is widespread [and that] these policies are routinely ignored”
(DOJ, 2015, p. 38).
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Institutionalization in a municipal police agency manifests though agency practices that
favor its members both to the exclusion of impartiality for internal bias, and the avoidance of
established protocols for practicality and operational convenience. Considering that such a high
percentage of police agencies under § 14141 investigation demonstrated attributes of
institutionalization is highly suggestive of internal compliance and culture as significant
contributors to deep systemic problems, and the potential for unconstitutional policing.
Theme three - lack of professional currency.
With the notable exception of one municipal police agency that discontinued cooperating
with the federal government during the investigation of the agency (Perez, 2012), all § 14141
letters are suffused with findings of municipal police departments that have failed to establish, or
maintain, acceptable standards in systems, procedures, policies, and practices. Differentiated
from conditions of ambiguity where a generalized lack of clarity exists regarding policies and
practices, or institutionalization where policies are not adhered to in favor of convenience,
practicality, or partiality, a lack of professional currency suggests that a municipal police agency
does not observe generally accepted practices of its own profession whether by intent, design, or
structure. A municipal police agency symptomatic of a lack of professional currency has been
found to behave in three distinct, but often overlapping ways. Hence, three subthemes.
Subtheme one - deficient selection criteria.
Routine and characteristic of many municipal police agencies under § 14141
investigation was the selection and appointment of personnel to agency positions in which they
were not qualified, trained, prepared, and in some instances, disqualified but assigned
nonetheless. These deficiencies centered on five critical police agency positions including; field
training officer, training instructor, investigative supervisor, specialized enforcement assignment,
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and field supervisor. Out of need, expediency, neglect or indifference, critical positions
throughout many municipal police agencies were filled by individuals unqualified to be there,
this as suggested, was to the great detriment of the police agency, the public it serves, and makes
a police agency susceptible to unconstitutional policing practices. One such example of deficient
criteria selection from the Investigation of the Alabaster Police Department:
Well-qualified FTO instructors are critical to ensuring well-trained police recruits. APD’s
current policy appears to contain no criteria to evaluate the qualifications or effectiveness
of those providing field training. The APD has no eligibility criteria for FTOs pertaining
to the applicants’ complaint and disciplinary histories, performance levels or special
skills. (Cutlar, 2004, p. 21)
The Investigation of the Yonkers Police Department findings suggest that qualifications
in these essential positions are paramount to preventing unconstitutional policing, and that this
could be rectified through the implementation of formalized selection criteria because “wellqualified FTOs are critical to ensuring well-trained police recruits. The YPD, however, has no
formal policy addressing the selection [of FTO’s]” (King & Dassin, 2009, p. 30). Furthermore,
deficiencies in agency selection criteria extend to in-service police trainers, that is, police trainers
who are responsible for training experienced officers:
All training [should] be conducted by instructors who have been trained and certified to
be instructors, and who are competent in the subject matter they are to teach.
Accordingly, the WPD should validate the qualification and expertise of its current
trainers. The WPD may do so through certification programs outside of the WPD.
(Cutlar, 2006, p. 26).
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The lack of staff preparation, and inadequacies of training instructors and qualifications
for assignment wean their way through the entire organizational structure in some municipal
police departments. This is particularly troubling as it impacts specialized units such as SWAT,
and other enforcement units that may be called upon to appropriately react in high-liability
circumstances, for example, in the Miami Police Department there is “a lax recruitment process
that insufficiently vets officer suitability for assignment [to a specialized enforcement unit]”
(Perez, 2013, p. 9). Even more troubling is when commanders of such specialized units are
unprepared or unqualified for assignment, such was the finding when the DOJ investigated the
Albuquerque Police Department: “[T]he SWAT commander had not received adequate training
and appeared to lack the experience to direct a disciplined and effective SWAT unit” (Samuels &
Martinez, 2014, p. 35).
The DOJ has also made numerous findings of police agencies that place officers as well
as civilian staff into internal investigative positions without preparation, necessary qualifications,
or sufficient experience to hold such a position (Rosenbaum & Collins, 2002). This suggests that
a relationship between a lack of professional currency in selection criteria, and internal partiality
of investigations exists, as employees who may be unqualified and partial, are charged with
conducting what ought to be impartial and thorough investigations. As an example, findings
from the Investigation of the Newark Police Department:
The NPD has failed to appropriately train its investigators. NPD command staff and
officers, IA investigators, and Integrity Compliance Officers (“ICO”) consistently
reported that investigative experience has not been required to become an
investigator….This failure must be addressed if the NPD is to ensure adequate
investigations of officer misconduct. (DOJ, 2014, p. 45)
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Subtheme two - failure to maintain standards in systems, practices, and policies.
The DOJ frequently attributed underlying organizational problems to systemic
deficiencies, inadequacies, and insufficiencies in internal control systems, common police
practices, internal communication failures, and training. This subtheme reflects similar global
assessments of § 14141 investigations made by scholars such as Walker (2017) who have studied
DOJ’s pattern or practice enforcement through content analysis. Police organizations that were
found to have these attributes had many, if not all of the capabilities to adhere to professional
standards, but they failed to do so. These failures cover a broad spectrum of police organizational
and operational functions. Taken together, this best reflects the failure of a municipal police
agency to operate as a professional organization. As such, many of these deficiencies are directly
implicated in a municipal police department’s failure to engage in constitutional policing. From
the Investigation of the New Orleans Police Department:
NOPD still does not provide meaningful in-service training to officers on how to properly
carry out stops, searches, and arrests. Throughout the Department, and among other
stakeholders in the criminal justice system, we heard broad and emphatic consensus that
officers have a poor understanding of how to lawfully execute searches and seizures.
NOPD’s failure to train officers or otherwise provide guidance on the limits and
requirements of the Fourth Amendment contributes directly to the pattern of
unconstitutional stops, searches, and arrests. (DOJ, 2011, p. 28)
As part of their investigation of a municipal police agency, the DOJ reviews policy and
procedure manuals wherein they have often found outdated procedures, convoluted and
disorganized operational guides, failure to effectively communicate procedural changes to rank
and file, as well as procedural deficiencies that may all lead to unconstitutional policing.
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The following serve as examples of such deficiencies.
A complete lack of policy or training of basic police functionality from the Investigation
of the Steubenville Police Department was noted in that “The City has no policy and provides no
training about what types of force are useful and acceptable in different types of situations. In
addition, it fails to require use-of-force reports or otherwise investigate or review uses of force”
(Pinzler, 1997, p. 2).
Many municipal police agencies that did have policies and procedures in place suffered
from failures to update them in a timely manner, from the Investigation of the Miami Police
Department:
The [use of force] matrix we saw at survival training is outdated, and does not include
some of the specific types of force MPD officers use, such as canines and Tasers. Lack of
specific guidance may lead officers to believe they are justified in using force in
situations in which it would be unreasonable or unnecessary. (Rosenbaum, 2003, p. 3)
An example of ineffective internal communication and accountability related to
procedures:
It is our understanding that there is no process for reviewing or updating the Manual on a
regular basis. Instead, new and revised policies are added to the disk upon approval by
the Chief, and the disks are then reissued to officers. (Cutlar, 2004, p. 2)
The lack of internal communication, and failure to update officers regarding policy and
procedural changes in a timely manner was noted in the Investigation of the Cleveland Division
of Police findings letter:
When a policy is revised, even significantly so, officers are advised of that change in rollcall. Officers informed us that no training accompanies that advisement – the new or
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revised policy simply is distributed to officers and read aloud. The officer in charge of the
training division informed us that no training on that revised policy will occur until the
next in-service training, which may be many months away. (Gupta & Dettelbach, 2014,
p. 44)
As well, generally disorganized and outdated policy manuals from the Investigation of
the Easton Police Department:
At the time of our initial tours, EPD policies and procedures were in a binder called the
“Black Book,” a hodgepodge of policies and procedures, that in many instances had not
been updated since the 1980s. With the exception of special orders or unofficial
procedural documents that have been distributed over the years, the “Black Book” served
as the primary document governing the field services and administrative actions of EPD.
(Cutlar, 2007, p. 2)
Failure to maintain currency in systems, collect and review data for risk management and
early intervention systems were commonly implicated as a direct contributor of systemic
misconduct and unconstitutional policing practices beginning with § 14141’s first publicly issued
investigative findings; from the City of Pittsburgh Investigative Findings Letter:
The PBP does not monitor complaints filed against its officers as a means of detecting
problems before they occur. Such a tracking system would alert management to a
potential problem and to the need for counseling, retraining or other intervention
techniques. (Patrick, 1997, p. 2)
As well, the failure of municipal police agencies to maintain adequate performance
tracking systems, and collect necessary and appropriate data has been implicated as causal in a
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failure to identify organizational trends and officers responsible for unconstitutional policing
practices. From the Investigation of the Newark Police Department:
NPD [has not] taken adequate steps to implement an early warning system that would
track and identify officers’ problematic behavior. As a result of these systemic
deficiencies, the NPD does not discern or respond to problematic trends in officer
conduct that could constitute or lead to misconduct….The NPD further must collect and
analyze data related to stops, searches, and arrests, so that it can minimize the disparate
impact of its enforcement efforts and avoid bias in policing. (DOJ, 2014, pp. 3-4)
Subtheme three - failure to adhere to established best practices.
Differentiated from subtheme two by a focus on adherence to external professionalism
standards rather than internal, failure to adhere to established best practices was noted in several
findings letters as symptomatic of systemic problems that placed an agency at risk of
unconstitutional policing practices. From the Investigation of the Newark Police Department:
A full understanding of the race-based effects of the NPD’s policing practices is made
more difficult by the NPD’s failure to track and analyze data with respect to race, which
is unusual, and at odds with sound policing practices, for a police department in a major
city, especially one with such diversity. (DOJ, 2014, p. 36)
Deviation from tactical best practices was also noted as contributing to the detriment of
the public and officer safety: “We recommend that the MPD follow the trend in most police
departments by setting a reasonable restriction on the speed for continuing a vehicle pursuit, and
add this specific limitation to the DO” (Rosenbaum, 2003, p. 14). As well, with best practices
related to the use of force, from the Investigation of the Portland, Maine Police Department:
“Many major city police departments employ a use of force continuum because it provides a
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useful tool in training officers to consider lower levels of force first, which protects the safety of
both the officer and the civilian” (Brown Cutlar, 2003, p. 4).
Theme four - leadership and management failure.
Contained within many findings letters were references, both direct and indirect, to
systemic problems attributable to a lack of leadership and effective management. These failures
focused on the upper layers of the organizational hierarchy and reflected deficiencies of
accountability within the chain-of-command, including leadership indifference to institutional
problems, lack of vision for the organization, and a generalized lack of investment in supporting
or guiding the police organization. The Investigation of the New Orleans Police Department
reveals how detrimental that leadership and management failure can be to an organization:
Our investigation further showed a lack of accountability throughout the chain of
command sufficient to ensure that field sergeants are properly supervising their
subordinates. Much of the work supervisors do requires review or approval by the chain
of command. Commanders seem to take no notice of, much less hold accountable,
supervisors who approve egregious uses of force without question, conduct obviously
flawed investigations, sign off on clearly deficient arrest reports, or who simply do not
supervise. (DOJ, 2011, p. xv)
Similarly, this up-the-chain lack of accountability was found in other police
organizations, however, the DOJ attributed these deficiencies to management’s desire to avoid
responsibility:
The hundreds of less lethal force reports we reviewed were almost entirely devoid of any
analysis by anyone in the chain of command regarding whether the force was reasonable.
Instead, they simply state that use of force was within Division guidelines. It is almost as
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if the goal of the chain of command in many incidents is not [emphasis in original] to
create a complete record of the incident that can be subjected to internal and external
review, instead of the opposite. (Gupta & Dettelbach, 2014, p. 31)
Leadership and management failure have been attributed to overall organizational
dysfunction, and have been implicated as leading to unnecessary use of deadly force: “We
further noted a near absence of organizational accountability. Officers are simply afforded too
much autonomy, which has contributed to even greater insularity from the department’s
accountability systems, ineffective deployments and tragic shootings that could have been
avoided” (Samuels & Martinez, 2014, p. 35).
The DOJ alludes to the importance of necessary leadership investment, and appropriate
communication with the organization as a whole, as leadership and management deficiencies can
infect many parts of a police agency’s operations, which may lead to unconstitutional policing
practices:
The responsibility for correcting the NPD’s unconstitutional policing practices lies at
every level within the Department. NPD supervisors and command leadership must
ensure that officers receive the training, guidance, and direction necessary to police
effectively and constitutionally, and clearly communicate to officers that constitutional
policing and effective law enforcement are not in tension with each other, but rather are
interdependent. (DOJ, 2014, p. 4)
Theme five - organizational myopia.
Organizational myopia as described by Catino (2013) is “the limited capacity on the part
of an organization to evaluate the facts as they actually are and in terms of their possible
evolution” (p. 3). For municipal police under § 14141 investigation, this limited capacity

122

manifests itself in two distinct ways: (1) the incapacity to detect potential signs of danger,
undermining an organization’s survival or compromising its regular operations, and (2) the
incapacity of an organization to detect potential opportunities that favor its survival and
adaptation to the environment (Catino, 2013). Analyzing § 14141 findings letters, it became clear
that many municipal police agencies had systemic problems related to short-term thinking and
planning; exhibited insularity, did not adapt to their external environment, and were unaware, or
indifferent to potential dangers and risks posed to their organization. Municipal police agencies
under § 14141 action that suffered from organizational myopia were characterized by at least one
of four subthemes.
Subtheme one - adaptation failure.
Adaptation failure is best interpreted as a municipal police agency’s failure to adapt to
changing external conditions in an appropriate manner to the point of detriment to that agency
and community served. This type of failure was evident in a number of § 14141 investigative
findings, and manifested in the organization as an inability of a municipal police agency to
effectively communicate or interact with members of the community served, thereby increasing
the potential for excessive or unnecessary force. An example of this type of failure, from the
Investigation of the Yonkers Police Department is instructive: “In light of the diversity of the
Yonkers community, we also recommend that any warnings issued to individuals prior to the
deployment of the K-9 Unit be issued in Spanish, as well as in English” (King & Dassin, 2009, p.
17).
Adaptation failure was also noted in other municipalities with diverse populations, such
as New Orleans: “NOPD is dangerously limited in its capacity to communicate effectively and
accurately with LEP [Limited English Proficient] victims, witnesses, suspects, and community

123

members in the Latino and Vietnamese communities” (DOJ, 2011, p. xii). The DOJ noted the
dangers inherent with a police department failing to adapt to their environment in the
Investigation of the Miami Police Department: “Failure to require multiple and complete
warnings in a language that the subject can understand can result in excessive force being used,
because it eliminates the opportunity for a subject to surrender before getting bitten”
(Rosenbaum, 2003, p. 6).
Subtheme two - conflicts of interest.
Conflicts of interest in the context of organizational myopia are practices in opposition to
the interest or autonomy of a municipal police agency. By allowing and accepting certain
practices that are in conflict with a police agency’s core function and mission, conflicts of
interest may allow unconstitutional policing to proliferate. One such example of a police
department absolving itself of a core responsibility – enforcement discretion, and ensuring that a
necessary legal standard for seizure is met for all arrest situations – led to findings of a pattern or
practice of unconstitutional policing in Meridian, MS. As indicated:
MPD policy requires officers to automatically arrest a student whenever school staff
indicate that they would like to press charges. MPD officers who respond to District
referrals do not asses the facts or circumstances of the alleged charge, or whether the
alleged conduct actually qualifies as an arrestable offense….MPD’s pattern or practice of
automatically arresting children referred by the District constitutes a blanket failure to
apply probable cause in violation of the Fourth Amendment. (Perez, 2012, p. 2)
Conflicts of interest can also be entrenched, system-wide, corrupting, and yet endorsed
by leadership and management, creating conflicts with organizational priorities and chain-ofcommand as in the case of New Orleans’ paid detail:
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The Detail system is essentially a form of overtime work for officers. Officers may work
ad hoc Details providing, for example, extra security for special events or individuals
visiting New Orleans. Or an officer may have a regularly-scheduled Detail, such as being
hired by a business to provide security in a retail establishment or by a neighborhood
association to patrol the neighborhood. When on Detail, however, officers are paid and
largely controlled by entities other than NOPD [emphasis added].….Virtually every
officer works a Detail, wants to work a Detail, or at some point will have to rely on an
officer who works a Detail. The effects of Details thus permeate the entire Department.
It is widely acknowledged that NOPD’s Detail system is corrupting. (DOJ, 2011, p. xvi)
Subtheme three - deficient interaction with external organizations.
Organizational myopia is also characterized by a police agency’s failure to effectively
communicate and interact with partner organizations including community groups, oversight
bodies, and other law enforcement organizations. This lack of interaction in many instances led
to deficiencies in operations, organizational performance, and accountability allowing
unconstitutional policing to proliferate. One such example from the United States’ Investigation
of the Missoula Police Department, attributed poor external communication to violations of
equal protection, and as such, unconstitutional policing:
Communication between police, prosecutors, and others is critical to ensure effective
investigations and prosecutions. MPD engages in insufficient communication and
cooperation with its law enforcement and community partners regarding their response to
reports of sexual assault. This lack of collaboration weakens the efficacy of MPD's
response to reports of sexual assault by inhibiting coordination and information-sharing
needed to fairly and objectively discern the truth in a sexual assault investigation and
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compounds the other deficiencies we found in the investigative process. (Perez & Cotter,
2013, p. 10)
Subtheme four - research, planning, and resource allocation.
Municipal police agencies that fail to use, collect, or analyze operational information for
the betterment of police functionality, fail to research and learn, fail to conduct internal studies,
assessments, review allocation of resources, and make well-informed operational decisions have
been found to be at risk of engaging in unconstitutional policing through insufficient knowledge,
feedback, and even fatigue. From the Investigation of the Baltimore City Police Department:
BPD fails to adequately support its officers with adequate staffing and material resources.
The Department lacks effective strategies for staffing, recruitment and retention, forcing
officers to work overtime after long shifts, lowering morale, and leading to officers
working with deteriorated decision-making skills. (DOJ, 2016, p. 11)
Failure of a municipal police agency to research, review, and learn from mistakes was
indicated by the DOJ to have future consequences:
We found that the files for recently completed investigations revealed little administrative
or operational analysis by MPD. As a consequence, the opportunity to learn from an
incident and apply lessons learned to future incidents, at both the individual and
departmental levels, was lost. (Perez, 2013, p. 11)
Lack of internal research and planning has also been indicated to lead to operational
problems involving routine police duties for supervisors, adding to cynicism, and overall
deficiencies:
Supervisors also reported that their workloads are simply unmanageable. Sergeants told
us that “it’s the worst job in the department” and “the work never stops,” noting that they
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might be responsible for five less lethal force investigations during one shift in addition
to various other duties….supervisors appeared to have difficulty balancing their
responsibility to effectively lead, manage, and hold officers accountable. (Gupta &
Dettelbach, 2014, p. 33)
Theme six - organizational orientation and culture.
Many § 14141 findings letters are highly suggestive of a deeply entrenched cultural view,
organizational and officer perspective, and enduring organizational legacy as root causes of
systemic problems that when left unaddressed, led to unconstitutional policing. Without
specification, in many § 14141 investigations, the DOJ was implying that frequently municipal
police agencies were conducting legitimate practices but for illegitimate ends, as such, were
engaged in unconstitutional policing.
When analyzing § 14141 investigative findings letters, it became clear that police
organizations that suffered from organizational orientation and cultural problems, were deeply
troubled. This theme then, revealed itself in two distinct, but often connected ways.
Subtheme one - focus on enforcement, activity, and arrests.
Characteristic of municipal police departments that had attributes of this subtheme were
often based on legacy perspectives that a police agency’s first and most important priority is to
fight crime. While prioritizing police resources to fight crime is a legitimate goal of police, often
the byproduct of an enforcement-first orientation for many of these police agencies were ends
that were highly problematic, discriminatory, and often illegitimate. An example from New
Orleans:
The Department’s organizational focus on arrests, particularly in combination with its
poor training and policies, encourages stops without reasonable suspicion, illegal pat

127

downs, and arrests without probable cause. NOPD’s focus on statistics…amplifies the
risk that officers will execute illegal searches and seizures…many officers described a
strong and unyielding pressure to increase numbers…As one commander told us, “[t]hese
officers are under the gun to make arrest, arrest, arrest, which leads to civil rights
violations and complaints.” Detached as it is from problem-oriented policing, community
partnerships, or long-term strategies, there is no indication that NOPD’s emphasis on
arrests results in better crime prevention or safer communities. To the contrary, NOPD
recently acknowledged that the Department’s staggering volume of arrests for low-level
offenses is counter-productive. (DOJ, 2011, p. viii)
An organizational culture that focuses on arrests and enforcement has also been noted to
create problems between the police and the community. Additionally, these practices were often
not just found to be acceptable by management, but were viewed as an appropriate and valuable
police function, and often required:
During various time periods in recent years, NPD leadership reportedly instituted a quota
to encourage officers to increase the number of citations issued. Officers’ eligibility for
overtime and desirable assignments apparently were linked to meeting the Quality of Life
citation quota, thus giving officers an incentive to issue more….Officers and residents
alike perceive that the NPD issues these citations in order to satisfy quotas rather than to
improve public safety. This perception alienates many community members. (DOJ, 2014,
p. 21)
An example from the Investigation of the Baltimore City Police Department
demonstrates how legacy perspectives and cultural orientation, coalesce with management
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demands for enforcement activity produces illegitimate ends through the corruption of legitimate
means, resulting in unconstitutional policing:
BPD’s legacy of zero tolerance enforcement continues to drive its policing in certain
Baltimore neighborhoods and leads to unconstitutional stops, searches, and arrests. Many
BPD supervisors instruct officers to make frequent stops and arrests – even for minor
offenses and with minimal or no suspicion – without sufficient consideration of whether
this enforcement strategy promotes public safety and community trust or conforms to
constitutional standards. (DOJ, 2016, p. 5)
Subtheme two - prevailing cultural view.
Contained within findings letters from many police departments investigated under §
14141, existed widely-held viewpoints and perspectives as part of the broader police culture.
Often, the DOJ would specifically mention the culture of an organization, and attribute systemic
problems to that culture, other times the attribution was implied. Apart from the differences in
latency, a prevailing cultural view, or dominant way of thinking by officers, was regularly a
contributing factor to systemic problems, police-community strains, and often unconstitutional
policing.
In conducting their investigation of the Albuquerque Police Department, it was noted that
“problematic behavior continues to be viewed as reasonable, even exemplary….These
deficiencies demonstrate a failure to embrace policing fundamentals, namely, recognizing and
enabling officers’ duty to protect both the public’s safety and civil rights” (Samuels & Martinez,
2014, p. 21). This type of prevailing cultural view is indicative of a police agency with “an
aggressive culture that undervalues civilian safety” (Samuels & Martinez, 2014, p. 22). An
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example of this aggressive culture was noted in that “subjects of force are…referred to as
‘combatants’ in APD policy” (Samuels & Martinez, 2014, p. 31).
A police agency with a problematic cultural view was viewed to have difficulties
embracing modern policing strategies because of that culture, and to resist organizational change.
The DOJ gives an example of how a prevailing cultural view creates rifts between the police and
community, and how difficult that culture can be to change within a police department. From the
Investigation of the Cleveland Division of Police:
Some officers hold views that are incompatible with community policing principles, and
that this attitude is tolerated and encouraged by at least some members of command staff.
A former actual Commander of community policing for CDP told us that he believes the
culture within CDP is antithetical to a community policing mentality and that officer
training instills in officers an “us-against-them” mentality. During an interview with one
district commander, he referred to his district as a “forward operating base,” and we later
observed a large sign hanging in the vehicle bay of that district station identifying it as
such. Such metaphors have no place in a community-oriented police department. (Gupta
& Dettelbach, 2014, p. 51)
Theme seven - routinized misconduct.
Many § 14141 investigative findings contained references and examples of misconduct,
malfeasance, and otherwise criminal conduct committed by officers routinely occurring within a
police agency. Although the federal government has the authority to bring criminal civil rights
charges against individual officers, §14141 investigations focus on systemic problems rather than
individual wrongdoing (DOJ, 2017a). Furthermore, although the DOJ has indicated that
individual incidents of misconduct never warrant the opening of a § 14141 investigation, they
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have informed that individual incidents of misconduct may suggest systemic problems, and
therefore be part of an investigative finding (DOJ, 2017a). To that end, numerous investigative
findings letters provided detailed examples of individual occurrences of police misconduct as
exemplary incidents of larger systemic problems. These examples repeatedly comprised one of
four types of police misconduct indicative of unconstitutional policing. As such, there are four
subthemes to routinized misconduct.
Subtheme one - abuse of authority.
Department of Justice findings from a number of investigations indicated that officers
routinely used their police authority in an intentionally abusive, often unnecessary, and
frequently excessive manner. Officers who abused their authority often had sufficient legal
justification to take enforcement action, but the poor use of discretion often led to what was
classified as unconstitutional policing. An example from the Lorain Police Department:
We noted several incidents in which LPD officers deployed ECWs [electronic control
weapons] to apprehend subjects in situations in which LPD officer's only recorded
knowledge at the time of deployment was that the subject was fleeing for an unknown
reason after a minor infraction, such as walking in the roadway or jaywalking. Similarly,
LPD has deployed its canine in find-and-bite apprehensions when subjects fled but did
not offer any resistance. In one such situation, LPD use-of-force reports show that LPD
had its canine pursue and eventually bite one subject who fled from a car pulled over
only for a window-tint violation. (Smith, 2012, p. 3)
An example of unreasonable use of force and poor discretion from the Investigation of
the Cincinnati Police Division:
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We received reports about CPD officers using chemical irritant at closer range than is
allowed pursuant to the CPD's policy, or in quantities that seem unreasonable. For
example, interviewees related instances in which officers emptied entire canisters of
chemical irritant on a single subject or sprayed chemical irritant up subjects' noses or
down their throats. (Rosenbaum, 2001, p. 2)
Abuse of authority was also evident in non-use-of-force situations where an officer’s
actions were legally justified, but by all appearances were unreasonable, yet deemed acceptable
by the organization because of a widespread culture and management acceptance of abusive
practices. From the Investigation of the Ferguson Police Department:
FPD officers routinely issue multiple citations during a single stop, often for the same
violation. Issuing three or four charges in one stop is not uncommon….Officers
sometimes write six, eight, or, in at least one instance, fourteen citations for a single
encounter. Indeed, officers told us that some compete to see who can issue the largest
number of citations during a single stop. (DOJ, 2015, p. 11)
Finally, abuse of authority frequently involved situations in which officers used force or
took enforcement action for the purpose of punishment and retaliation. In these situations, the
DOJ found the initial use of force may have been legally justified, but the excessive or
unreasonable nature of its use was believed to be abusive relative to the facts, circumstances, and
context that the force was used. An example of this finding from the Investigation of the
Cleveland Division of Police:
Despite the fact that there were two officers present, the officers drive-stunned Jason
twice while he was handcuffed and on the ground. This use of force was unreasonable.
The suspect was already on the ground and was in handcuffs. The decision to drive stun
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him twice appears to have been made more to punish Jason for running rather than to
gain control of him, which could have been accomplished with less force, if any. (Gupta
& Dettelbach, 2014, p. 22)
Subtheme two - biased-based practices.
Policing practices that are motivated by bias towards any particular class or group of
persons was repeatedly evident in numerous investigative findings letters. Throughout many §
14141 investigations, the DOJ informs that biased intent need not be present for a police
department to engage in a pattern or practice of unconstitutional policing, rather differential
impact may satisfy this standard. Both biased intent, and differential impact were evident in a
number of § 14141 investigative letters, where unconstitutional policing practices were
committed by a number of police agencies affecting a wide array of groups including those
identified as women, Blacks, Hispanics, LGBTQ, Asians, and persons in mental health crisis.
Routinized misconduct against these groups manifested itself in one of three, but not necessarily
mutually exclusive ways: Biased intent, denial of adequate services, or biased differential
impact.
An example of intentional bias from the Investigation of the New Orleans Police
Department:
Transgender women complained that NOPD officers improperly target and arrest them
for prostitution, sometimes fabricating evidence of solicitation for compensation.
Moreover, transgender residents reported that officers are likelier, because of their gender
identity, to charge them under the state’s “crimes against nature” statute – a statute whose
history reflects anti-LGBT sentiment. Multiple convictions under the “crimes against
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nature” statute, unlike Louisiana’s general prostitution statute, require registration as a
sex offender. (DOJ, 2011, p. x)
An example of bias through the denial of adequate services from the Investigation of the
Missoula Police Department:
We found practices that discourage female victims of sexual assault from cooperating
with law enforcement and thereby significantly compromise the investigative
process…these investigative weaknesses appear due, at least in part, to stereotypes and
misinformation about women and victims of sexual assault. (Perez, 2013, p. 6)
An example of bias through differential impact from the Investigation of the Newark
Police Department:
This investigation found that black people in Newark have been stopped and arrested at a
significantly higher rate than their white and Hispanic counterparts. This disparity is stark
and unremitting. Approximately 80% of the NPD’s stops and arrests have involved black
individuals, while Newark’s population is only 53.9% black. Black residents of Newark
are at least 2.5 times more likely to be subjected to a pedestrian stop or arrested than
white individuals. (DOJ, 2014, p. 16)
Subtheme three - cultural deviation.
Cultural deviation is a phenomenon described by O’Hara (2012) as occurring “when
elements of the organization increasingly operate according to their own standards, with little
regard for the organization and its rules” (pp. 19-20). Expanding on this definition to specifically
include the violation of laws and criminal activity committed by subgroups of officers within a
police department, it was evident that cultural deviation was a form of routinized misconduct
existing in many municipal police agencies under § 14141 investigation.
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An example of cultural deviation within a subgroup manifested as criminal conduct, from
the Investigation of the Newark Police Department:
The evidence makes clear that theft from arrestees has been more than an aberration
limited to a few officers or incidents within NPD. Examples of the problem include
allegations of theft of money and drugs during arrests and allegedly deliberate failure to
return money and property such as wallets, cell phones, jewelry, and car keys upon
arrestees’ release by the NPD….that theft of civilians’ property and money by officers
was particularly problematic in the NPD’s specialized units, such as narcotics and gangs,
and in the prisoner processing unit at the NPD’s Green Street Cell Block. (DOJ, 2014, p.
31)
When cultural deviation exists outside of subgroups, that is, within the broader
organizational context, it suggests that cultural deviation may be intertwined with other thematic
failures including culture and leadership, the combination of which, may be responsible for
unconstitutional policing practices.
An example from the Investigation of the Baltimore City Police Department is
instructive:
In some cases, unconstitutional stops result from supervisory officers’ explicit
instructions. During a ride-along with Justice Department officials, a BPD sergeant
instructed a patrol officer to stop a group of young African-American males on a street
corner, question them, and order them to disperse. When the patrol officer protested that
he had no valid reason to stop the group, the sergeant replied “Then make something
up.” [emphasis added]. This incident is far from anomalous. (DOJ, 2016, p. 29)
Subtheme four - unjustified enforcement actions.
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The final type of routinized misconduct contained within § 14141 investigative findings
related to individual, and organizational enforcement actions that occurred without meeting a
necessary or sufficient legal standard. Municipal police agencies wherein unjustified
enforcement actions were found, typically revolved around police actions involving seizures,
searches, arrests, and detainments without proper legal justification.
An example of unjustified enforcement from the Columbus Findings Letter served as an
example of unjustified enforcement actions early in the life of § 14141: “Many of the victims of
excessive force, false arrest or charges, and/or an improper search are, at the time when the
misconduct occurs, carrying out some ordinary, routine daily activity” (Lann Lee, 1999, p. 1). As
well, in the investigation of the LAPD, the DOJ directly implicated systemic unconstitutional
policing practices with unjustified enforcement actions “including improper officer-involved
shootings; improper seizures of persons, including making stops not based on reasonable
suspicion and making arrests without probable cause” (Lann Lee, 2000, p. 2).
The DOJ frequently identified unjustified enforcement actions where a specific legal
threshold was met only after an unjustified action had taken place. This ex post facto application
of a necessary and appropriate burden of proof is unconstitutional, and when municipal police
departments have patterns or practices of such, formed the basis for a negotiated settlement.
Newark Police Department provides and instructive example of this finding:
NPD officers also regularly have justified stops based solely on information or evidence
discovered after the stop was initiated. Examples include “Individual Was Stopped on
Bicycle No Proper ID” and “A Record Check of the Above Individual Revealed an Open
Warrant”….Similarly, officers have justified stops based on the fact that the individual
was ultimately arrested….This is constitutionally impermissible: an officer must first
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have reasonable suspicion of criminal activity in order to conduct a stop, and the
discovery of evidence during or after the stop that provides probable cause for arrest
cannot be used to retroactively establish reasonable suspicion for the stop. (DOJ, 2014,
pp. 11-12)
Theme eight - tactical discretion, weapon competency, and equipment inadequacies.
In the course of regular police duties, use of force may be necessary to gain control of a
suspect, prevent escape, or defend human life. The DOJ acknowledges these facts in many of
their findings reports (Samuels & Martinez, 2014), yet they also make efforts to point out when
the use of force goes beyond what may be necessary.
Frequently cited by the DOJ were situations in which police officers used force, and were
justified in using that force, however, the amount of force, or under specific circumstances, albeit
constitutional, constituted poor choices and discretion including when the use of force, justified
at the moment, could have been avoided. When it is determined that these poor tactical decisions
are systemic within an organization, the DOJ suggests that it contributes to unconstitutional
policing practices. Furthermore, the DOJ views officer’s availability of suitable equipment, and
competency to use that equipment effectively as a contributor to systemic misconduct and
possible unconstitutional policing practices. As such, this theme is comprised of the following
three subthemes.
Subtheme one - inappropriate tactical discretion.
Police officers have a variety of tools to choose from when taking appropriate and
necessary law enforcement action. The application of these tools falls on what is referred to as a
force continuum. A force continuum is the standard in which police use of force guidelines are
conceptualized and visualized. At its lowest level, a force continuum involves officer presence,
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and at its highest, deadly physical force (National Institute of Justice, 2009). In many § 14141
investigative findings letters, there were frequent references to situations in which officers used
force, albeit within policy guidelines and legally justified under the circumstances, that resulted
in unnecessary public risk, injury, or death.
An example of poor use of tactical discretion and its implications from the Investigation
of the Albuquerque Police Department: “Officers frequently use takedown procedures in ways
that unnecessarily increase the harm to the person. Finally, officers escalate situations in which
force could have been avoided had they instead used de-escalation measures” (Samuels &
Martinez, 2014, p. 3).
Poor tactical choices by police officers have also been found to contribute not just to
injury, but risk of death to innocent civilians:
We found that officers sometimes draw, point and/or fire their weapons without
considering their environment, or the potential harm to bystanders or nearby residents.
Officers do not adequately consider the potential destination of rounds fired especially if,
as often happens, they miss their intended targets. (Gupta & Dettelbach, 2014, p. 26)
The DOJ has concluded that poor tactical discretion can contribute to unconstitutional
policing through unnecessary force, in addition to contributing to the erosion of policecommunity relations: “BPD uses overly aggressive tactics that unnecessarily escalate encounters,
increase tensions, and lead to unnecessary force, and fails to de-escalate encounters when it
would be reasonable to do so” (DOJ, 2016, p. 8).
Subtheme two - equipment inadequacies.
Although not directly implicated as a cause of unconstitutional policing, equipment
inadequacies, including not have the proper equipment, or having inadequate equipment, has
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been attributed to a police organization not supporting their officers to do the job for which they
are tasked.
In an example of the risks inherent in not providing officers the appropriate equipment,
the DOJ suggests that officers who are not issued appropriate and necessary equipment, may use
the equipment they have improperly: “Officers may unnecessarily resort to their firearms if
intermediate force options are not available, we recommend that the APD require all officers to
carry a chemical weapon, in addition to an impact weapon” (Cutlar, 2008, p. 13). Other times, it
was noted that the failure of a police agency to properly equip their officers contributes to a less
effective agency: “Cleveland police officers are not given the basic equipment, the physical
structures, and the technology required to perform their jobs safely and effectively” (Gupta &
Dettelbach, 2014, p. 55).
Subtheme three - weapon competency.
Tying together a lack of professional currency with equipment inadequacies, the DOJ
identified many instances of officers who appeared to use their weapons and tactics without the
requisite competence. This to the detriment of public safety, and potentially leading to
unconstitutional policing. An example from the Investigation of the Portland Police Bureau:
We found instances that support a pattern of officers using multiple cycles of shock
without waiting between cycles to allow the suspect to comply, or officers failing to
utilize control tactics during ECW cycles to properly affect handcuffing without having
to resort to repeated ECW shocks. (Perez & Marshall, 2012, p. 3)
The DOJ directly implicated a lack of weapon competency with unjustified use of force
in the Investigation of the Cleveland Division of Police illustrating the risks inherent for the
public:
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CDP officers use their guns to strike people in the head in circumstances where the use
of deadly force is not justified. Striking someone in the head with an impact weapon is
deadly force, as CDP’s own policies recognize….CDP officers have hit suspects in the
head with their pistols in circumstances that do not warrant deadly force. This practice is
partially a result of tactical errors where officers drawn their firearms at inappropriate
times. In these circumstances, when officers ultimately engage physically with suspects,
they do so while holding a firearm. This is an extremely dangerous practice, increasing
the risk of an accidental discharge – which has happened on more than one occasion
involving CDP officers – and the risk that a suspect will gain control of the weapon. It
also limits the less-lethal options an officer has available to bring an actively resisting
subject under control because one of his hands is occupied holding the firearm. (Gupta &
Dettelbach, 2014, pp. 18-19)
Unconstitutional Policing
Police practices adhering to constitutional standards were differentiated from
unconstitutional police practices through § 14141 investigative outcomes. For the n = 24 police
negotiated settlements, the DOJ determined there was reasonable cause to believe that the
municipal police agency was engaged in a pattern or practice of unconstitutional policing,
whereas for the n = 9 police agencies under technical assistance, the DOJ made no such
affirmative determination. By comparing themes associated with each investigative outcome, a
clearer picture emerges of the contours of unconstitutional policing.
Since an investigative outcome differentiates patterns or practices of constitutional from
unconstitutional policing, it was posited that the number and types of themes between these two
outcomes would differ. As such, the following hypothesis was offered and tested:
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•

H1: Thematic findings will differ between municipal police agencies under negotiated
settlement, and those under technical assistance.
A two-tailed z-score test for two population proportions was conducted on the total

number of thematic findings, and for each of the eight themes by investigative outcome to test
H1, that thematic findings would differ between municipal police agencies under negotiated
settlement, and technical assistance. This type of test can be used to determine if two population
proportions significantly differ for categorical data (Laerd, 2016a). Since each of the eight main
themes, and total number of themes by investigative outcome were measured as presence or
absence of the theme, and H1 is a non-directional prediction, a two-tailed test was appropriate for
this hypothesis. Although not statistically significant at the p < .05 level, proportions of total
thematic findings were found to be marginally significant between agencies under negotiated
settlement (.70), and technical assistance (.58), z = 1.84, p = .066. However, as indicated in Table
7, police agencies under negotiated settlement had a significantly higher proportion of
organizational orientation and culture thematic findings (.38) than those under technical
assistance (.00) z = 2.15, p = .032. As well, there were significant differences in proportions of
the theme routinized misconduct by investigative outcome, z = 2.76, p = .005, with the police
agencies under negotiated settlement (.75), higher than the proportion under technical assistance
(.22).
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Table 7
Thematic Analysis Findings by Investigative Outcome.
Negotiated settlements (n = 24)

Technical assistance (n = 9)

Theme

# of investigations
with thematic
finding

% of investigations
with thematic
finding

# of investigations
with thematic
finding

% of investigations
with thematic
finding

Conditions of ambiguity

14

58%

7

78%

Institutionalization

21

88%

7

78%

Lack of professional
currency

23

96%

9

100%

Leadership and
management failure

12

50%

3

33%

Organizational myopia

20

83%

7

78%

Organizational
orientation and culture

9*

38%

0*

0%

Routinized misconduct

18**

75%

2**

22%

18

75%

7

78%
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70%

42

58%

Tactical discretion,
weapon competency,
equipment
insufficiencies
Total
*p < .05; **p < .01

Having established that there were differences in two specific themes by investigative
outcome, and that overall differences in total thematic findings by investigative outcome
marginally differ, a more nuanced and detailed analysis at the subtheme level should then
provide greater insight into the differences in findings by investigative outcome. As such, the
following hypothesis was offered and tested:
•

H2: Municipal police agencies under negotiated settlement will have more scaled
subtheme findings than police agencies under technical assistance.
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Using a process described by Boyatzis (1998), all subthemes were scaled to the thematic
level, and measured by presence or absence in the same manner as the themes. Comparisons
were then made between proportions in the presence or absence of total scaled themes by
investigative outcome. A one-tailed z-score test for two population proportions was conducted to
test H2, that municipal police agencies under negotiated settlement will have more scaled
subtheme findings than those under technical assistance. This type of test can be used to
determine if two population proportions significantly differ for categorical data (Laerd, 2016a).
Since each of the scaled subthemes, and total number of scaled subthemes by investigative
outcome were measured as presence or absence, and H2 is a directional prediction, that is, it is
expected that the proportion of themes present will be greater for negotiated settlements than
technical assistance outcomes, a one-tailed test was appropriate for this hypothesis.
As indicated in Table 8, police agencies under negotiated settlement had a significantly
higher proportion of total scaled subtheme findings (.49), than agencies under technical
assistance (.40), z = 2.00, p = .022. Additionally, significant differences were found between
police agencies by investigative outcome in the failure to adhere to best practices subtheme (.71),
to (1.00), z = -1.82, p = .034, although this result was significant opposite of the hypothesized
relationship.
As one subtheme of organizational orientation and culture – prevailing cultural view –
the proportion of police agencies with this theme under negotiated settlement significantly
differed from the proportion under technical assistance (.38) to (.00), z = 2.15, p = .016. In the
routinized misconduct theme, the proportion of police agencies significantly differed by
investigative outcome for the abuse of authority subtheme (.67) to (.22), z = 2.28, p = .011, and
the biased-based policing subtheme (.42) to (.00), z = 2.31, p = .01. Additionally, the proportion
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of police agencies under negotiated settlement significantly differed from those under technical
assistance for the unjustified enforcement actions subtheme (.54) to (.00), z = 2.83, p = .002. All
other scaled subtheme differences by investigative outcome were not statistically significant.
Table 8
Scaled Thematic Findings by Investigative Outcome.
Negotiated settlements (n = 24)
# of agencies
with scaled
theme

Conditions of ambiguity

Technical assistance (n = 9)

%

# of agencies
with scaled
theme

%

14

58%

7

78%

Internal partiality

17

71%

7

78%

Misaligned policy and practice

14

58%

5

56%

Deficient selection criteria

13

54%

4

44%

Fails to maintain established standards…

22

92%

9

100%

Failure to adhere to best practices

17

71%

9*

100%

Leadership and management failure

12

50%

3

33%

Focus on enforcement, activity and arrests

4

17%

0

0%

Prevailing cultural view

9*

38%

0

0%

Adaption failure

8

33%

3

33%

Conflicts of interest

3

13%

0

0%

Deficient interaction with external organizations

16

67%

7

78%

Research, planning and resource allocation

15

63%

4

44%

Abuse of authority

16*

67%

2

22%

Biased-based policing

10*

42%

0

0%

6

25%

1

11%

Unjustified enforcement action

13**

54%

0

0%

Inappropriate tactical discretion

16

67%

4

44%

Equipment inadequacies

3

13%

3

33%

Weapon competency

6

25%

4

44%

234*

49%

72

40%

Scaled theme

Cultural deviation

Total
* p < .05; ** p < .01
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Analysis of Theoretical Issues
Disjointed Incrementalism
Lindblom’s (1979) disjointed incrementalism proposes that an organization will engender
small changes in the application of their decision-making authority over-time through trial, error,
and minor revisions as appropriate to changing internal and external conditions. As applied to
DOJ’s decision-making regarding § 14141, over-time adjustments should be revealed through
variables related to year-over-year investigations. Two related outcomes that would be expected
to change through disjointed incrementalism then are efficiency and productivity. As measured
by the average number of scaled themes per investigation over the life-course of § 14141, the
phenomena of disjointed incrementalism is clearly revealed in Figure 3 through increases in
productivity.
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Figure 3. Average Number of Scaled Themes per Investigation by Year:
1994 - 2017

Having visually established that DOJ’s approach to § 14141 is indicative of disjointed
incrementalism through increases in productivity year-over-year, it was therefore expected that
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the application of § 14141 would be revealed through DOJ’s output. As such, the following
hypothesis was offered and tested:
•

H3: Second-generation DOJ output will be significantly longer than first-generation
DOJ output.

The DOJ categorizes their § 14141 investigations by generation; first-generation
investigations were those initiated between 1994 and 2005, and investigations initiated after
2005 are referred to as second-generation (DOJ, 2017a). One way to test over-time changes in
organizational decision-making as it relates to unconstitutional policing is to quantitatively
measure the output (i.e. findings letters length) of § 14141 investigations. To that end, a one
tailed t-test for two independent means was conducted on the length of § 14141 output to test H3,
that second-generation output will be significantly longer than first-generation output. See Table
9 for the estimated mean length of the output, disaggregated by generation.
Table 9
Mean Length of DOJ’s Output by Generation.
95% CI
Generation

n

M (SD)

LL

UL

First

16

20.06 (14.06)

12.56

27.55

Second

17

60.88 (54.33)**

32.94

88.81

Total

33

41.09 (44.7)

25.2

56.93

**p < .01

The results of a one-tailed t-test with unequal variances indicate that there were
significant differences in the length of DOJ’s output between first-generation (M = 20.06, SD =
14.06), and second-generation output (M = 60.88, SD = 54.33); t(18) = -2.99, p = .004, d = 1.02.
Furthermore, separate one-tailed t-tests with unequal variances were conducted on the length of
DOJ’s investigative output between first and second-generation investigations disaggregated by
investigative outcome as a further test of H3, resulting in significant differences between first146

generation negotiated settlement (M = 18.45, SD = 16.72), and second (M = 72.23, SD = 56.83);
t(14) = -3.24, p = .003, d = 1.28. However, the results of the one-way t-test for length of DOJ
output under technical assistance was not significant t(3) = -0.04, p = .49. Summary statistics can
be found in Table 10.
Table 10
Mean Length of DOJ’s Output by Generation and Investigative Outcome.
Negotiated Settlements

Technical Assistance

Generation

n

M

SD

n

M

SD

First

11

18.45

16.72

5

23.6

4.5

Second

13

72.23**

56.83

4

24

23.36

Total

24

47.58

50.55

9

23.78

13.47

** p < .01

Analyzed ordinally without disaggregating § 14141 findings letters into two generations,
the scatterplot in Figure 4 illustrates a positive association between temporal order, and DOJ’s
output while the average length of an investigation remains unchanged. Suggestive of disjointed
incrementalism through the increased efficiency of DOJ’s output relative to their investigation
length, three Spearman’s correlations were conducted to assess the bivariate relationship between
temporal order and output length. This type of test can be used to measure the association
between an ordinal and continuous variable (Onwuegbuzie, Daniel, & Leech, 2017). Since
DOJ’s findings letters were measured ordinally as depicted in Figure 4, and the length of an
investigation, measured as the number of months, is a continuous variable, a Spearman’s
correlation was the most appropriate inferential test for this analysis.
The results indicate a strong positive significant correlation for the N = 33 study
population, (rs = .69, p < .001), a very strong positive significant correlation for the n = 24

147

agencies under negotiated settlement, (rs = .79, p < .001), and a moderately negative nonsignificant relationship for the n = 9 agencies under technical assistance, (rs = -.30, p = .404).
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Figure 4. Changes in § 14141 Investigation Length and Output

Having established that a relationship exists between output length and the order of §
14141 investigations, the application of disjointed incrementalism to § 14141 investigations
suggests that investigative efficiency would be revealed through lesser investigative length for
more recent investigations compared to earlier investigations. As such, the following hypothesis
was offered and tested:
•

H4: First-generation § 14141 investigations will have lasted longer than secondgeneration investigations.

To test the hypothesis that first-generation investigations lasted longer than secondgeneration investigations, and this hypothesis is directional, that is, first-generation
investigations are expected to be longer than second, a one-tailed t-test for two independent
means was conducted in which no significant differences between the mean length of DOJ’s
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investigations by generation were found t(31) = 0.12, p = .45, summary statistics can be found in
Table 11.
Table 11
Length of Investigation by Generation (in months).
95% CI
Generation

n

M (SD)

LL

UL

First

16

19.06 (13.72)

11.75

26.37

Second

17

18.52 (11)

12.86

24.17

Total

33

18.79 (12.2)

14.46

23.11

Two separate one-tailed t-tests for two independent means were conducted for the length
of an investigation by investigative outcome, disaggregated by generation as a further test of H4.
The results presented in Table 12 indicate that the mean difference between first and secondgeneration investigation length for police agencies under negotiated settlement was not
significant, t(15) = 1.20, p = .12. Although the mean difference in length of investigation for
police agencies under technical assistance was close to significant, with unequal variances, t(3) =
-1.83, p = .081, this difference was opposite of the hypothesized relationship.
Table 12
Length of Investigation by Generation and Outcome (in months).
Negotiated Settlements

Technical Assistance

Generation

n

M

SD

n

M

SD

First

11

22.18

15.51

5

12.2

4.38

Second

13

15.92

8.3

4

27

15.64

Total

24

18.79

12.27

9

18.78

12.73

Having established that the length of an investigation does not differ by generation, nor
by investigative outcome, the size of a municipal police department was brought in as a control
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to glean a more complete analysis of disjointed incrementalism’s effect on DOJ’s § 14141
investigative process. As such, the following hypothesis was offered and tested:
H5: The length of an investigation will be negatively associated with the number of

•

scaled thematic findings, controlling for the size of a police department.
Disjointed incrementalism applied to § 14141 investigations suggests that the DOJ would
become more efficient in their investigative process, resulting in greater thematic findings in
shorter investigative time periods. An illustration of this relationship in Figure 5 for the N = 33
study population indicates a slight negative trend in the relationship between investigation length
and number of scaled thematic findings.
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Figure 5. Relationship Between Length of Investigation and Scaled Thematic Findings

A Pearson’s r correlation was conducted to assess the relationship between the length of
investigation, and total scaled findings for the N = 33 investigations, (r = -.22, p = .199),
indicating a weak negative, non-statistically significant relationship. Similarly, Pearson’s r
correlations were calculated to assess the relationship between length of investigation and scaled
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findings for the n = 24 negotiated settlements, (r = -.18, p = .399), indicating a weak negative,
non-statistically significant relationship, and the n = 9 agencies under technical assistance, (r = .64, p = .061), although a moderate negative relationship, this difference was marginally, but not
statistically significant.
Since it was hypothesized that length of investigation, and scaled thematic findings
would be negatively associated, three one-way Pearson’s partial correlations were conducted to
bring the size of a police agency in as a control variable. Disjointed incrementalism applied to §
14141 decision-making suggests that over-time efficiency by the DOJ would be revealed by
producing a greater number of findings, in less time, holding the size of the police department
constant. The results of these partial correlations indicate that a weak negative, marginal, but
non-significant relationship exists between investigative length and scaled findings, controlling
for the size of a police agency in the study population, (r = -.265, p = .072), a weak negative nonsignificant relationship exists for the n = 24 agencies (r = -.209, p = .169), and a moderately
strong negative and significant relationship exists for the n = 9 police agencies (r = -.661, p =
.037).
Having established that disjointed incrementalism marginally affects DOJ’s investigative
efficiency in a statistically significant manner controlling for the size of a police department for
the entire study population, a second approach to assessing disjointed incrementalism’s influence
on organizational decision-making relative § 14141 enforcement was taken. Here, disjointed
incrementalism’s influence on outcomes over-time was assessed, and as such, the following
hypothesis was offered and tested:
•

H6: DOJ’s investigative findings will differ over time.
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Supported by disjointed incrementalism’s core characteristics, changes in the number,
and types of findings over the course of § 14141 enforcement should reveal themselves through
the aggregation of findings by generation, and disaggregated by findings between generations.
As such, to test H6, that DOJ’s number and type of findings change over-time, a two-tailed zscore test for two population proportions was conducted for the total number of scaled findings
between first and second-generation investigations with statistically significant differences found
between generations (.38) to (.54), z = -3.96, p < .001.
Each of the 20 scaled thematic findings were tested for over-time changes by generation
using a two-tailed z-score test for each of two population proportions, significant differences
were found between first and second-generation findings for the following six scaled themes: (a)
leadership and management failure (.19) to (.71), z = -2.99, p = .003; (b) focus on enforcement,
activity, and arrests (.00) to (.24), z = -2.06, p = .038; (c) prevailing cultural view (.00) to (.53), z
= -3.41, p < .001; (d) biased-based policing (.13) to (.47), z = -2.16, p = .031; (e) cultural
deviation (.06) to (.35), z = -2.04, p = .041; and, (f) weapon competency (.13) to (.47), z = -2.16,
p = .031. All other scaled thematic differences between generations were not significant. See
Table 13 for summary statistics.
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Table 13
Differences in Scaled Themes by Generation.
First Generation n = 16

Second Generation n = 17

# of agencies
with scaled
theme

%

# of agencies
with scaled
theme

%

Conditions of ambiguity

12

75%

9

53%

Internal partiality

12

75%

12

71%

Misaligned policy and practice

7

44%

12

71%

Deficient selection criteria

8

50%

9

53%

Fails to maintain established standards…

16

100%

15

88%

Failure to adhere to best practices

13

81%

13

76%

Leadership and management failure

3

19%

12**

71%

Focus on enforcement, activity and arrests

0

0%

4*

24%

Prevailing cultural view

0

0%

9***

53%

Adaption failure

3

19%

8

47%

Conflicts of interest

0

0%

3

18%

Deficient interaction with external organizations

10

63%

13

76%

Research, planning and resource allocation

11

69%

8

47%

Abuse of authority

6

38%

12

71%

Biased-based policing

2

13%

8*

47%

Cultural deviation

1

6%

6*

35%

Unjustified enforcement action

6

38%

7

41%

Inappropriate tactical discretion

7

44%

13

76%

Equipment inadequacies

4

25%

2

12%

Weapon competency

2

13%

8*

47%

123

38%

183***

54%

Scaled theme

Total
* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001
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Having established that DOJ’s findings differed between first and second-generation
investigations, applying disjointed incrementalism beyond investigations and findings to
exploring differences in the characteristics of the municipal police agencies between generations,
the following exploratory hypothesis was offered and tested:
•

He: Organizational and environmental characteristics for municipal police will differ
between first and second-generation investigations.
Independent sample t-tests were run for the four variables; population category, percent

non-white, size, and resources by generation. Differences in the population category by
generation were not significant, t(31) = 0.142, p = .44; nor were differences in the size of a police
department by generation, with unequal variance, t(31) = -0.03, p = .48; nor were differences in
resources, t(31) = 0.09, p = .46. However, differences in the percent non-white significantly
differed by generation, t(31) = -2.06, p = .048, d = 0.72. See Table 14 for summary statistics.
Table 14
Means of Environmental and Organizational Variables by Generation.
First Generation (n = 16)

Second Generation (n = 17)

95% CI
Variable
Population
category
Percent nonwhite
Size (sworn
x10)
Resources
(sworn per
1,000)
*p < .05

95% CI

M (SD)

LL

UL

M (SD)

LL

UL

3.9 (2.02)

2.8

4.9

4.5 (1.7)

3.6

5.4

45.1 (24.9)*

31.8

58.4

62.6 (23.9)*

50.3

74.9

151 (23.9)

138.3

163.7

153.6 (28.0)

139.2

168

2.8 (1.29)

2.1

3.5

2.7 (1.05)

2.16

3.24
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Deterrence
The application of deterrence to DOJ’s § 14141 decision-making suggests that
municipalities and their police agencies are specifically targeted for enforcement action under §
14141 authority because of their size. For example, data in Figure 6 illustrate that the DOJ
initiated § 14141 investigations against municipal police agencies disproportionate to their
representation in the U.S. population as aggregated (BJS, 2015), implying that the largest
municipal police agencies, as measured by total sworn employees, are the focus of § 14141
investigations.
% of municipal police departments

% of N = 33

50.0%
45.0%
40.0%
35.0%
30.0%
25.0%
20.0%
15.0%
10.0%
5.0%
0.0%

1

2-4

5-9

10-24

25-49

50-99

100-249

250-499

500-999

1,000 +

Municipal Police Agencies by Number of Total Sworn Employees

Figure 6. Share of Municipal Police Departments Subject to § 14141 by Agency Size

Concerning the data presented in Figure 6; the percentage of municipal police agencies
categorized by total sworn employees was calculated by multiplying the number of local police
agencies per category by .98. Since BJS (2015) informs that 98% of local police departments in
the U.S. serve municipalities, that product was then divided by the total number of municipal
police agencies to create a percentage of police agencies categorized according to sworn
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employees, quantitatively supporting the inference of targeted enforcement by the DOJ.
Moreover, the application of § 14141 against municipal police agencies appears to concentrate
among few states; of the N = 33 investigations in this study, 57% were concentrated in just six
states, as presented in Table 15.
Table 15
DOJ Investigation of Municipal Police by State.
State
Ohio
California
New York
Florida
Illinois
Pennsylvania
All others
Total

# of N = 33
Investigations
7
3
3
2
2
2
14
33

% of N = 33
Investigations
21%
9%
9%
6%
6%
6%
43%
100%

Having established that the DOJ targets larger municipal police agencies disproportionate
to their representation in the general U.S. population, the application of deterrence theory to §
14141 enforcement suggests that these investigative decisions are intentional ones because of a
greater societal benefit in reforming a few large municipal police agencies to serve as an
example for the many smaller municipal police agencies in the United States. Since
characteristics of large municipal police agencies and their parent jurisdiction differ from smaller
ones, the following hypothesis was offered and tested:
•

H7: Environmental and organizational characteristics will differ between police
agencies found to engage in unconstitutional policing, and police agencies without
such findings.

Two variables were conceptualized to represent municipal police agency environmental
characteristics (BJS population category, and percent non-white), and two variables were
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conceptualized to represent organizational characteristics (size – total sworn, and resources –
sworn per 1,000 population). See Table 16 for summary statistics of these variables for the N =
33 investigations of municipal police by investigative outcome.
Table 16
Means of Environmental and Organizational Variables by Investigative Outcome.
Negotiated settlement (n = 24)

Technical assistance (n = 9)

95% CI
Variable
Population
category
Percent nonwhite
Size (sworn
x10)
Resources
(sworn per
1,000)
*p < .05

95% CI

M (SD)

LL

UL

M (SD)

LL

UL

4.5 (1.96)

3.7

5.3

3.4 (1.51)

2.2

4.6

54.7 (22.46)

45.2

64.2

52.7 (34.3)

26.3

79.1

194.7 (290.35)*

75.1

320.3

39.2 (49.8)*

0.94

77.5

2.9 (1.24)*

2.5

3.5

2.1 (0.6)*

1.6

2.6

Results of a two-tailed t-test for two independent means for the variable population
category did not significant differ by investigative outcome, t(31) = 1.4, p = .17. As well, results
of a two-tailed t-test for two independent means for the variable percent non-white was not
significant by investigative outcome, t(31) = .189, p = .85. Results of a two-tailed t-test for
independent means with unequal variances for the variable size (sworn x 10) significantly
differed by investigative outcome, t(26) = 2.52, p = .018, and differences in independent means
with unequal variances for the variable resources (sworn per 1,000) by investigative outcome
was also statistically significant, t(29) = 2.6, p = .014.
Deterrence – economic theory of public enforcement of law as applied to § 14141, when
viewed through a resource dependence lens suggests that municipal police agencies with fewer
resources will have more organizational problems due specifically to their reliance on economic
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support from public funding. Therefore, municipal police agencies with less economic support
should have more institutional and systemic problems. As such, the following hypothesis was
offered and tested:
•

H8: Municipal police agency resources will be negatively associated with the number
of scaled findings, controlling for the size of a police department.

Since the average number of sworn employees per 1,000-person population is known to
vary according to the size of a police department and their municipality (BJS, 2015), the size of a
police agency was used as a control when correlating police resources and total scaled findings.
A one-tailed Pearson’s partial correlation was conducted to test H8, that a police agency’s
resources and the number of scaled findings will be negatively associated, controlling for the size
of a police department. Results indicate these variables were moderately associated and
statistically significant, however, opposite of the hypothesized relationship, (r = .402, p = .011).
These results present a mixed interpretation regarding the conceptualization,
measurement and application of a dimension of deterrence theory to § 14141 enforcement of
municipal police. In particular, the partial correlation that resulted in a statistically significant but
reverse finding calls into question the conceptualization of a resource dependence perspective of
deterrence for § 14141. This and other results are discussed more fully in the discussion chapter.
Multiple Streams
Problem stream.
Applying the multiple streams framework to all N = 33 investigations, and comparing the
variables from that framework across § 14141 investigative outcomes allowed for an analysis of
organizational decision-making, and by which variables, if any, that DOJ is influenced. The
problem stream is the first of Kingdon’s (1995) three, and comprises focusing events, indicators,
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and feedback, all three of which are posited to influence problem recognition, therefore assisting
in decision-making, and facilitating a problem to influence a policy outcome.
Focusing events.
The first of the elements in the problem stream are focusing events, in the MS framework
focusing events are known to bring attention to a problem. As applied to § 14141, focusing
events should be an indication of highly dysfunctional organizational behavior in municipal
police. As such, the following hypothesis was offered and tested:
•

H9: Municipal police agencies experiencing a focusing event are more likely to have
been found to engage in unconstitutional policing than those that have not
experienced a focusing event.

A Fisher’s exact test was conducted to assess H9, that police agencies with a focusing
event would be more likely to have engaged in unconstitutional policing than municipal police
agencies that have not experienced a focusing event. This test can be used to determine if two
dichotomous variables are independent of each other similar to a chi-square test of independence,
however, since the chi-square test cannot be run on small sample sizes including those with cell
frequencies less than five (Fitzgerald & Fitzgerald, 2014), a Fisher’s exact test is the appropriate
test of association. Crosstabulations for these two variables are presented in Table 17. The results
of the one-sided Fisher’s exact test were not statistically significant (p = .37), indicating that
focusing events and investigative outcome are independent of each other.
Table 17
Crosstabs: Focusing Event by Investigative Outcome.
Outcome

Focusing Event

Negotiated Settlement
Technical Assistance

Yes
14
4

No
10
5

Total

18

15
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Row
Totals
24
9
33

Indicators.
Having established that focusing events within the problem stream do not by themselves
effect the outcome of a policy output (viz., constitutional or unconstitutional policing findings),
the MS framework suggests that indicators are a second element in the problem stream that may
influence the policy output. As such, the following hypothesis was offered and tested:
•

H10: Municipal police agencies found to have deficient intervention systems will be
more likely to engage in unconstitutional policing than municipal police agencies
without such deficiencies.

A Fisher’s exact test was conducted to assess H10, that police agencies found to have
engaged in unconstitutional policing are more likely to have deficient intervention systems than
police agencies that have not been found to have engaged in unconstitutional policing. This test
was used as an alternative to a chi-square test of independence since two cell frequencies have
fewer than five observations. Crosstabulations for these two variables are presented in Table 18.
Results of a one-sided Fisher’s exact test were not statistically significant (p = .58), indicating
that deficient intervention systems, and investigative outcome are independent of each other.
Table 18
Crosstabs: Indicators by Investigative Outcome.
Outcome

Deficient Indicator System
Yes
20
8
28

Negotiated Settlement
Technical Assistance
Total
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No
4
1
5

Row
Totals
24
9
33

Feedback.
The third individual element in the problem stream is feedback. As an individual
variable, feedback was tested by investigative outcome to determine its relationship with an
investigative outcome. In the MS framework, feedback’s influence is typically measured as an
interaction with focusing events in what Kingdon (1995) refers to as accompaniment, the concept
of which was tested, and is reported in the next section. Since feedback as a stand-alone variable
is rarely measured and tested in MS, a specific hypothesis was not offered for the following
inferential test. However, assessing feedback’s relationship with the investigative outcome was
critical for subsequent analysis in this dissertation, as such, a Fisher’s exact test was conducted to
determine if feedback and investigative outcome are independent of each other, the result was not
significant (p = .23), indicating that feedback and an investigative outcome are independent.
Summary statistics are reported in Table 19.
Table 19
Crosstabs: Feedback by Investigative Outcome.
Outcome

Feedback
Yes
17
4
21

Negotiated Settlement
Technical Assistance
Total

No
7
5
12

Row
Totals
24
9
33

Accompaniment.
Having established that focusing events alone are insufficient to determine the
relationship with investigative outcome, the MS framework suggests that the influence of
feedback along with a focusing event forms a type of accompaniment that can affect a policy
decision, and therefore a § 14141 outcome. As such, the following hypothesis was offered and
tested:
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•

H11: Municipal police agencies with associated focusing events are more likely to
have accompaniment in the form of feedback than agencies without focusing events.

A Fisher’s exact test was conducted to assess H11, that municipal police agencies with
associated focusing events are more likely to have accompaniment, in the form of feedback from
the national news media than police agencies without focusing events. Crosstabulations for the
variables focusing events and feedback are presented in Table 20. Results of the Fisher’s exact
test of independence were statistically significant (p = .014), indicating that focusing events and
feedback are interdependent variables, forming a type of accompaniment.
Table 20
Crosstabs: Accompaniment - Focusing Events by Feedback.
Focusing Event

Feedback
Yes
15
6
21

Present*
Absent*
Total
*p < .05

No
3
9
12

Row
Totals
18
15
33

Policy stream.
The second stream in the MS framework consists of policies that rise to actionable status
as solutions to problems identified in the problem stream through focusing events, indicators,
feedback, and accompaniment. To test whether deficient policies are related to investigative
outcomes, and serve as a root cause of municipal police agency dysfunction, the following
hypothesis was offered and tested:
•

H12: Municipal police agencies under negotiated settlement will have a greater
number of policy deficiencies than those under technical assistance.

Multiple one-way z-score tests for two population proportions were conducted to test H12,
that municipal police agencies under negotiated settlement would have a greater number of
162

policy deficiencies than agencies under technical assistance. The results presented in Table 21
indicate that by investigative outcome, police agencies under negotiated settlement have a
significantly higher proportion of deficient policy findings compared to police agencies under
technical assistance by total (.78) to (.56), z = 2.78, p = .003; for stop, search, and arrest policies
(.75) to (.33), z = 2.22, p = .013; for response to special populations policies (.50) to (.00), z =
2.66, p = .004; and for internal discipline policies (.88) to (.56), z = 1.99, p = .023.
Table 21
Differences in Deficient Policies by Investigative Outcome.
Negotiated settlements (n = 24)

Technical assistance (n = 9)

# of agencies with
policy cluster

% of agencies with
policy cluster

# of agencies with
policy cluster

% of agencies with
policy cluster

Use of force

21

88%

9

100%

Stop, search & arrest

18*

75%

3

33%

Response to special
populations

12**

50%

0

0%

Civilian complaint
system

21

88%

8

89%

Internal discipline

21*

88%

5

56%

Total

93**

78%

25

56%

Policy cluster

*p < .05; **p < .01

Having established that the number and type of policy deficiencies are related to
investigative outcome, to further test the influence of the policy stream on an investigative
outcome and organizational decision-making, the following hypothesis was offered and tested:
•

H13: The number of deficient policies will be positively associated with the number of
thematic findings.

Three separate one-way Pearson’s r correlations were conducted, one for the study
population, and one by each investigative outcome to test H13, that deficient policies and
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thematic findings are positively associated. A Pearson’s r correlation is a measure of association
between two variables measured at the interval or ratio scale (Laerd, 2016b). Since both the
number of deficient policies and the number of thematic findings are measured as continuous
variables, and have a linear relationship, a Pearson’s r is the appropriate test for H13. The results
indicate that very strong, positive, and statistically significant associations exist between the
number of policy deficiencies and thematic findings for the N = 33 investigations of municipal
police, (r = .79, p < .001); the n = 24 police agencies under negotiated settlement, (r = .79, p <
.001); and the n = 9 police agencies under technical assistance (r = .71, p = .033).
Political stream.
Administrative turnover.
The third, and what Kingdon (1995) argues as the most important of the three streams in
the MS framework is the political stream. The combination of elements including administrative
turnover and the national mood exert the most pressure on an issue rising to actionable status,
effecting a policy output. As such, the following hypothesis was offered and tested:
•

H14: The number of observed § 14141 investigations occurring during the tenure of
each president will differ from expected observations.

A chi-square goodness-of-fit crosstabulation with observed and expected § 14141
investigations by presidential officeholder is presented in Table 22. This type of test can be used
when one variable is nominal and there are at least five expected frequencies in each group of the
nominal variable (Fitzgerald & Fitzgerald, 2014). The chi-square goodness-of-fit test is the
preferable test for H14 because the null assumes that there would not be any differences between
the number of expected and actual observations of the nominal variable (presidential
officeholder). As such, the goodness-of-fit allows for a test of this assumption.
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Since § 14141 spans two of three president’s complete tenure, I calculated the life of §
14141 for each president by months served in office beginning with initiation of the first § 14141
investigation. That is, § 14141 was passed in September 1994, with the first investigation
occurring 28 months into President Clinton’s tenure for a total of 68 months, whereas President’s
Bush and Obama each served 96 months in office concurrent with §14141. I then calculated an
expected number of § 14141 investigations of municipal police to compare against actual
observations to test H14, that administrative turnover effects decision-making as suggested by the
MS framework. The number of months in office for each president was multiplied by the ratio of
total municipal police agency investigations (33), to months of presidential tenure (260). An
expected number of § 14141 investigations during each president’s tenure was then calculated by
the product of the resultant .13 ratio, and number of months in office. The results of these
calculations are presented in Table 22.
Table 22
Expected and Observed Investigations by president.
President
Clinton
Bush
Obama

Political Party
Democratic
Republican
Democratic

Months in
Office
68
96
96

Ratio

Expected

Observed

.13
.13
.13

9
12
12

7
13
13

A chi-square goodness-of-fit test was performed to determine whether there were
differences between the number of expected and observed § 14141 investigations against
municipal police during the tenure of each president. The results presented in Table 22, indicate
that the observed and expected number of § 14141 investigations based on the presidential
officeholder did not significantly differ, (χ2 = 0.611, p = .73).
Since administrative turnover as conceptualized by officeholder of the president did not
have any effect on the number of expected and observed § 14141 investigations, administrative
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turnover was further conceptualized to reflect the political party of the president rather than
officeholder, since a changeover in party may better reflect a changeover in administrative
turnover rather than presidential officeholder. As such, the following hypothesis was offered and
tested:
•

H15: Investigative outcomes will differ between political parties.

A Fisher’s exact test was conducted to determine if there were differences in a § 14141
investigative outcome based on the political party of the president when aggregated. Significant
differences were found (p < .001), indicating that political party, and category of § 14141
investigative outcome are interdependent. See Table 23 for summary statistics.
Table 23
Political Party and Investigative Outcome.
Political Party
Democratic***
Republican***
Total
***p < .001

Negotiated
Settlement
19
5
24

Technical
Assistance
1
8
9

Row Totals
20
13
33

National mood.
The MS framework posits that the combination of administrative turnover and the
national mood exert the strongest influence within the political stream – and the political stream
is powerful enough influence agenda-setting and organizational decision-making because of the
power of the presidency. As applied to § 14141, the combination of the national mood and
administrative turnover were calculated to identify over-time changes in the public’s positive
attitude towards the police, and contrasted with presidential turnover.
From 1994 through 2017, the national mood related to attitude towards the police was
more positive than average positive for 12 years, and less positive than average positive for 12
years. The 12 positive years accounted for the initiation of 14 § 14141 investigations leading to a
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negotiated settlement, and six investigations leading to technical assistance. In contrast, the 12
years in which the national mood was less positive than average, 10 § 14141 investigations were
initiated leading to a negotiated settlement, and three investigations were initiated leading to
technical assistance. Since the national mood data reflect over-time changes, a more instructive
presentation of these data can be found in Figure 7, visually presenting the N = 33 investigations,
national mood, and average positive national mood, suggesting that a relationship between the
national mood, political leadership, and the initiation of § 14141 investigations existed through
the provision’s life-course.
6
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Figure 7. National Mood and Number of § 14141 Investigations: 1994-2017

The influence of both the national mood and administrative turnover on § 14141
decision-making becomes more discernable when viewed only as the n = 24 negotiated
settlements, disaggregated by president, since this investigative outcome is indicative of
unconstitutional policing, hence, more serious systemic misconduct. As indicated in Figure 8,
over-time changes in decision-making by the DOJ to initiate a § 14141 investigation leading to a
167

negotiated settlement appear to mirror the national mood, and are aligned with changes in
presidential leadership during the following terms: Clinton, 1994-2001; Bush, 2001-2009;
Obama, 2009-2017. 5
From the passage of § 14141 until the year 2000, the positive national mood toward the
police was less than average positive compared over the life-course of § 14141. This time period
saw the initiation of five investigations, all of which led to a negotiated settlement. The year
2000 coincided with the election of George W. Bush to the Presidency, and the first time over
the life-course of § 14141 where the positive national mood in attitude toward the police was
higher than historic average, with that trend continuing through 2006. During this time period, 11
§ 14141 investigations were initiated, five of which resulted in technical assistance, coinciding
with the § 14141 life-course historical peak positive support for the police.
During the final two full years of the Bush Presidency, 2007-2008, four new § 14141
investigations were initiated, three of which resulted in technical assistance. These two years
corresponded to a drop in the positive mood from historic average towards police to lower than
historic average at 42% and 45% positive. A changeover in administrations occurred in early
2009 from President Bush to President Obama. During the Obama Administration, 13 new §
14141 investigations of municipal police were conducted, one of which resulted in technical
assistance. During the first four years of the Obama Administration the national mood towards
the police was above historic positive, yet, this time period accounted for 9 of the 13
investigations of municipal police during the entire Obama Presidency, including a spike of
investigations by the DOJ occurring in 2011. In 2014, the national mood towards police was at

The term of the president begins on January 20th. As such, the final year of the three presidential terms do not
reflect the entire calendar year. Accordingly, calculations for the number of § 14141 investigations reflect full years
of the presidency.
5
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its second-lowest throughout the life-course of § 14141. The only year in which the mood
towards the police was less positive was in 1994, the year § 14141 was passed into law.
Clinton

Bush

Obama
6
5

50
4
3

45

2
40

Number of investigations

National mood - Positive attitude to police %

55

1
0

Neg Set investigations

National mood

2017

2016

2015

2014

2013

2012

2011

2010

2009

2008

2007

2006

2005

2004

2003

2002

2001

2000

1999

1998

1997

1996

1995

1994

35

Average mood

Figure 8. National Mood and Negotiated Settlements, 1994-2017

To better determine the combined influence that the national mood and presidential
administration have on DOJ decision-making related to § 14141 enforcement, three separate
correlations were conducted 6 which included two point-biserial correlations and one Pearson’s r
correlation. A point-biserial correlation is used when one variable is measured on a continuous
scale and the other is dichotomous (Laerd, 2016c). The results of the first point-biserial between
the national mood, and political party of the president found a moderate, positive, marginal, but
non-statistically significant relationship, (rpb = .395, p = .062). A second point-biserial

Data from the year 2017 were excluded from these analyses since a new president was inaugurated on January 20th,
2017, and the purpose of these analyses were to identify the over-time interaction between elements in the political
stream. As such, the end of President Obama’s second term in 2017 is indicative of the end of § 14141’s “lifecourse”.
6
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correlation was run between the political party of the president and the number of § 14141
investigations, wherein a weak, positive, non-statistically significant relationship was found, (rpb
= .118, p = .590). Finally, a Pearson’s correlation was run on the number of investigations and
national mood wherein a weak, positive, non-statistically significant relationship was found, (r =
.268, p = .216).
A summary of all hypotheses tested, and their results can be found in Appendix G.
Binary Logistic Regression
A binary logistic regression was conducted using select variables from the MS and
deterrence framework to better understand, and predict how the DOJ identified a specific
municipal police agency engaged in unconstitutional policing. This type of regression is used
when a researcher wants to predict the probability that an observation falls into one of two
categories based on one or more categorical independent variables (Laerd, 2015). Since the
dependent variable being tested is binomial, and the independent variables have been dummy
coded categorically, a binomial regression is the most appropriate inferential test to determine
which independent variable(s) best predict an outcome of unconstitutional policing. Variables
from disjointed incrementalism were intentionally excluded since as applied in this study,
disjointed incrementalism was used to identify, explore, and explain over-time changes in §
14141 investigative findings, and changes in productivity and investigative efficiency throughout
the provision’s life-course. Implicit in this application is that a decision to conduct a § 14141
investigation by the DOJ has already been made. As such, deterrence and MS, as applied, are
used in an attempt to explore and explain how the DOJ made their decision regarding which
municipal police agencies to target for patterns or practices of unconstitutional policing.
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Since the study population consisted of just 33 cases, all independent variables could not
be used in one predictive model. Although it falls below the events per variable (EPV) “rule of
thumb” of 10 events for the smaller of the two outcomes per independent variable (Austin &
Steyerberg, 2017), scholars have argued that between five and nine independent variables per
event can also produce valid results when properly constructed (Vittinghoff & McCulloch,
2007). Using the above described rationale, there was a need to identify the fewest independent
variables to stay within an acceptable EPV ratio considering the smaller of two outcomes was the
n = 9 municipal police agencies under technical assistance.
Based on the need to reduce the number of variables to create a workable and valid
regression model, purposeful variable selection (Bursac, Gauss, Williams, & Hosmer, 2008) was
conducted in two analytical phases: First, phi coefficients were run between all independent
variables to identify those with significant relationships, see Appendix D, with the objective of
teasing out binary combinations with a coefficient of a ϕ > .50.
Using the described analytic technique, 19 combinations of binary variables were found
to be significant at p < .05, and in two of those combinations the ϕ > .50 threshold was violated.
The relationship between the policy stream independent variable civilian complaint systems and
problem stream independent variable indicators was very highly correlated, (ϕ = .879, p < .001).
Moreover, two policy stream independent variables, civilian complaint systems and use of force
were found to be moderately correlated, but above the established threshold, (ϕ = .528, p < .01).
No other binary independent variables met or exceeded the established threshold. This
information was used to assist in independent variable model inclusion after completion of the
second phase.
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Following the first phase, the four deterrence-supported independent variables,
percentage non-white, size, resources, and population group were reviewed for previous
inferential testing where the independent variable and investigative outcome had a statistically
significant relationship. Two of the four independent variables from the deterrence framework,
size, and resources, were found to significantly differ by investigative outcome at p < .05 in
previously run independent samples t-tests, as such, both were considered for model inclusion.
Inferential tests by investigative outcome were reviewed from each of the three streams
to identify the most appropriate variable for model inclusion. Although all three variables in the
problem stream were not significantly related to the investigative outcome, the third variable in
the problem stream, feedback, had the lowest p value of the three; focusing events, (p = .37),
indicators, (p = .58), and feedback, (p = .23). Moreover, the variable feedback was significantly
related to focusing events, yet below the established maximum threshold for model inclusion (ϕ =
.449, p < .01). As well, the variables feedback and focusing events were significantly related,
acceding to the interdependence of the MS concept accompaniment (Fisher’s exact, p = .014). As
such, the variable feedback was considered for model inclusion, whereas the two other problem
stream variables, focusing events and indicators, were excluded from consideration. Within the
policy stream, three independent variables, measured as policy clusters, significantly related to
the investigative outcome, these included: Stop, search, and arrest; response to special
populations; and, internal discipline. As such, all three variables were initially considered for
model inclusion. Within the political stream, only Presidential party was inferentially tested
against the dependent variable, however, since this variable was also found to have a statistically
significant relationship by investigative outcome, it was the only one of the political stream
variables considered for model inclusion.
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The candidate variables for selection were then analyzed and compared to each other
with phi coefficients. Since the deterrence variable size, had a significant phi correlation with
two other deterrence variables, percent non-white (ϕ = .389, p < .05), and resources (ϕ = .344, p
< .05), whereas the variable resources was significantly correlated with only the variable, size (ϕ
=.344, p < .05), size was selected as the most fitting and best representative deterrence-supported
variable for the binary regression.
Of the three statistically significant independent variables by investigative outcome in the
policy stream, the response to special populations policy cluster variable was excluded from
consideration because of a lack of variation in the distribution of the outcome, that is, 12
agencies under negotiated settlement had this deficiency, whereas there were none under
technical assistance: This lack of an affirmative outcome for one of the binary options proved
inappropriate for the regression model. The other two significant variables; stop, search, and
arrest policies, and internal discipline system policies were both included in the model. The
variable stop, search, and arrest was significantly correlated to response to special populations,
(ϕ = .440, p < .05), and the variable internal discipline system was significantly correlated to the
variable use of force, (ϕ = .352, p < .05), as well as significantly correlated with civilian
complaint system, (ϕ = .489, p < .01). Since two variables in the policy stream accounted for
significant relationships with the other variables in the policy stream but did not violate the ϕ >
.50 threshold, it was decided to include both variables in the model since they best represent the
entire influence of the policy stream for the regression model.
Using the described analytical strategy and methodology, five independent variables were
selected for initial model inclusion. This produced a final yield of events per variable of less than
2:1, falling well-below the minimum 5:1 to 9:1 threshold in which scholars consider necessary
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for model validity; noting that an EPV of less than 5:1 consistently produces problems in logistic
regression models (Vittinghoff & McCulloch, 2007).
As a workaround to the low EPV, I chose to run a backward-stepwise-Wald binary
logistic regression including the five independent variables: size; feedback; stop, search, and
arrest; internal discipline system; and Presidential party to identify which of the purposefully
chosen MS, and deterrence-supported variables, or combination of two, best predict a § 14141
investigative outcome. Conducting this type of stepwise regression eliminated each independent
variable that did not contribute to the significance of regression model based on the Wald chisquare statistic. Running the analysis with all five independent variables, and eliminating each
using this technique allowed the regression to identify the fewest independent variables
necessary while maintaining model significance. This technique produced five regression
iterations with the best fitting model including only one independent variable – Presidential
party. The one-variable model was found to be statistically significant over the null, χ2 (1, N =
33) = 13.409, p < .001, and explained 48% (Nagelkerke R2) of the variance in the dependent
variable, operationalized by investigative outcome as unconstitutional policing. As well, this
model correctly classified 89% of technical assistance outcomes, and 79% of negotiated
settlement outcomes for an overall successful classification rate of 82%. Of the five predictor
variables in the first model, only Presidential party significantly contributed to the model’s
overall significance throughout the five regression iterations resulting in a final EPV ratio of 9:1;
this was in keeping with Vittinghoff and McCulloch’s (2007) recommendation of maintaining a
minimum EPV of between 5:1 and 9:1 to ensure model validity when using the purposeful
variable selection method. All summary statistics for the five iterations of backward-stepwise
regression can be found in Table 24.
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Deriving the probability of an investigative outcome based on the regression model
produced the following probabilities: When the president is a Democrat and there is a § 14141
investigative outcome, there is a .95 probability that the outcome will be a finding of
unconstitutional policing (negotiated settlement). In contrast, when the president is a Republican
and there is a §14141 investigative outcome, there is a .39 probability that the outcome will be a
finding of unconstitutional policing (negotiated settlement). These probabilities were derived
using the following formulas: (1) odds equation, (2) probability equation, (3) probability of
unconstitutional outcome when Democrat, (3) probability of unconstitutional outcome when
Republican.
𝑝𝑝

(1)

𝑝𝑝 = 1+𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜

(2)

𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂 = 1−𝑝𝑝
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜

𝑒𝑒 2.944
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𝑝𝑝 = 1+𝑒𝑒 2.944 = 20
𝑒𝑒 2.944−3.414

(3)
0.625

𝑝𝑝 = 1+𝑒𝑒 2.944−3.414 = 1+0.625
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(4)

Table 24
Backwards Stepwise Logistic Regression Predicting an Outcome of Unconstitutional Policing.

Iteration 1

Iteration 2

Iteration 3

Iteration 4

Iteration 5

Variable
Size
Feedback
Stop, search, & arrest
Internal discipline
Presidential party
Constant
χ2
df
Nagelkerke R2
Size
Stop, search, & arrest
Internal discipline
Presidential party
Constant
χ2
df
Nagelkerke R2
Size
Stop, search, & arrest
Presidential party
Constant
χ2
df
Nagelkerke R2
Stop, search, & arrest
Presidential party
Constant
χ2
df
Nagelkerke R2

Presidential party
Constant
χ2
df
Nagelkerke R2
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001

Model

17.557**
5
.598

17.555**
4
.598

16.990**
3
.583

15.576***
2
.545

13.409***
1
.484

95% CI
UL

B

SE

Wald

df

OR

LL

1.205
-.047
1.646
.969
-2.886
.543

1.162
1.186
1.175
1.316
1.289
1.790

1.076
.002
1.963
.542
5.012*
.092

1
1
1
1
1
1

3.337
.954
5.187
2.634
.056
1.721

.342
.093
.519
.200
.004

32.539
9.751
51.858
34.724
.698

1.208
1.636
.959
-2.874
.519

1.161
1.149
1.290
1.248
1.680

1.082
2.030
.552
5.300*
.095

1
1
1
1
1

3.345
5.137
2.609
.056
1.680

.344
.541
.208
.005

32.561
48.795
32.712
.652

1.334
1.529
-3.001
1.324

1.145
1.099
1.245
1.258

1.356
1.935
5.807*
1.108

1
1
1
1

3.795
4.611
.050
3.758

.402
.535
.004

35.814
39.744
.571

1.515
-3.264
2.031

1.057
1.212
1.143

2.054
7.255**
3.161

1
1
1

4.549
.038
7.625

.573
.004

36.112
.411

-3.414
2.944

1.174
1.026

8.463**
8.236

1
1

.033
19.000

.003

.328
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Discussion
Thematic Analysis - Interpretation
•

RQ2: What patterns or practices does DOJ find contribute to unconstitutional policing?
Although the differences in proportions of total themes by investigative outcome was not

significant, when individually disaggregated, differences in proportions for two of the eight
themes by investigative outcome were statistically significant. These differences, as well as an
analysis of differences in proportions at the subtheme level by investigative outcome, provide
insight into the contours of unconstitutional policing, its symptoms, causes, and how the
interpretation of patterns or practices of systemic police dysfunction and misconduct influence
DOJ’s decision-making regarding the constitutionality of police action.
Of the eight themes analyzed, most prevalent among the N = 33 investigations of
municipal police was a lack of professional currency. In 97% of the § 14141 investigations there
was at a minimum, sufficient cause to believe that a municipal police agency suffered from
failures to adhere to generally accepted practices within the policing profession, including any or
all of the following; failing to maintain standards in systems, practices, and policies;
inappropriately selecting personnel for assignment; or a failure to adhere to the police
profession’s best practices. The mere fact that the DOJ identified at least one of these subthemes
as systemic failures in every investigation, but one, suggests that a lack of professional currency
is both a cause, and symptom of a poorly performing police agency at risk of engaging, or
engaged in patterns or practices of unconstitutional policing. Put another way, a lack of
professional currency may not differentiate municipal police agencies that have been found to
engage in patterns or practices of unconstitutional policing from agencies where the DOJ made
no such determination, but characteristics and attributes of a lack of professional currency may

177

very well differentiate poorly performing municipal police agencies from better performing
police agencies in the global population of municipal police under the jurisdiction of the DOJ.
This interpretation is supported by the fact that at the thematic level, there were no
significant differences in proportions of municipal police agencies exhibiting symptoms of a lack
of professional currency by investigative outcome. There was, however, an unexpected
difference in proportions at the subtheme level. The failure to adhere to best practices subtheme
significantly differed for police agencies by investigative outcome opposite of the hypothesized
relationship. This difference was unexpected, and the following three plausible explanations are
offered; (a) adhering to best practices does not necessarily shield a municipal police agency from
unconstitutional policing practices, (b) the DOJ’s orientation towards certain police agencies
under § 14141 is reflective of assisting an agency with appropriate reform, rather than
compelling agency change through force of law. This carrot-and-stick approach is indicative of a
bias embedded in DOJ’s findings letters, consequently, investigative outcomes reflect this bias,
since a finding of a pattern or practice of a failure to adhere to best practices may not by itself
elicit an unconstitutional policing finding by the DOJ, yet, other pattern or practices could.
Finally, (3) my interpretation of DOJ’s findings letters lacked reliability. Of the three
explanations offered, I believe a combination of both (a) and (b) to be the most strongly
supported.
The rationale for this interpretation is that in adhering to certain best practices, if poorly
constructed, or through the misapplication of a law, rule, or policy, would not ensure a lack of
misconduct or prevent unconstitutional policing. Normalized police conduct, and common police
practices can still produce differential outcomes when inappropriately applied. These outcomes
can, and have, served as the basis for a DOJ finding of a pattern or practice of unconstitutional
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policing, such as in the Investigation of the Newark Police Department (DOJ, 2014), thereby
negating any benefit of adhering to best practices.
Concerning the second explanation, when the outcome of a § 14141 investigation led to
technical assistance, DOJ’s findings letters reflected a more conciliatory, and cooperative tone
than findings letters issued to police agencies subject to a negotiated settlement; an example from
a technical assistance letter:
As an initial matter, we would like to thank you…for the considerable cooperation and
assistance we have received since the beginning of our investigation. We appreciate the
City’s commitment to improving police practices in Portland, and we commend the
PPD’s willingness to review, analyze, and revise its policies and procedures as needed.
(Brown Cutlar, 2003, p. 1).
Contrasting the tone of a negotiated settlement:
The NOPD has long been a troubled agency. Basic elements of effective policing – clear
policies, training, accountability, and confidence of the citizenry – have been absent for
years. Far too often, officers show a lack of respect for the civil rights and dignity of the
people of New Orleans. (DOJ, 2011, p. vi)
By directing a municipal police agency towards best practices, the DOJ is leading an
agency towards learning and self-improvement that the agency may not have otherwise
considered. Moreover, through an agreement to adhere to professional best practices, the DOJ is
endorsing specific policies and practices as meaningful and appropriate mechanisms within the
profession. However, this does not speak to how a police agency implements, or applies those
best practices. Municipal police agency failure to properly implement best practices can
legitimize the initiation of a subsequent § 14141 action when deemed necessary. Contextualizing
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this possibility, three municipal police agencies among the N = 33 were the subject of two
discrete § 14141 investigations, with all three secondary § 14141 investigations reflecting a
failure to fully implement previous agreed-upon reforms (DOJ, 2011; Gupta & Dettelbach, 2014;
Perez, 2013).
The third possible explanation for this result relates to reliability of my interpretation of
the qualitative data. For two distinct reasons I believe this is the least likely explanation of the
three offered. First, in conducting this research, I strictly adhered to established protocols for
thematic analysis (Braun & Clarke, 2006), and sought to meet all the trustworthiness criteria as
established in previous research (Nowell, et al., 2017). Second, among the themes and subthemes
analyzed, the failure to adhere to best practices was among the richest, most detailed, and
manifest of § 14141 reported findings. While much of the thematic analysis relied heavily on
interpretation, the failure to adhere to best practices was frequently explicitly stated, therefore,
could be more objectively identified. An example: “It is apparent that officers have not received
guidance nor have been trained on well-established best practices [emphasis added] for police
interactions with juveniles” (DOJ, 2016, p. 78). As such, both an emphasis on misapplied best
practices, and DOJ investigative bias best explain the results opposite of the stated hypothesis.
Institutionalization, and organizational myopia were two themes that characterized a very
high percentage of municipal police agencies, 85% the former and 82% the latter. These findings
suggest that municipal police agencies investigated under § 14141 suffered from issues related to
internal partiality, misaligned policies and practices, inwardness, short-term thinking, and
conflicts of interest. These attributes did not appear to be root causes or effects of
unconstitutional policing practices, but through their embeddedness in a police agency, allow
systemic misconduct and unconstitutional policing to proliferate.
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This interpretation is based off two interrelated factors. First, both themes
institutionalization, and organizational myopia characterized more municipal police agencies
than any other but for a lack of professional currency, yet there were no significant differences in
proportion of police agencies with either of these themes by investigative outcome. Second,
unlike a lack of professional currency, there were no significant differences for
institutionalization, or organizational myopia at the subtheme level in either direction. This
suggests that by investigative outcome, neither institutionalization, nor organizational myopia are
specifically associated with unconstitutional policing practices after a municipal police agency
has been selected for § 14141 investigation. Rather, organizational problems associated with
institutionalization, and organizational myopia appear to be deeply embedded in many troubled
municipal police agencies, and although they are undifferentiated by investigative outcome, they
may very well be the manifestation of problematic organizational attributes that bring a troubled
municipal police agency to the attention of the DOJ for initial § 14141 investigation.
The theme tactical discretion, weapon competency, and equipment insufficiencies was
the fourth most common finding with 76% of the N = 33 investigations of municipal police
exhibiting related systemic problems. Differences in the proportions of police agencies with this
finding at the thematic, and subthematic level did not differ based on investigative outcome.
Noteworthy, however, at the subtheme level, 67% of municipal police agencies under negotiated
settlement were found to have utilized inappropriate tactical discretion compared to 44% for
agencies under technical assistance. While these differences were not statistically significant,
they are meaningful nonetheless. Tactical discretion is closely tied to the use of force and
discretion, that is, choices that police officers make regarding the appropriateness of coercive
force to achieve a legally justified end. These choices can themselves be interpreted as
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unconstitutional forms of policing when inappropriately applied by individual police officers,
however, the DOJ differentiates acts of unconstitutional policing committed by individual
officers, and those acts that rise to the subjective level of a pattern or practice of unconstitutional
policing. It is my interpretation then that the proportion of municipal police agencies with this
subthematic finding were not specifically found to engage in unconstitutional policing on a
systemic level, but through officer use of inappropriate tactics, and the application of poor
discretion, engaged in individual acts of unconstitutional policing. The aggregation of these acts
assisted in differentiating municipal police agencies found to engage in unconstitutional policing
from investigations where no such conclusion was made.
Both themes – conditions of ambiguity, and leadership and management failure – did not
have any subthemes, and as appropriate, were analyzed by proportions only at the thematic level
wherein no statistically significant differences were found by investigative outcome. Even with
this result, a qualitative interpretation of these two themes suggests they both relate to overall
municipal police agency dysfunctionality. The role they play in that dysfunction has been
interpreted in the following way.
It is possible that conditions of ambiguity in policing are the result of the opaque nature
of the profession. That is, policework is comprised of, and police officers must respond to, a
wide-array of scenarios that may be unpredictable, chaotic, mutable, and disorganized. In such
scenarios a reliance on common sense and good judgement may guide officer conduct more
effectively than a policy or procedure. Simply put, no police department can have a policy or
procedure for every situation that an officer or police organization will encounter. Perhaps then,
conditions of ambiguity are an embedded aspect of the profession. Alternatively, the conditions
of ambiguity cited in this study as exemplar extracts better reflect conditions of ambiguity in

182

which well-functioning, and properly led municipal police agencies should have had appropriate
guidelines and clarity for their officers, the failure of which to provide officers with is a
symptom of a poorly run police department. It is this latter explanation that I find more valid
based on my research, subsequent analysis, and interpretation.
This line of reasoning then points to a cause of conditions of ambiguity – the failure of
leadership and management. Vision, clarity, direction, and efficiency should be characteristics
that effective police leadership instills within their organization; by extension, conditions of
ambiguity are then a symptom of a poorly led, and ineffectively managed police agency. Since
not all police agencies that exhibited conditions of ambiguity also had findings of leadership and
management failure, my interpretation is based on a qualitative understanding of these themes,
and how they apply to the content and interpretation of DOJ’s findings. To the extent that
conditions of ambiguity in § 14141 findings were more symptomatic of municipal police
agencies with leadership deficiencies, than conditions of ambiguity were symptomatic of the
opaqueness of policework, suggests that leadership deficiencies are a primary cause of
conditions of ambiguity.
As an example of the connection between leadership failure and conditions of ambiguity,
scholars of police leadership have noted that agency dysfunction and mismanagement are often
attributed to unclear goals and objectives, poor command and control, a lack of accountability,
and ineffective and unclear communication (Dias & Vaughn, 2006); attributes at the root of
conditions of ambiguity. Moreover, poor police leadership is identified as a “recurrent factor in
organizational failures” (Schafer, 2010, p. 738). By extension, deficient leadership is more
relevant to conditions of ambiguity than the opaqueness of policework, since a failure of
leadership in a municipal police agency may have outlasted the leader of that police agency. As
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such, conditions of ambiguity are directly tied into leadership and management failure even
when that leadership failure is a residual of a past leadership and management deficiency.
Of the eight themes analyzed, both organizational orientation and culture, and routinized
misconduct were the only two that significantly differed in proportions by investigative outcome.
The theme organizational orientation and culture had two subthemes, however, only the
prevailing cultural view subtheme statistically differed by investigative outcome. Upon further
analysis, it became clear that the DOJ identified the culture of an organization as a contributing
factor in few and select pattern or practice investigations of unconstitutional policing. This is a
reasonable, and in all likelihood, strategic decision by the DOJ considering that during the course
of a § 14141 investigation, the DOJ is attempting to legally justify a pattern or practice of
unconstitutional policing. To that end, the culture of an organization may be more difficult to
assess, and develop necessary reasonable cause to believe that a pattern or practice of
unconstitutional policing is occurring, than an objective numerically based analysis of deficient
policies, procedures, and systems. Indeed, organizational culture is characterized as “the climate
and practices that organizations develop around their handling of people, or to the espoused
values and credo of an organization” (Schein, 2016, p. 302), defined this way, organizational
culture is very difficult to empirically measure under § 14141.
The prevailing cultural view of a municipal police department was identified to be a root
cause of unconstitutional policing in some, but among the most egregious and highly detailed §
14141 investigations, including the following municipal police departments: Albuquerque,
Baltimore, Chicago, Cleveland, Ferguson, New Orleans, Newark, Portland (Oregon), and
Yonkers. Indeed, no municipal police agencies under technical assistance had this finding, and
all save one, Yonkers, were conducted under the Obama Administration. These investigations
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had one other distinctive commonality – they were all second-generation, suggestive of a DOJ
orientation towards seeking to reform municipal police agencies for systems, practices, policies,
and culture – specifically during the second half of the life-course of § 14141. Thus, reflecting
DOJ’s position in their over-time enforcement of § 14141 that their “priorities change over time
as the Division is responsive to contemporary issues in policing and the law” (DOJ, 2017a, p. 6).
Concerning over-time enforcement of § 14141 against municipal police, it is apparent that
reforming a deeply-embedded culture within police agencies was a priority in the second-half of
§ 14141 enforcement with what was viewed as a primary cause of unconstitutional policing.
The second subtheme of organizational orientation and culture was an orientation
towards enforcement, arrests, and officer activity. Although four municipal police agencies under
negotiated settlement had findings indicative of this orientation compared to none under
technical assistance, the difference in proportions by investigative outcome was not significant.
This result is interpreted in the following three ways, (a) it supports the importance of the
subtheme prevailing cultural view as attributable to unconstitutional policing practices, (b) since
all four of these police agencies had more than the mean number of total findings, and were
investigated during the second-half of the second-generation of § 14141 investigations, it
supports the previous conclusion that the DOJ sought out more complex and intricate systemic
police agency problems later in the life of §14141 whereby attributing unconstitutional policing
causes to culture, and (c) a larger study population would be more helpful in determining how
this attribute of organizational orientation and culture can lead to unconstitutional policing, as the
small number of police agencies with this subtheme made it difficult to draw a fully meaningful
interpretation.
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The proportions of municipal police agencies with the theme routinized misconduct
significantly differed by investigative outcome. Moreover, routinized misconduct has four
discrete subthemes, three of which were found to significantly differ by investigative outcome.
In two of the three routinized misconduct subthemes that significantly differed by investigative
outcome – biased-based policing, and unjustified enforcement actions – no municipal police
agencies under technical assistance had any such findings, suggesting that these two subthemes
were critical to the differentiation of municipal police agencies with widespread unconstitutional
policing and generalized misconduct from those with systemic problems not rising to a pattern or
practice of unconstitutional policing in most, but not all § 14141 investigations.
For the abuse of authority subtheme, just two of the n = 9 agencies had such findings
while 16 of the n = 24 police agencies had this finding, suggestive of a widespread tolerance for
abusive police behavior that is an effect of unconstitutional policing. This inference is further
supported since the final subtheme in routinized misconduct – cultural deviation – was the only
one in which no significant differences were found in proportions by investigative outcome.
There are two takeaways here; (a) since the subtheme cultural deviation was found to be
applicable more to subgroup behavior rather than organizational behavior, this supports the other
three routinized misconduct subthemes and their contributions to widespread unconstitutional
policing practices, and (b) cultural deviation when widespread and organizational rather than
embedded within a subgroup, better reflects the theme organizational orientation and culture.
There are other analyses and interpretations which speak to the importance of routinized
misconduct as highly influential to a finding of unconstitutional policing. Indeed, routinized
misconduct findings were associated with municipal police agencies in which DOJ findings
letters were issued between 1997-2002, and 2011-2017. This phenomenon leads to a twofold
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interpretation. First, beginning in 2002, the DOJ appeared to move away from negotiated
settlements as a method of enforcement against municipal police, preferring to engage in a
collaborative approach towards reform. This interpretation is evinced by the data which informs
that all n = 9 investigations resulting in technical assistance commenced between 2002-2009,
while just four of the n = 24 investigations resulting in a negotiated settlement were initiated
during that same timeframe.
Second, the transition in emphasis away from findings of routinized misconduct
facilitated investigative outcomes that allowed for technical assistance in lieu of a negotiated
settlement. It is possible this was an intentional choice as these transitions coincide with the
changeover in presidential administration from Clinton to Bush, and Bush to Obama, as well as
by political party, Democrat to Republican and Republican to Democrat. These facts support
Kingdon’s (1995) contention that administrative turnover in the political stream exerts a
powerful influence on the agenda. Taken together, this could suggest that seeking out routinized
misconduct in municipal police departments was the orientation for early § 14141 investigations,
and for some of the more recent. Moreover, avoiding a finding of routinized misconduct could be
argued as necessary to obviate a negotiated settlement for technical assistance – reflecting the
influence of political preference in the enforcement of § 14141 against municipal police.
Disjointed Incrementalism - Interpretation
•

RQ3: Have DOJ’s pattern or practice investigations changed over-time?
The application of § 14141 authority by the DOJ over the life-course of the law is

indicative of disjointed incrementalism in a number of ways including; changes in the number of
thematic findings per investigation, length, complexity and nuance of the output, and variations
in unconstitutional policing thematic findings over-time.
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Between the two generations of investigations, the average number of total scaled
findings per year increased from five to 13, reflecting changes in productivity, while the length
of a § 14141 investigation remained the same, the combination of these two variables reflects
increases in investigative efficiency. Indeed, as predicted in H3, the output between first and
second-generation investigations significantly increased for the entire N = 33 study population,
and n = 24 negotiated settlements, while the output for the n = 9 technical assistance letters
remained the same, reflecting the prioritization of one investigative outcome over the other. It is
not just that DOJ’s output increased in length, a qualitative interpretation reveals changes in
complexity, nuance, and depth of analysis. Moreover, as predicted in H6, second-generation
investigations were more closely associated with addressing issues related to police culture,
criminal misconduct, unnecessary use of weapons, and poor tactical decisions, in addition to
leadership deficiencies as causes and effects of unconstitutional policing practices contrasted to
first-generation investigations.
Along with these expected changes, there were unexpected results as well. The
hypothesized relationship between an increase in the variable length of an investigation between
first and second-generations, as predicted in H4, was not statistically significant. The mean of
this variable remained remarkably similar for all N = 33 investigations when aggregated and
compared between both generations. Additionally, when disaggregated both by investigative
outcome and generation, there was a non-significant decrease in the length of investigation for
negotiated settlements, and a non-significant increase in the length of an investigation for those
resulting in technical assistance.
To the first result; although not a significant decrease in investigation length, this result
nonetheless indicates a trend in the direction of the hypothesized relationship as predicted in H4.
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One possibility for non-significance is that for this test there were variables which were
unaccounted for that mitigated the influence of the downward trend. Concerning the second
result; although close to statistical significance opposite of the hypothesized relationship, this
result supports other interpretations and conclusions in this dissertation, specifically, that the
DOJ deprioritized their use of technical assistance as a tool of § 14141 in lieu of greater
enforcement under negotiated settlements during the second half of second-generation
investigations. That is to say, technical assistance cases during the second-generation of § 14141
were not prioritized by the DOJ relative to investigating and uncovering more serious patterns or
practices of organizational police behavior that in the aggregate, were believed to be
unconstitutional.
Moreover, investigations of larger police departments were prioritized during the
second-generation of § 14141 investigations leading to technical assistance, and this is supported
by the opposite, but marginally non-significant finding related to length of investigation for those
police agencies. As an example, of the four investigations resulting in technical assistance, the
two agencies from the smaller jurisdictions, Lorain and Harvey, had § 14141 investigations
lasting more than three years, whereas the two agencies from the larger jurisdictions, Austin and
Inglewood, had investigations lasting 19 months the former, and nine months for the latter
agency. These results support the inference that differences in length of investigations reflect
DOJ priorities in § 14141 enforcement of larger, and more complex agencies with an emphasis
towards findings of a pattern or practice of unconstitutional policing and reforming larger police
agencies.
To the non-significant finding in H4 for the entire study population, it is my speculation
that there are internal guidelines, which are unknown to the public and me, that necessitate
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completion of a § 14141 investigation within a specific timeframe. This supposition is based off
my interpretation of the data, professional experience, and knowledge of general investigative
procedures whereby investigators are required to follow standardized internal protocols including
adhering to pre-specified timelines. Disjointed incrementalism then, without considering any
other variables in H4, appears to offer an incomplete explanation of length of investigation and
over-time changes as operationalized. I considered these as possible complicating factors when
constructing this hypothesis, and as a result of that reasoning, offered the next hypothesis, H5, to
bring in the size of a police department as a control. By controlling for the number of sworn
employees, and correlating for findings, it was believed that disjointed incrementalism would
more clearly be revealed. Consider; if the length of an investigation experienced no changes over
the two generations, but the output had become longer, more complex, and nuanced, then
disjointed incrementalism should be revealed through changes in variables such as the number
and types of findings, in addition to output productivity. This should then be revealed more
clearly holding the size of a municipal police department constant.
The result of this partial correlation was marginal, but not statistically significant for the
entire study population and negotiated settlements, but significant for agencies under technical
assistance. Even with these mixed results, there is meaningful information here. The direction of
the relationship between length of investigation and number of scaled findings was accurate, and
this I believe speaks to DOJ’s productivity and efficiency. Yet the deficiency of H5, is what is
unknown regarding the cooperation that existed between a municipal police agency and the DOJ;
information which was not regularly recorded in § 14141 findings letters, and as such, went
unaccounted for. Exceptions to this qualitative information existed in one notable investigation.
In the output of the investigating the Meridian Police Department, the DOJ specifically indicated
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that the city did not cooperate, or fulfill requests for information, data, or records (Perez, 2012).
This lack of cooperation had two meaningful consequences: First, the City of Meridian Police
Department was the only municipal police agency found not to suffer from a lack of professional
currency. Second, this investigation lasted just eight months – from commencement to issuance
of DOJ’s investigative findings letter – the third shortest investigation of the N = 33.
When considering the implications of the result of the marginally, but not statistically
significant partial correlation from H5, for the study population and significant relationship for
agencies under technical assistance, along with the results of the Meridian investigation, two
meaningful inferences can be drawn. First, for the DOJ to make a finding related to the
appropriateness of a municipal police department’s systems, procedures, practices, and policies,
the DOJ requires access and cooperation of the police agency under investigation. Second,
cooperation with an investigation, and the length of investigation may be related, evinced
through the Meridian investigation being the third shortest of all the § 14141 investigations. Yet,
it is unknown if the opposite is true, that greater cooperation between organizations equates
longer investigations, as it is unknown which agencies cooperated with a § 14141 investigation,
or what the optimal municipal police agency cooperation to investigation relationship is. The
meaningfulness of this marginally statistically significant result then is that investigation length,
agency cooperation, and the number of scaled findings may be related. Such that when
controlling for the size of a municipal police department, the relationship between the length of
an investigation, and number of scaled findings may reflect a previously unknown, and currently
unaccounted for variable – cooperation between agencies.
The final hypothesis of research question three, H6, predicted that investigative findings
would differ over-time. Although this was a non-directional hypothesis, significant differences
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were found between first and second-generation § 14141 investigative findings by total, and in
six of the 20 scaled themes, all of which were present in greater proportions for secondgeneration investigations. The interpretation of this finding is twofold: First, for secondgeneration investigations, DOJ was seeking out, and identifying a greater number of systemic
deficiencies within municipal police agencies. Second, during second-generation investigations,
the DOJ was also seeking to address and define systemic problems differently from firstgeneration investigations. In particular, the DOJ identified problems with municipal police
agencies in second-generation investigations related to police culture, routinized misconduct,
weapon competency, and failures of leadership to a greater extent than during first-generation
investigations. These findings reflect a departure from, and change in the orientation of § 14141
enforcement over-time, changes in the subjective interpretation of unconstitutional policing, and
how the application of that interpretation changed through organizational decision-making.
Further supporting this conclusion, results from the exploratory hypothesis indicate that
between first and second-generation § 14141 investigations, the DOJ sought to enforce findings
of unconstitutional policing practices against police departments with a greater non-White
municipal population. Bringing together differences in themes, and the targeted enforcement of
larger police agencies, DOJ investigations of more diverse jurisdictions appears to be intentional
decision-making, and conforms to what DOJ indicates in their technical reports (2017a) that the
focus of their enforcement changes over-time. It appears that over the two generations of §
14141, the DOJ was targeting municipal police agencies for greater levels of misconduct,
leadership failure, use of weapons, and orientation and culture problems in municipalities where
there was a significantly higher percentage of the jurisdiction that identified as non-White;
apparently reflecting intentional decision-making by the DOJ in § 14141 enforcement.
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Disjointed incrementalism, along with MS and deterrence, supports why, and how these changes
occurred.
Deterrence - Interpretation
•

RQ4: What organizational characteristics, and environmental conditions existed in
municipal police departments prior to a § 14141 investigation?
Of the N = 33 investigations of municipal police in this study, 19, or 57% involved

police agencies with more than 500 sworn employees. This by itself is unrevealing, however,
when compared to the percentage of police agencies in the United States that serve
municipalities, a much different picture emerges. Municipal police departments with more than
500 sworn employees make up 0.9% of all local police departments in the U.S. (BJS, 2015), but
made up 57% of the study population. Even more revealing is that of these 19 municipal police
agencies, 16 had over 1,000 sworn employees. Municipal police departments in the United States
with over 1,000 sworn employees comprise just 0.4% of all local police departments nationwide
(BJS, 2015), yet made up almost fifty percent (48%) of the § 14141 investigations in this study.
These large differentials and their lack of representativeness in the general population, cannot be
due to chance.
When viewed in the context of municipal police agency size from the previous
interpretation, it was unsurprising that there was a disproportionate number of large
municipalities, as measured by population, represented among the N = 33 investigations of
municipal police. For example; 0.8% of police agencies in the United States serve municipalities
with a population greater than 250,000 persons (BJS, 2015), yet police agencies serving these
municipalities made up 55% of the study population.
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Both of these analyses reflect an interpretation that the DOJ targeted large
municipalities, and large police departments for §14141 enforcement both for symbolic, and
pragmatic reasons. This is supported by work done by police scholars such as King (2014) who
has noted that larger police departments are better able to withstand, and better able to respond to
crises than smaller police departments, which may be put at risk of demise when faced with
external or institutional intrusion. These results also suggest that the DOJ used their limited
resources for enforcement of §14141 as a deterrence strategy, which is supported by their policy
language (DOJ, 2017a), and by their choices of police agencies deemed suitable to conduct a
§14141 investigation – preferring to be responsible for reforming a large troubled police agency,
rather than being perceived as leading to the demise of a smaller police agency.
Moreover, larger police agencies serve larger jurisdictions, and although the non-White
population of the N = 33 remained the same over different investigative outcomes (55% n = 24,
53% n = 9), the change in the non-White population over the two generations, increases in DOJ
thematic and scaled findings, as well as emphasis on unconstitutional policing determinations
during the second half of the second-generation investigations suggests that DOJ was targeting
larger police agencies serving more diverse populations later in the life-course of § 14141
specifically to address problematic police practices made against more diverse populations.
Another aspect of my analysis that supports the interpretation of targeted enforcement
and deterrence revolves around the concept of clustering. As described by King (2014), when
discussing the phenomena of police organizational demise, clustering occurs when “the
disbanding of a police agency increases the likelihood that geographically proximate police
agencies will suffer disbanding as well” (p. 685). Indeed, Kingdon (1995) has a similar construct
within the MS framework; “spillovers” (pg. 190) are described as the increase in probability that
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a window of opportunity will open in adjacent policy areas – often geographically. Applying the
phenomena of clustering and spillovers to the initiation of a § 14141 action against a municipal
police department, the triggering of a new investigation in proximate municipalities, and for
similar reasons, should not then be unexpected.
This “clustering” or “spillover” effect was found in my analysis wherein many § 14141
investigations involved geographically proximate municipal police departments. For example,
seven of the N = 33 investigations involved cities in Ohio. Moreover, the first two municipalities
subject to a § 14141 investigation leading to a negotiated settlement were roughly adjacent cities
albeit in different states – Pittsburgh and Steubenville – the latter of which is located in Ohio.
This for a state whose population reflects 3.7% of the overall U.S. population (U.S. Census,
2010a), and is but one of 50 states and numerous territories to which DOJ has jurisdiction. In
fact, just six states accounted for 19 of the N = 33 investigations of municipal police under study,
further suggesting the clustering and spillover effect of §14141 enforcement.
Also supporting an interpretation of targeted enforcement, deterrence, and a clustering
effect were the results from H7, that environmental, and organizational characteristics would
differ by investigative outcome. For both environmental variables, population category and
percent non-white, there were no significant differences by investigative outcome, suggesting
that the size of a municipality, by category, and racial composition make no difference to the
outcome of a § 14141 investigation. An explanation for the rejection of the alternative hypothesis
for the variable population category relates to the chosen methodology. By creating seven
categories of municipal populations, the sensitivity of analysis was reduced as the largest
municipalities (e.g. Los Angeles & Chicago) are many times larger than the second largest
category of municipality (e.g. Columbus, Washington, D.C., Detroit, etc.). Analyzing the range
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of largest of the large municipalities – Los Angeles, population 3,694,820 (U.S. Census, 2000),
and comparing that to the smallest of the second largest category – Albuquerque, population
545,695 (U.S. Census, 2010a) produces a population ratio of almost 7:1. Assigning
municipalities to categories based on population size makes the analysis more manageable, but
less sensitive to large differentials, and as such, less sensitive to precision analysis.
Although differences by investigative outcome for the variable percent non-white were
not statistically significant, when contrasted to the general U.S. population of 39.3% non-White
(U.S. Census, 2010a), differences in racial and ethnic make-up appear to be substantial. Two
inferences can be drawn this information. First, municipalities in the study population are
misrepresented in terms of population characteristics for the nation as a whole, and second, the
racial and ethnic make-up of a municipality is not differentiated by investigative outcome. Put
another way, the N = 33 investigations of municipal police agencies are more diverse than the
general population, but diversity does not relate to investigative outcome after a municipality has
been selected for § 14141 action by the DOJ. As well, the exploratory hypothesis supports that
the DOJ changed their orientation in second-generation investigations, seeking to address police
misconduct in municipalities with greater non-White populations.
Both organizational variables, size, and resources, significantly differed by investigative
outcome. A non-directional hypothesis was offered here as I reasoned that the variable size
would be significantly larger for municipal police under negotiated settlement – this was
supported by the test results. However, I reasoned that resources would be significantly different
wherein municipal police agencies with fewer resources would have more problems. As such,
police agencies with fewer resources would be more likely to be subject of a negotiated
settlement. I offer the following interpretation for the results of both below.
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The size of a police department is the total number of sworn employees, and is largely a
reflection of the size of the municipality served in terms of overall population. In fact, the
variables size and population group were very highly associated when correlated categorically, r
= .86, and r2 = .74. The variable resources, however, is a ratio of total sworn employees to
overall population, and was conceptualized to measure a municipality’s ability to sufficiently
support a police agency, and determine what if any effects strained resources have on
organizational performance.
Considering that the n = 24 municipal police agencies were more highly skewed in a
positive direction than the n = 9 municipal police agencies (2.64 to 1.65), and that negotiated
settlements reflect a more involved investigative outcome, it was unsurprising that there were
significant differences in the size of a municipal police department by investigative outcome. Put
simply, larger police departments because of their size, have the potential for greater systemic
problems than smaller departments, and in DOJ’s enforcement strategy, larger police agencies
require more substantial interventions to fix.
The variable resources significantly differed by investigative outcome. As well, this was
a non-directional hypothesis, however, I reasoned that fewer resources would be associated with
more problems, and more problems would be reflected in both the number of findings, and the
type of investigative outcome. The results differed from this expectation, and my interpretation
follows.
According to data from BJS (2015), smaller police agencies by category have less sworn
officer-to-population ratios than larger police agencies by category. These data may better reflect
that small and large police agencies have different needs based on their population to a greater
extent than reflect how resource rich or resource poor a municipal police department is. Using an
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external control of organizations, resource dependence model to support a resource interpretation
appears incomplete. That is, this perspective does not take into consideration the policing needs
and differentials between large and small municipalities. Simply put, smaller police departments
with fewer resources may have plenty of resources to meet their specific, and often, more limited
mission, whereas large police agencies that serve large municipalities may require many more
resources to meet their more complex tasks, and the more robust mission inherent in policing a
large municipality.
This interpretation also then accounts for the unexpected result opposite of the next
hypothesis, H8, that a municipal police agency’s resources, and scaled findings will be negatively
associated when controlling for the size of a police department. From this statistically significant
result, I can say the opposite is true; that greater resources are positively associated with the
number of findings. My interpretation of this unexpected result is twofold. First, conceptually,
the variable resources is more closely aligned with size of a police agency than economic
constraints, and second; larger municipal police agencies have more systemic problems than
smaller police agencies, simply as a consequence of their size.
Multiple Streams - Interpretation
•

RQ5. How does the DOJ identify a specific municipal police agency engaged in
unconstitutional policing?
Regarding the choice of a municipal police agency to investigate under § 14141

authority, the DOJ has indicated that a high-profile event (focusing event) never justifies a §
14141 decision, per se (2017a). The DOJ does, however, use focusing events as a basis to initiate
an investigation since a focusing event may serve as a symptom of deeper and more systemic
problems within a municipal police agency (DOJ, 2017a). The DOJ’s choice of municipal police
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agency to investigate, and their decision-making could only be tested indirectly here, but through
a non-significant finding, it was revealed that focusing events are independent of investigative
outcome.
Through further analysis of the N = 33 investigations of municipal police in this study, it
was found that 18 had focusing events, and 15 did not. This equates to 55% for the former, and
45% for the latter. These differences were not statistically significant as predicted and in contrast
to the alternative hypothesis in H9. The inferences drawn from these analyses are that; (a)
although DOJ’s attention may be drawn towards a police agency because of a focusing event,
that event is not necessary or sufficient for a § 14141 action, and (b) focusing events have no
relationship to DOJ’s investigative outcome, per se. The interpretation of the rejection of the
alternative hypothesis here is twofold. First, as described by Kingdon (1995), focusing events by
themselves are typically insufficient to raise an issue to agenda status (as applied, the policy
output), and DOJ’s claim regarding the role of focusing events accurately reflects their practice
concerning municipal police.
The presence or absence of an insufficient intervention system served as indicators in this
study. That is, in findings letters wherein the DOJ noted deficiencies in EISs, that municipality
was categorized as having deficient indicators. The sufficiency of an indicator system was not
interdependent with the type of investigative outcome as predicted in the alternative hypothesis
in H10, however, in 28 of the N = 33 (85%) investigations, municipal police agencies were found
by the DOJ to have deficiencies in indicator systems. This suggests not that the DOJ seeks to
investigate municipal police agencies because of their deficient indicator systems, rather, it
suggests that a deficient indicator system is endemic to a poorly functioning police agency. This
conclusion is inferred from the interpretation of the data indicating that for 15% of investigations
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in this study, the DOJ did not find issues with the municipal police agency’s indicator system,
yet there was no statistically significant relationship by investigative outcome. This does not
mean or suggest then that a properly implemented and performing indicator system obviates a
DOJ investigation, clearly it does not and cannot, because findings regarding the adequacy of an
EIS are only made after a § 14141 investigation has concluded.
Although there is disagreement in the literature as to whether focusing events require
accompaniment to reach agenda status and become actionable (Worrall, 1999), in keeping with
Kingdon’s (1995) contention, feedback was operationalized as national news reports, and when
corresponding to the same time period as a focusing event, albeit not necessarily because of that
focusing event, was operationalized as the presence or absence of accompaniment. For this
hypothesis, H11, the null was rejected as it was found that focusing events and feedback are
interdependent, and form a type of accompaniment. Considering this result in combination with
the null finding from focusing events in H9, supports Kingdon’s (1995) position that focusing
events require accompaniment to become actionable, however, this was not true in all cases. In
12 of the N = 33 investigations, the focusing event did not have accompaniment. There are two
plausible explanations for this result; (a) certain types of focusing events do not require
accompaniment to reach agenda status (viz., the policy output) in keeping with Worrall’s (1999)
conclusion, and (b) there are other variable(s) that share greater responsibility in a municipal
police department being selected by the DOJ for §14141 investigation other than a focusing
event, with or without accompaniment.
Since the second stream of the MS framework involves policies, and policies are the
result of both technical feasibility and value acceptability, it was reasoned that policy clusters
were a more appropriate level to analyze than specific policies for two reasons. First, policy
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clusters better reflect the core concept of value acceptability insofar as elements in the policy
stream are responsible for its movement into agenda status, including those of an interested
public. This public would be more amenable to police policies that are not too esoteric, granular,
or highly nuanced, as policy clusters are easier to interpret and understand to an interested, but
non-expert public. Second, the technical feasibility aspect of the policy stream is implicit in
DOJ’s policy recommendations.
The DOJ employs subject matter experts in their investigations, many of whom have
executive-level law enforcement experience (DOJ, 2017a), and through the negotiation process
with the offending police agency, derives policy suggestions that typically conform to common
police practices which must be implementable by the municipal police agency. Overly technical,
complex, or intricate policies can lead to implementation failure, which then would lead to one
of two outcomes; (a) the DOJ could not close their § 14141 action, or (b) in a scenario where the
implementation failure was really a sustainability failure, the DOJ could open a new § 14141
action against that same agency. This scenario occurred in three cases; New Orleans, Miami, and
Cleveland, wherein the justification for initiating a new § 14141 investigation was based on the
failure to institutionalize agreed-upon reforms. Although the closing of an investigation is
beyond the scope of this study, what is known about the reform agreement process, and
accompanying reform implementation timelines, suggests that all §14141 actions of municipal
police will close eventually. Just as the two largest municipal police agencies under DOJ’s §
14141 authority, which are two of the three largest police departments in the United States –
LAPD and Chicago Police Department – both closed, albeit for different reasons.
Of the five policy clusters analyzed, three significantly differed by investigative outcome
in the direction of the hypothesized relationship as predicted in the alternative hypothesis, H12.
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As well, there were significant differences in the total proportion of police agencies with
deficient policies by investigative outcome, conforming to the hypothesized relationship. These
results suggest that policy deficiencies are a main contributor to unconstitutional policing, but
they also suggest that specific polices, particularly those related to the use of force, and civilian
complaint systems, although not significantly different by investigative outcome, are a main
contributor to a type of dysfunctionality that brings a municipal police agency to the attention of
the DOJ for a § 14141 investigation.
Put another way, since 91% and 89% of the N = 33 investigations of municipal police in
this study had policy deficiencies regarding use of force, or civilian complaint systems, but the
differences by investigative outcome were undifferentiated, strongly suggests that these two
deficient policy areas, more than any of the others, contribute to dysfunctionality that is endemic
to a troubled municipal police agency. As such, these two deficient policy areas appear to
contribute to behaviors making the DOJ aware that systemic problems exist within a municipal
police agency, whereas other policy deficiencies make it more likely that patterns or practices of
unconstitutional policing will proliferate.
A second explanation for the differentials in policy findings between outcomes relates to
a municipal police agency’s size. That is, police agencies under negotiated settlement are larger
in terms of sworn employees than police agencies under technical assistance. Larger police
agencies have more complex structures, missions, and scope, or what is referred to as
bureaucratization (King, 2014). It stands to reason then that larger police agencies would require
more policies to manage their more complex and detailed function. Hence, larger municipal
police agencies are more likely to have a greater number of policy deficiencies than smaller
municipal police agencies, in part, as a consequence of their size.
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This interpretation is supported by the rejection of the null hypothesis for H13, wherein
deficient policies and thematic findings were significantly correlated in a positive direction for
the study population, and by investigative outcome. Since the variable resources was interpreted
to closely represent municipal police agency size, as the unexpected result of H8 suggests, and
resources and scaled findings were positively correlated, then the number of thematic findings
and deficient policies should be positively correlated because they contain the specific common
element of size.
The choice in this hypothesis to use thematic findings instead of scaled thematic findings
was a strategic and methodological one. I reasoned that since the policy stream was measured in
clusters, that any comparison between variables would require measurement at that same level.
Scaled findings are measured at a more granular level but when appropriate for analysis, scaled
findings provide for more finely tuned nuance and analysis. When comparing across variables, I
felt it was necessary to compare similar levels for consistency and accuracy, and comparing
themes to cluster, and vice versa, was the appropriate way to do this.
The third of the streams tested in the study was the political stream. In the MS
framework, Kingdon (1995) argues that changeover in administration has the strongest effect on
a problem becoming actionable and effecting the policy output. To test this idea, and to facilitate
an understanding of the influence of political turnover on complex organizational decisionmaking and a policy output, two inferential tests were conducted. The first test, a chi-squared
goodness-of-fit test, was used to detect any differences that may have existed between the
number of §14141 actions involving municipal police with the number of § 14141 actions
expected to occur under each president as predicted in H14. In contrast to Kingdon’s (1995)
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argument, this test revealed that changeover in administration was unrelated to the number of
observed § 14141 actions.
When changeover in administration was operationalized as changes in political party
rather than turnover in the presidency and tested by investigative outcome, significant
differences were found as predicted in H15. Indicating that although presidential administration is
independent of the initiation of a § 14141 action, the political party of the president is directly
related to the type of investigative outcome. This finding is quite revealing, the results of which
coincide with the change in orientation of § 14141 after 2002. After the changeover in political
party from Democrat to Republican, and after 2002 no municipal police agency had a DOJ
finding characterized by routinized misconduct. This trend continued until 2009 with a
changeover in political party of the administration from Republican to Democrat. This suggests
that a finding of unconstitutional policing, and specifically routinized misconduct, is as much
influenced by political orientation as the legality of the police action. Operationalizing
Kingdon’s (1995) turnover in administration then as turnover in political party, accedes to the
notion that turnover in the political stream is the most influential factor within in the streams,
albeit after a decision has been made to conduct a § 14141 investigation of municipal police.
Analyzing the influence of the national mood on § 14141 as a discrete measure leads to a
mixed interpretation. That is, the national mood by itself appears to have some influence on both
the outcome of an investigation, and the number of investigations. For example, when the
national mood is more positive, the DOJ is more likely to engage in technical assistance, and
when less positive, the DOJ is more likely to engage in investigations leading to negotiated
settlement.
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More strikingly, however, it appears that the national mood is most accurately reflected
by the president, and who was president is most reflective of the type of investigative outcome.
For example: President Clinton was in office for seven full years during the life-course of §
14141 – in six of those seven years, the national mood was less positive than average, with all §
14141 investigations during those years leading to a negotiated settlement. President Bush was in
office for eight full years during the life-course of § 14141 – in six of those eight years the
national mood was more positive than average, and of the 13 § 14141 investigations conducted
during that time, eight, or 62% resulted in technical assistance. Lastly, President Obama was in
office for eight full years during the life-course of § 14141 – for this time period the national
mood was an even split between four years more positive than average, and four years less
positive than average, however, of the 13 § 14141 investigations initiated against municipal
police, only one led to technical assistance.
In an attempt to tease out the influence of the national mood and administrative turnover,
three correlations were run between variables measured at different scales. The three correlations
in the political stream; mood associated with political party, political party associated with
number of investigations, and the number of investigations associated with mood, were all nonsignificant, however, all associations were positive, supporting the previous inference that the
national mood is reflective of the president, and the party of the president is reflective of
investigative outcome. Indeed, the results of the marginal, but not significant association
between the national mood, and political party support this conclusion, insofar as when the
administration is led by a Republican, the national mood is more positive, and there are fewer §
14141 investigations leading to negotiated settlement.
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Regarding the influence of public opinion on policy, scholars such as Burstein (2003)
have argued that “public opinion influences policy most of the time, [and] often strongly” (p.
29). To what degree that public opinion influences policy is a question that is beyond the scope
of this study, what is relevant, however, is that public opinion, and public policy regarding the
application of § 14141 against municipal police appear to conform to Kingdon’s (1995) position
that elements in the political stream, specifically the combination of national mood and
administrative turnover, are highly influential on the agenda, and for this study, highly influential
on the policy output. It is suggested by my analysis that changes in administration conform to the
national mood, which then conforms to § 14141 investigative outcomes. What is unknown from
this analysis is which way the influence runs. That is, did the national mood drive the agenda of
the president, or the president drive the agenda and lead the national mood?
When conducting an analysis of the relationship between public opinion towards crime,
and political elites including the president, Enns (2016) concludes that although there is a give
and take between the two, public opinion leads political elites, including the president. Yet,
Kingdon (1995) asserts that “there is little doubt that the president remains a powerful force in
agenda setting, particularly compared to other actors” (p. 23). The analysis in this dissertation
does not answer which way the influence runs, but what is clear is that both the national mood
and administrative turnover had a role in DOJ’s § 14141 decision-making and outcomes.
The results of the stepwise-backward regression model also support Kingdon’s (1995)
notion regarding administrative turnover in the political stream exerting the biggest influence on
the agenda, and in the case of § 14141 of municipal police, it was the variable that was
significantly related to the investigative outcome. Consider, in the one-variable significant
model, a one-unit change in political party to Republican decreases the odds of unconstitutional
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finding by a factor of .033. Put another way, when only considering a § 14141 investigation
leading to a finding of unconstitutional policing, the odds of a municipal police agency being
found to engage in unconstitutional policing after a DOJ investigation increases by a factor of
30.4 with a change in Presidential party from Republican to Democrat, this for an outcome that
was already highly differential; 73% of outcomes were negotiated settlements compared to 27%
for technical assistance. In terms of probabilities, the differences between the two political
parties that an affirmative §14141 investigation will result in a finding of patterns or practices of
unconstitutional policing are almost two-and-a half-times as probable when a Democrat is
president compared to a Republican, .95 to .39.
Even with these compelling results, some caution is necessary when drawing conclusions
regarding a specific political party and their orientation toward the enforcement of patterns or
practices of unconstitutional policing. As further elaborated as a study limitation, this model does
not allow for the accounting of § 14141 investigations that did not lead to any findings. That is,
what is being predicted in this model is the investigative outcome based on the political party of
the president, but only after a decision has been made by the DOJ to commit their resources
towards enforcement of pattern or practices of unconstitutional policing or systemic misconduct.
Municipal police agencies that were investigated under § 14141, but those investigations
were closed without a finding were not part of this study, thus, unattributable to a political party.
As such, the political influence on the decision not to pursue a § 14141 may be as important to
understanding political stream influence on a DOJ decision as it is on the influence of the
investigative outcome. Until that knowledge is gleaned, it can only be inferred from the result of
the binary regression that administrative turnover does in fact exert the most powerful effect on a
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DOJ decision regarding the differentiation of patterns or practices of unconstitutional policing
from problematic, but constitutional policing.
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Policy Implications
•

RQ6: How can § 14141 support police departments to practice constitutional policing?
Answering this research question required four discrete but interrelated components.

First, to understand constitutional policing, the knowledge gained from this study was applied to
the concept of unconstitutional policing; providing a clear, distinct and explicated differentiation
of constitutional and unconstitutional policing in the context of § 14141. Second, supporting
municipal police agencies to practice constitutional policing required a compendium of policies,
practices, and procedures that by deduction, analysis, and interpretation of DOJ’s § 14141
findings letters, were found necessary to shield, forestall, or course correct police agencies
engaged in, or at risk of engaging in, unconstitutional policing. Third, police leaders must have
an awareness, and knowledge of internal and external conditions that have been linked to
patterns or practices of unconstitutional policing. This presupposes that municipal police leaders
know when, where, and for what to look – which cannot be taken as a given, since preemptively
addressing unconstitutional policing, or alternatively, course-correcting patterns or practices of
systemic misconduct that may lead to unconstitutional policing, requires not just knowledge
acquisition, but knowledge application. As such, a pragmatic, and workable model was
conceptualized, grounded in this study’s findings that when followed by municipal police,
supports them forestall unconstitutional policing. Finally, to fully explain how § 14141 can
support municipal police agencies to police constitutionally, it was necessary to explore DOJ’s
decision-making regarding enforcement of § 14141. To that end, an exploration of rational
decision-making related to past enforcement of §14141 was conducted; using the knowledge of
past enforcement supported by the application of disjointed incrementalism, served as the basis
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to explore options for future enforcement of § 14141. The combination of these four elements,
offer municipal police leadership the answer to the final research question.
Unconstitutional Policing
Concerning the differentiation of constitutional and unconstitutional policing; it is
through their numerous findings letters and technical reports that the DOJ, and by extension, the
federal government have defined unconstitutional policing as the accumulation of patterns or
practices of systemic police misconduct that violate federal laws or constitutional rights (DOJ,
2010; DOJ, 2017a; DOJ, 2017b; DOJ, 2018). Throughout the life-course of § 14141, special
emphasis has been placed on modifying police behaviors that in the aggregate, violate the first,
fourth, fifth, and fourteen amendments to the Constitution (DOJ, 2017a) – individual protections
that relate to free expression, search and seizure, standards of proof, use of force, due process,
and equal protection. As well, the DOJ has regularly made known that isolated and individual
acts of officer misconduct, when unconstitutional, per se, are insufficient to warrant a finding of
a pattern or practice of unconstitutional policing (DOJ, 2017a). Unconstitutional policing then,
requires that individual police misconduct be systemic, representative, or typical conduct within
a police agency.
Using this standard, constitutional policing requires the absence of individual acts of
police misconduct that violate federal laws, or civil rights of individuals, and specific groups
people within a jurisdiction that when aggregated, represent conduct typical of organizational
police behavior, or is systemic within a police agency. Noteworthy in this description is that
constitutional policing does not equate to good policing, yet, unconstitutional policing is clearly
poor policing. The differentiation of what constitutes good and bad policing has been discussed
in the literature by scholars such as Scott (2017), and while important to recognize, the
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elaboration and differentiation of these two concepts is beyond the scope of this study. Since
unconstitutional policing is the aggregation of behaviors, then municipal police agencies require
the knowledge to address those behaviors in order to ensure constitutional policing.
Compendium of Policies, Procedures, and Practices
Through the research, analysis, and interpretation conducted in this study, the following
policy recommendations are offered as necessary to forestall, shield, or course correct, municipal
police from engaging in patterns or practices of unconstitutional policing:
•

Address organizational-wide lack of professional currency in policies, systems,
procedures, and training.

•

Review, revise, and require adherence to a comprehensive set of use-of-force policies that are
in keeping with well-established professional practices, comport with constitutional standards
and applicable law, are clear and understandable, and are guided by restraint, discretion and
overall safety.

•

Enforce full-compliance with use-of-force reporting, review, and investigative followthrough.

•

Individuals considered for specialized units must meet all qualifications prior to assignment.
Personnel decisions within municipal police agencies cannot be made solely on familiarity
with the officer or nepotism. Criteria that would exclude a candidate from a position must be
adhered to in practice, and officers in positions for which they are not qualified, must not
remain in those positions.

•

All training staff must be competent in the material they teach, and must be officially
qualified to teach it.
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•

Training materials must be memorialized and documented. Records of who was trained, on
what material, when, and if a refresher is required must be recorded, maintained, and updated
at regular intervals.

•

Ensure that an updated data-driven early intervention system is implemented, with
appropriate and comprehensive measures entered into the system on a regular basis.

•

Early intervention systems must have reasonable and objective triggering mechanisms where
appropriate intervention is required of supervision who must then document findings, and be
held accountable for outcomes and appropriate follow-through.

•

Address attributes of an institutionalized police agency.

•

Internal investigations must be conducted in an unbiased and impartial manner by employees
who are immaterial to the incident or officer under investigation. Investigators must orient
themselves towards seeking truth, rather than officer exoneration. To that end, statements
from complainants, and the accused officer must be given equal weight during internal
investigations.

•

Refusal to accept, or dissuasion of civilian complaints must be unacceptable in all
circumstances. All complaints of officer misconduct must be recorded, investigated, and
disposed of in an impartial and objective manner.

•

If a policy or practice is impractical, routinely ignored, or outdated, it must be appropriately
revised or expurgated. Police departments cannot condone widespread non-compliance of
existing policies and procedures.
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•

Address organizational characteristics of shortsightedness, conflicts-of-interest,
learning, and environmental awareness.

•

An awareness of, and flexibility with, the external environment must be fostered. This can be
facilitated by police agencies dedicating themselves to ongoing learning, innovation,
adaptation, and openness to change.

•

Police agencies must better conform to the needs of the citizens in their subject jurisdiction,
and adapt to those needs as necessary, particularly with communities in which changing
demographics, language differences, and evolving norms are prevalent.

•

Have clear, appropriate, and conflict-free guidelines and policies. Organizational and
individual decision-making must always be conflict-of-interest free. Officers and the police
organization must always act in accordance with the Constitution, applicable laws, and
appropriate standards of proof. Every police decision must be at a minimum, legally justified,
but also appropriate to the circumstances, and made in the interest of just enforcement of law.

•

Policies and procedures must be routinely reviewed; a dedicated research and development
unit must be created to keep current and abreast of professional standards and changing
environments, facilitating innovation in a police agency.

•

Foster communication with law enforcement partners, other public service agencies, and the
general public.

•

Address tactical deficiencies, weapon competencies, and improve officer equipment.

•

Require that all sworn members of the police agency regularly engage in tactical training
with a variety of officers and different units. Focus tactical training on high-liability
encounters, specializing in scenarios with individuals who are emotionally disturbed, elderly,
sick, young, or possibly intoxicated.
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•

Prioritize de-escalation techniques during use of force training with special emphasis on
interacting with individuals who are emotionally unstable, intoxicated, or otherwise in crisis.

•

Use-of-force and de-escalation training should be both lecture and scenario-based, and all
officers must be required to participate. All officers must be evaluated on the application of
this training, and meet minimum performance requirements for full-duty responsibilities.

•

Sufficiently train officers in the proper use of their equipment, and provide officers with
appropriate, high-quality equipment that is necessary to help accomplish the task for which
they have been given.

•

Restrict the use of weapons and equipment only to their designed use, absent exigent
circumstances. To that end, provide officers with the requisite tactical equipment and
sufficient training to cover the entire use-of-force continuum.

•

Clarify policies, procedures, and general expectations by reducing internal conditions of
ambiguity.

•

Policies and procedures must be clear, legally sound, and easily understood by all agency
employees.

•

Any new policy, or policy change, must immediately be made known to all sworn
employees. Sufficient training must be conducted with all policy or procedural changes for
all sworn employees, and that training must commence upon promulgation by the police
agency.

•

Policy and procedure manuals must be updated regularly, distributed to all officers, and made
available at all police facilities for reference.
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•

Address leadership and management deficiencies.

•

Leadership must set the agenda of reform, and create a vision for the police agency.
Supervisors must be tasked with seeing that vision through, and held accountable for the
performance of the officers under their supervision.

•

Leadership and management must look to the external environment for signals of
problematic agency behavior including, focusing events, media reports, and community
feedback.

•

Leadership and management must be attuned to their organizational soft-spots, and
vulnerabilities including; being a very large or very small police agency, having police
agencies in their proximate area being investigated, externally controlled, or in the process of
demise.

•

Leadership and management must remain aware of the national political environment and
mood, as the orientation towards intervention of police is mutable.

•

Address misconduct through strict enforcement of ethical guidelines, compliance,
investigation, and discipline.

•

Work to eliminate bias and deviance within the department by having clear codes of ethics,
and corruption and misconduct guidelines that all members of a police agency must follow –
without exception – leadership included. Police agencies should regularly engage in integrity
tests, and inspection checks across all ranks of the organization to ensure compliance with
policies, procedures, and general guidelines.

•

Monitor, track, and discipline employees who have numerous or substantiated allegations of
excessive force, abuse of authority or other similar allegations of misconduct. Discipline
must be swift and appropriate.
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•

Address the culture and orientation of an organization to reflect community needs and
realities of modern policing.

•

Foster a culture of service over enforcement; of cooperation with the community over
conflict.

•

Eliminate officer enforcement activity as a primary metric of officer performance.

•

Seek to recruit organizational police leaders, and officers who share in a vision of
collaboration, learning, and continuous improvement.
Necessary and sufficient elements.
Two global elements have been found critical to the success of reforming a municipal

police department under § 14141; committed leadership, and the dedication of adequate
resources (Morgan, Murphy, & Horwitz, 2017). First, concerning leadership; municipal police
agencies must be headed by individuals who have the requisite leadership abilities, and desire to
foster change as the success of lasting reform in police agencies under § 14141 has been closely
linked to reform-minded police leaders (Kalyal, Huey, Blaskovits, & Bennell, 2018; Scott,
2017). The concept of leadership, as described for the purpose of overseeing necessary change in
a municipal police department can best be defined as “a process whereby an individual
influences a group of individuals to achieve a common goal” (Northouse, 2001, p. 3). Applying
this definition of leadership to municipal police, the common goal is the reform of a municipal
police department to conform with modern and professional practices, for promoting an
organization of learning, transformation, and compliance with strict internal standards and
regulations, while policing within the restrictions of applicable law, and boundaries set forth by
professional best practices, and the Constitution.
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When discussing the importance of leadership as a necessary component for
organizational change in policing under § 14141, Scott (2017) posits that police officers are more
likely to accept internally driven changes rather than externally forced ones – by extension,
leadership from police executives who have bought into the notion of reforming their agencies
prior to, or in lieu of, external intervention. Furthermore, police chiefs as leaders of police
organizations are better suited to gain the compliance of subordinates because “police officers
tend to respect and comply with police chiefs’ rules, even if they do not like them” (Scott, 2017,
p. 610). This requires sufficient financial support (Kalyal, et al., 2018), and an acknowledgment
that leadership is directly tied into the dedication of adequate resources. For example, when
analyzing why police reforms fail, Skogan (2008) noted that for reforms to last “the astute
change manager has to ensure that they are the department’s and even the city’s project, not just
their own” (p. 33). This orientation will help facilitate greater buy-in from the public, and
provide a municipal police leader the necessary political leverage to help fund the changes a
police leader deems necessary. The issue that accompanies this orientation then is this: How
should those resources be allocated?
After leadership, adequate investment of resources was indicated to be the most critical
element of lasting success of police reform under §14141 (Morgan, Murphy, & Horwitz, 2017).
By extension, reform of a municipal police agency can occur prior to, or in lieu of federal
intervention with appropriate and dedicated leadership, sufficient allocation of resources, and the
identification of troublesome environmental and organizational areas. Since the above policy
recommendations revolve around policies, procedures, practices, and systems, the primary
financial investment that a municipal police agency should make is towards research and
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planning, this investment will facilitate municipal police agencies to become learning
organizations (Geller, 1997).
In the 1967 U.S. President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration
report: The Police, the call for police to develop a greater openness to research, and to apply the
byproduct of that research to policing was made (Skogan, 2018). Since then, research and
planning units within police agencies have been associated with the potential for innovation that
can support an organization to be more forward-thinking, dynamic, adaptive to change, and
responsive to the needs of the public (Bond & Gabriele, 2018). Police research and planning
units were initially conceptualized to engage in a variety of activities related to researching best
practices, planning, review of equipment needs and quality, conducting needs assessment, and
evaluation of programs (Bond & Gabriele, 2018). However, the extant literature on research and
planning units in police agencies indicates that these units are more likely to engage in
administrative functions instead of their intended purpose of research, evaluation, and promoting
innovation (Haberman & King, 2011).
An optimal investment in research and planning for municipal police is the second policy
component that municipal police should embrace to prevent their agencies from engaging in
patterns or practices of unconstitutional policing. This investment must not just be financial, but
as important, the role of research and planning, and tasks they are assigned must be for
organizational development, and an orientation towards learning and continuous improvement.
The specific policies, procedures, practices, and systems that have been found to allow
for patterns or practices of unconstitutional policing to proliferate have now been identified, how
these comport with what each individual municipal police agency does must then be left to that
agency to assess. With the support of reform-minded police leadership, an adequate investment
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in research and planning can facilitate that necessary change, internally, which has been found
critical to the success of police reform, whereby preventing decent into patterns of behavior that
may leave a police agency susceptible to loss of reputation, loss of autonomy, and potentially,
federal intervention.
The SIRR Model - Forestalling Unconstitutional Policing
Although the previously described policy recommendations can be used to address an
array of municipal police agency behaviors, these recommendations alone do not inform police
leaders when, or how that knowledge should be applied. To this end, it is critical that police
leadership not just have the appropriate model, process, and structure to identify internal and
external threats to constitutional policing within their agencies, but they must also have
appropriate guidelines in place to know when to initiate the model as a preemptive, or coursecorrecting mechanism against unconstitutional policing. The proposed model, below, does just
that.
In a four-stage model consisting of scanning, identifying, relating, and responding
(SIRR), applied from the knowledge created in this study, municipal police leaders can more
readily identify both internal and external operational threats that are linked to patterns or
practices of unconstitutional policing, providing a municipal police agency with the timing, tools
and know-how to forestall the potential for federal investigation, loss of autonomy, national
stigma, and organizational demise.
The four-stage SIRR model employs a mixed-scanning approach (Etzioni, 1967) to
identify and review variables indicated to pose threats to constitutional policing. In this sense the
model is fully grounded in a pragmatist orientation of knowledge application. Described by
Etzioni (1967), mixed scanning takes place on different levels and is akin to a weather satellite
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that takes pictures of general patterns yet can focus in on smaller more nuanced details to gain a
more granular view of problematic areas. A mixed-scanning pragmatist perspective is embedded
in the orientation of SIRR; variables within the model exist on multiple levels – some within the
broader environment, and others deep in the police organization. A visual representation of the
SIRR model, conceptualized as an iterative process is presented in Figure 9.

Internal &
External Threats

2. Identify

1. Scan

• Variables relevant to
the agency &
environment
• Best practices

• Annual review
• Political turnover
• Accompaniment

Constitutional Policing

4. Respond

3. Relate
• Variables to
thematic findings
• Focus on
significance

• Problematic areas
• Prioritize strongest
relationships

Figure 9. The SIRR Model: Forestalling Unconstitutional Policing
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Step one - initiate a scan.
The first step in forestalling, course-correcting, or addressing threats to constitutional
policing involves deciding when to initiate a scan. Scholars of mixed-scanning, such as Etzioni
(1967) have argued that for decision-making to be most effective, an encompassing scan is
required at least sporadically, or at set intervals because scanning is “aligned with improved
organizational performance” (Choo, 1999, p. 22). As such, scanning should be conducted
continually by criminal justice administrators to be better prepared for changing environments
while allowing the organization to be more responsive to external and environmental demands
(Stojkovic, Kalinich, & Klofas, 2015). Other scholars of strategic management and police have
suggested less planned-out methods for identifying organizational issues (Loo, 2002). Regardless
of timing, researchers of strategic planning note that police organizations frequently conduct less
than detailed scans, and that there’s a notable a lack of attention being paid to this phase of
organizational planning resulting from an absence of competition among police services (Rogers,
McIntyre, & Caputo, 2019). To work-through the issues and discrepancies presented above,
applying a detailed and pragmatic mixed-scanning approach as the first step of the SIRR model
to forestall unconstitutional policing, and obviate a § 14141 action, a formal, detailed, and
complete scan should be initiated at one planned annual, and two discrete intervals as conditions
dictate.
A planned mixed-scan should be initiated every year as part of an annual budget review
in keeping with Etzioni’s (1967) suggestion that “annual budget reviews, and the State of the
Union messages provide, in principle, such occasions [for a scan]” (p. 389). Although both of
these suggestions are sensible for municipal police, since municipal police agencies are primarily
funded through local and state revenues (King, 2014), initiating a scan prior to an annual budget
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review is a more relevant and pragmatic interval to initiate the SIRR process. Moreover,
conducting an annual scan prior to, or in anticipation of an annual budget review provides
municipal police leadership the necessary knowledge for leveraging additional resources as
deemed necessary. This orientation is in keeping with the lessons learned from many police
leaders who sought out § 14141 to gain resources that were not otherwise available to their
police agency, and although this leverage may originate differently – internal and preemptive vs.
external and compelled, the end-goal is the same, securing additional resources to address
problematic organizational police behavior. As such, there would be no more opportune moment
throughout the year to conduct an annual scan than prior to an annual budget review.
In addition to an annual mixed-scan, the initiation of a complete scan should take place
each time one of two variables are present; political turnover, and during times of
accompaniment. First, since the variable Presidential party best predicted a DOJ finding of a
pattern or practice of unconstitutional policing in the logistic regression, this should serve as an
indication to municipal police leadership that a scan of the agency is required every time there is
a turnover in executive officeholder – both at the federal and state level – the latter for reasons
that are explicated in the next section.
Although administrative turnover at the federal executive level was not significant by
investigative outcome, when operationalized as turnover in political party, significant differences
emerged by investigative outcome, and since changes in the political stream are mutable, as
indicated by the combination of the national mood and presidential officeholder, it best serves
the municipal police agency to initiate a scan for each executive-level turnover regardless of
political party.
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Second, the initiation of a mixed-scan is recommended whenever a municipal police
agency is subject to the combination of a focusing event, and negative national news media
attention. As formulated in the MS framework and operationalized in this study, the combination
of the variables focusing events and feedback through negative national news media attention
formed the variable accompaniment. As individual variables, neither focusing events, nor
feedback were significantly interdependent with the investigative outcome, however, they were
significantly related to each other. Furthermore, although accompaniment was also independent
of investigative outcome, the combination of focusing events and feedback presents another
opportune moment for a municipal police agency to initiate a sporadic scan.
Empirical considerations aside, initiating a sporadic scan during times of accompaniment
is also qualitatively supported by DOJ’s past § 14141 enforcement policies. Indeed, the DOJ has
noted in their technical reports that neither a focusing event, nor media attention alone serve as
the basis for a finding of a pattern or practice of unconstitutional policing (DOJ, 2017a),
however, the DOJ has made no known policy statement regarding the combination of these two
variables. Moreover, the DOJ has publicly noted that high-profile events, and national media
attention are two sources they have used throughout the life-course of § 14141 to identify police
agencies at risk of patterns or practices of unconstitutional policing.
Pragmatically, initiating a scan when a police agency has experienced both a focusing
event and feedback can serve as an indication to both an interested public, and the DOJ that at a
minimum, the municipal police agency is taking necessary action to address ongoing or
emerging problems – potentially forestalling external review, investigation, and intervention.
Using this approach, responsible and forward-thinking municipal police leadership must
begin to address operational threats to constitutional policing by initiating a scan both annually,
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and at sporadic intervals, thereby placing their agency in a better position to examine
organizational and environmental threats at different levels within and about their agency, prior
to falling into, or to course-correct, patterns or practices of unconstitutional policing.
Step two - identify variables.
After the decision to initiate a scan has been made, police leaders must then identify
variables relevant to their agency so they can detect linkages that put their agencies at risk of
patterns or practices of unconstitutional policing. At this stage, scanning of the variables takes
place on multiple levels, reflecting both an orientation towards mixed-scanning, and the
combination of variables from the MS and deterrence framework, such that scanning exists at the
national, state, municipal, organizational, system, and policy levels. Each of these levels has
accompanying variables as conceptualized by the MS framework and deterrence.
In keeping with a mixed-scanning orientation, some variables are more manifest than
others (e.g. Presidential party, size vs. indicators, use of force policies). This differentiation, and
more specifically, the subject area specialties that are required from municipal police to identify,
capture, and to understand the finely grained nuances of, underscore the need for a research and
planning capacity. Indeed, this capacity must have a dual-role to ensure the success of the model
at this stage. First, the capacity and orientation of a research and planning apparatus must exist,
and be appropriately supported by municipal police leadership to conduct objective internal
reviews. Second, that research and planning capacity must also have the ability to look beyond
their agency, to professional associations, to seek-out best practices that can be made applicable
to their own agencies.
This inside-outside research and planning orientation is supported by findings from this
study. For example, the subtheme failure to adhere to best practices existed within the lack of
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professional currency main theme – the most commonly attributed theme across all N = 33
investigations of municipal police. This subtheme was found to be statistically significant
opposite of the hypothesized relationship by investigative outcome. As addressed in the
discussion chapter, there are reasons this unexpected result came to pass, but noteworthy here is
that DOJ’s reliance on suggesting adherence to professional best practices was a form of risk
reduction for municipal police, since the lack of a capacity to recognize, and adhere to
professional best practices was endemic to police agencies with systemic problems found to be at
unreasonable risk of engaging in patterns or practices of unconstitutional policing. Additionally,
by directing a municipal police agency towards adherence to professional best practices, the DOJ
is endorsing specific practices as appropriate, and in keeping with the highest standards of
professional conduct. As such, this inside-outside focus by research and planning, at a minimum,
can help shield a police agency from allegations of deviation from professional standards, and if
properly implemented, patterns or practices of unconstitutional policing.
Step three - relate variables to themes.
All independent variables in this dissertation were correlated with themes using phi
coefficients (Appendix E). After the research and planning apparatus has identified all the
variables relevant to their agency through mixed-scanning, the next step is to relate those
variables to themes from past § 14141 investigations. From the results of the thematic analysis,
and associations that were empirically shown to have linkages with the independent variables,
municipal police leadership can better identify what variables (potential problems) have allowed,
or put at risk of allowing, past municipal police departments to engage in patterns or practices of
unconstitutional policing.

225

Once related to a specific municipal police agency, independent variables that have been
significantly associated with a theme require prioritization for two reasons. First, significant
relationships between variables and themes are those that have been empirically shown to have
the strongest, non-random relationship justifying their prioritization. Second, the practicality of
organizational focus is important, as an organization that attempts to prioritize all related
problems will likely end up diluting focus, having the effect of prioritizing none. To facilitate the
process of identifying variables and prioritizing the associated themes, relationships between
independent variables and themes have been categorized according to primary, secondary, and
tertiary priority – determined by their significance and strength of association. See Appendix F
for a matrix of these relationships.
The processes involved in this step provide municipal police agencies with the requisite
knowledge of where to look both organizationally and environmentally, to protect against
patterns or practices of unconstitutional policing. Themes rather than subthemes were the chosen
level of association in this step since themes provide police agencies the specificity to know
where to look organizationally and environmentally, without too great a specificity that they
overlook other problematic areas within a particular theme.
Step four - respond to thematic findings.
The fourth step in the SIRR model requires that municipal police leaders appropriately
respond to related recommendations from the compendium of policies, procedures, and practices
necessary to forestall patterns or practices of unconstitutional policing by addressing and
sufficiently implementing linked recommendations. Here the importance of forward-thinking,
and effective leadership is most critical. As previously discussed, reforming a police department
is most likely to be successful when changes come from internal leadership rather than external
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sources. To that end, prioritization must involve: (1) significant thematic relationship that have
been most closely attributed to unconstitutional policing (i.e. organizational orientation and
culture, and routinized misconduct), (2) addressing the strongest significant relationship among
all the variables and themes, and (3) addressing themes with the strongest relationships within a
variable and theme relationship. Applying this process, and overseeing the implementation of the
recommendations is the critical last step in protecting a police agency against patterns or
practices of unconstitutional policing.
The SIRR model makes the knowledge gained from this study useable, and pragmatic,
and although individual organizations may have discrete needs, this model provides police
leaders with the knowledge of where to look, what to look for, and how to address threats to
constitutional policing practices before they take hold. The success of which falls to two critical
elements – dedicated and directed resources (i.e. research and planning), and effective and
committed forward-thinking leadership.
Future Enforcement Options
The fourth component of this research question requires an understanding of
organizational decision-making, and how that may change over-time. The acquisition of
knowledge here then is part art, and part science. Indeed, it is known what the DOJ did, and the
orientation that guided those decisions. It is unknown, and quite possibly unknowable, what the
DOJ will do, however, based on the analysis presented in this dissertation, and what is known
regarding the application of this provision by the DOJ through disjointed incrementalism, three
possibilities for what law enforcement organizations need to know about § 14141 are offered.
Section 14141 implementation towards municipal police has been characterized by
targeted enforcement, deterrence, political leanings, and the mutable interpretation and
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prioritization of behaviors that constitute unconstitutional policing. This conclusion adds to the
literature regarding DOJ’s global enforcement of § 14141 and their decision-making, suggesting
that decisions regarding which police agencies to enforce the provision against are in fact a
complex “mixture of politics, policy, and legal discretion” (Harmon, 2017, p. 622). As well, the
DOJ appears to identify police departments for reform when those departments are particularly
large, or their problems salient (Harmon, 2017). With the future status of § 14141 as a means of
reforming municipal police tenuous, restricted, and uncertain (Sessions, 2018), three policy
options are offered to better explore and explicate implications on municipal police.
Enforcement option one – continuation of past practices.
Since DOJ’s enforcement policies have been influenced by administrative turnover and
the accompanying agenda, a plausible policy option is to continue to pursue § 14141 actions in
the manner that has been done so in the past. Although such a policy does not comport with a
long-term strategy, it is a strategy nonetheless, and does present a realistic and rational option
that is flexible to administrative turnover, vicissitudes in the political stream, and changes in the
national mood. In a rational decision-making sense, this policy option is quite rational, but not
comprehensive, comporting with Lindblom’s (1979) disjointed incrementalism approach – small
adjustments to the present course, while recognizing the influence of Kingdon’s (1995) position
that elements in the political stream exert the greatest influence on the agenda. However, there
are two core problems associated with this option: First, scholars of police and organizational
behavior, police practitioners, and the DOJ have yet to agree on what constitutes a successful
intervention of municipal police under § 14141 through its current life-course (Chanin, 2014a;
Harmon, 2017; Walker, 2017). Second, this policy does not rectify any of the current criticisms
of § 14141 enforcement including those related to federalism, exclusion of police leadership
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from the investigation process, and the apparent random nature of DOJ’s enforcement policies.
Moreover, this policy option is aligned with a punishment-first orientation that stigmatizes a
municipal police agency – still a criticism of § 14141 by police leadership in general.
By adopting this policy option, all that municipal police know about DOJ’s enforcement
orientation is this: Under § 14141 authority, the DOJ is most likely to target large police
departments, influenced by the political environment, deterrence, and proximity to other
municipal police departments under investigation; everything else is guesswork. This leads to a
glaring problem for municipal police: Who or what agency can a municipal police department go
to for guidance to determine if their practices and policies put them at risk of unconstitutional
policing? Certainly, a municipal police agency cannot go to the DOJ under this policy option for
two reasons. First, for fear that a request for assistance may initiate a costly and onerous § 14141
action – a similar outcome that occurred to the New Orleans Police Department. Second, as
DOJ’s position on § 14141 enforcement is uncertain, municipal police may not find a receptive
audience from the DOJ in matters related to patterns or practices of unconstitutional policing. As
such, municipal police leaders hoping to reform and guide their agencies towards avoiding
unconstitutional policing have to play a guessing game – never knowing if they will be the next
police agency subject to a § 14141 action, unsure of where to go for appropriate assistance, and
what can be done about it.
Enforcement option two – revised deterrence strategy.
The application of deterrence through an economic framework was first put forth by
Harmon (2009), wherein it was suggested that the DOJ seek to substantially raise the probability
of § 14141 action against specific police departments as a means of deterring current and future
patterns or practices of unconstitutional policing. In a two-pronged approach, the idea is be able
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to both compel and induce change in organizational police behavior. In sum and substance,
Harmon (2009) recognizes that the scope of law enforcement in the United States, combined
with the limited resources of the DOJ, makes it so that § 14141, as previously enforced, is
unlikely to address problematic police behavior through compelling change. The costs associated
with § 14141 action, the time dedicated to conducting a § 14141 investigation, and the scale of
law enforcement in the U.S. compared to the capabilities and resources necessary to identify and
address troubled police agencies makes the application of §14141 untenable.
As an alternative to the past model of enforcement, it is suggested that the DOJ identify
and categorize police departments according to the degree of harm, and depth of misconduct
within their agency. Being assigned to a category of misconduct would then be the equivalent of
being put on notice by the DOJ. Police agencies that are unable, or unwilling to reform within a
specific period of time, are then recategorized as high-risk, and placed at much greater
probability of federal intervention. This strategy would then have the effect of raising the
probability of compelled change under § 14141 enforcement for the most troubled agencies, and
similarly, incentivizes less-offending police agencies to self-correct through induced change.
The basis for this model of enforcement is the application of economic theory to the
public enforcement of law, whereby an increase in the probability of enforcement, or costs
associated with that enforcement, alters the behavior of the rational actor, in this case the rational
actor is the police agency. Aligning this policy option with investigative findings, and
interpretations from this study produces two notable benefits, and two notable drawbacks.
The first benefit of this proposal relates to the police practitioner. As mentioned earlier in
this dissertation, many municipal police leaders have called for greater transparency,
cooperation, and involvement in the § 14141 process. Identifying troubled police agencies, and
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prioritizing those police agencies into two discrete groups ameliorates much of these criticisms
by notifying police agencies at risk, and allowing them to engage in induced internal change, as
opposed to being stigmatized through association as a failed police agency, and having changed
compelled upon them by the federal government.
Second, DOJ’s limited resources dedicated to § 14141 enforcement can be more
efficiently managed and utilized through this two-tiered process. Under past enforcement of §
14141, the DOJ opens a preliminary investigation, which may lead to a full investigation, which
may lead to a finding of unconstitutional policing, which then leads to a type of agreement. All
of this is time-consuming, costly, and heavily resource dependent. Under the deterrence model,
the entirety of the § 14141 process would be streamlined, and more efficient.
Before moving on to the drawbacks of this policy, it is important to consider that DOJ’s
use of technical assistance during Bush Administration as a means of supporting police reform
may have been an attempt to practice such a policy. By having a bifurcated outcome, the DOJ
had two types of affirmative enforcement options under § 14141, not dissimilar to this policy
option. A qualitative analysis of investigative timelines and outcomes for many § 14141 actions
of municipal police support this interpretation. For example, two municipal police agencies
under negotiated settlement were first the subject of a discrete § 14141 investigation that led to
technical assistance (Miami & New Orleans). Moreover, there were municipal police agencies in
this study whose final outcome was a negotiated settlement, however, during the course of a DOJ
investigation, interim technical assistance was offered (Easton & Cleveland). Both of these
examples suggest that at times over the life-course of § 14141, DOJ’s decision-making sought to
induce change in police agencies first, and then to compel change when that option was reasoned
ineffectual.
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The two most compelling negatives to the adoption of this policy option are the vagaries
of political support, and burdensome costs associated with § 14141 action on the police agency
that have the potential to lead to organizational demise.
Any and all policy options that the DOJ chooses among its alternatives will have to take
into consideration the agenda and political preferences of the chief executive, since past § 14141
enforcement has been directly influenced by this unknowable. This presents a significant
problem in the enforcement of this provision, and most acutely for this policy option. As
contrasted with the first policy option wherein the DOJ takes this unknowable into consideration,
and reacts to the agenda, priorities, and wishes of the chief executive accordingly, policy option
two requires that the DOJ be proactive by leading the agenda rather than following.
Making a deterrence strategy workable requires that the rational actor believes in the
certainty, swiftness, and severity of the punishment. This presupposes that the DOJ is taking an
active policy stance towards enforcement of § 14141, has the capital, and political support to
implement the policy as described. Knowing what is known about the interaction of the political
stream influence on agenda setting and the policy output in the context of § 14141, this option is
tenuous at best. Alternatively, the DOJ could take a wait-and-see approach by incorporating
policy option one and two; recognizing the influences of the political stream, while allowing
policy option two to lay dormant until a conducive political environment emerges in support this
option.
A second negative to a policy of deterrence through economic sanctions is that it poses
major threats to the viability of many municipal police agencies, in particular smaller ones.
According to BJS (2015), 88.3% of local police agencies in the United States have fewer than 50
sworn employees. As supported in the literature on police disbanding (i.e. no longer in
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existence), police agencies most likely to disband are small (King, 2014), with the causes of
disbanding related to lack of bureaucratization, changeover in political leadership, age, failure to
adapt to their environment, and most importantly, financial decline (Giblin & Nowacki, 2018;
Brunet, 2015; King, 2014). A deterrence policy that emphasizes the potential for federal
intervention cannot treat all municipal police agencies as equally culpable regardless of the depth
of misconduct because not all municipal police agencies can withstand the economic sanction
implicit in a § 14141 action. Yet, the overwhelming majority of municipal police agencies in the
U.S. are small; by extension, a DOJ deterrence policy would be required to eliminate the threat
of § 14141 for small police agencies, therefore, the deterrent aspect of this policy is meaningless
and unworkable for the majority of police agencies in the U.S.
An alternative implementation could make this policy more workable, and is probably
more realistic. By targeting police agencies through the two-pronged deterrence approach, the
DOJ implicitly acknowledges the risks to smaller police departments. As part of this policy then,
the DOJ should address misconduct in municipal police through compelling those police
departments that can withstand § 14141 intervention to reform, while hoping that smaller, more
vulnerable municipal police agencies follow the lead of the larger agencies. This policy option
has support in the literature on isomorphism, wherein “organizations change because of
pressures from larger, more powerful organizations” (Giblin & Nowacki, 2018, p. 189), and may
represent the best approach if this policy option were to be adopted.
Enforcement option three – suspension of enforcement, enhancement of
collaboration.
The third policy option involves the suspension of § 14141 actions in favor of a
collaborative reform approach with federal deferral to state-level authorities for police oversight
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and accountability. Collaborative reform has been implemented by the DOJ as an independent
program apart from §14141 enforcement since 2011 (Cole, Collins, Finn, & Lawrence, 2017).
From public statements of support made by former Attorney General Sessions (2017), and
financial assistance being offered to local police departments through DOJ’s collaborative
policing program (DOJ, 2017d), it is apparent that the collaborative reform model is the current,
and foreseeable policy option that the DOJ has adopted as an alternative to § 14141. This model
seeks to provide proactive, non-adversarial, and cost-effective technical assistance for law
enforcement agencies to make necessary internal and organizational reforms (National
Association of Police Organizations, n.d.). Moreover, collaborative reform offers an opportunity
for induced change, and professional development apart from the coercive § 14141.
A second and unexplored aspect of this policy option, that also placates core criticisms of
§ 14141, is that in suspending their enforcement against municipal police, the DOJ is allowing
state-level governments to take independent action regarding bringing a § 14141-like lawsuit in
federal court against an in-state municipal police department. Such is the case in Chicago, where
as recently as September 2018, the Illinois State Attorney General, along with the Mayor of the
City of Chicago, and the Chief of Chicago Police Department announced that they have entered
into a consent decree to be overseen by a federal judge, the findings and agreement of which
were supported by DOJ’s Investigation of the Chicago Police Department (Hinkel & Byrne,
2018). Could this policy option be the future of § 14141 enforcement against municipal police?
Only time will tell since as of this writing, the details of the agreement between Chicago and the
State of Illinois are emerging. What is known though, is that the combination of a collaborative
approach, with deferral to state-level authority placates many of the criticisms of § 14141,
namely those involving the argument that § 14141 violates the principle of federalism embedded
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in the philosophy of American governance, and that the scale of law enforcement in the U.S. is
too big and unwieldy to be effectively overseen by the limited-resourced DOJ.
Put succinctly then, § 14141 has supported municipal police to practice constitutional
policing through the identification of policies, practices, procedures, and system deficiencies
identified by the DOJ, and contained herein that contribute to unconstitutional policing and
systemic misconduct. As well, for municipal police to know is that the DOJ’s most realistic
policy option for the future of § 14141 is collaboration concomitant with a deferral to state-level
enforcement authorities. This is the most agreeable and pragmatic option for municipal police,
the federal government, and the future of federal intervention of municipal police under § 14141.
The adoption of this policy option by the DOJ, along with the compendium of policy
recommendations offered here, and the use of a self-initiated SIRR model would raise an
important question then: Are we on the cusp of a new era in federal intervention of police?
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Conclusion
Throughout this dissertation, § 14141 and the time period under study, 1994 through
2017, have been referred to as the law’s life-course. Analyzing findings from the first completed
§ 14141 investigation of municipal police in Pittsburgh, to the most recent in Chicago, the
knowledge created in this study fills many of the gaps that previous scholars of § 14141 have
called for. To a large extent, everything that municipal police leaders need to know about the
contours of unconstitutional policing – what policies, practices, procedures, and systems
contribute to its proliferation, what the DOJ looks for when conducting a § 14141 investigation,
what influenced the DOJ in their decision-making regarding enforcement of § 14141, how that
influence changed over-time, and what municipal police departments can do to initiate selfcorrection to prevent and address patterns or practices of unconstitutional policing, has now been
researched, analyzed, and reported.
This however does not suggest that there is no new knowledge to glean or create from §
14141’s legacy. The DOJ investigation of the Chicago Police Department represents both an end,
and new beginning of § 14141. After the agreement to enter into a negotiated settlement that was
made between the DOJ under the Obama Administration and the City of Chicago was
discontinued in 2017 by the Trump Administration, the Illinois State Attorney General brought a
legal action in federal court against the Chicago Police Department to enter into a consent decree
for oversight and reform. This is the first known case where a state-official initiated a reform
agreement against a municipal police agency in the spirit of § 14141, ex post a DOJ finding of a
pattern or practice of unconstitutional policing. This legal action has brought the relationship
between municipal police, and federal intervention into unprecedented territory. In this sense, the
consent decree between the Chicago Police Department and the State of Illinois now represents a
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test-case for a new paradigm of structural reform litigation involving municipal police. And yet,
in another sense it’s the same model of reform that has been in place since 1994, as the State of
Illinois has simply replicated what the DOJ did under § 14141 for over 20 years. Consider it a
Lindblomian approach in their decision-making – Illinois modeled their own investigation,
investigative findings, and legal justification for initiating a consent decree off that created by the
DOJ under § 14141. Perhaps then, 2017 and the action against the Chicago Police Department do
not represent the end of § 14141, but a new beginning.
In 2017, Stephen Rushin expertly identified and described three eras of federal
intervention of police in the United States. As expanded upon earlier in this dissertation, the third
and most recent era was categorized as the intervention era, commencing with the passage of the
1994 crime bill and § 14141. I believe that the findings presented in this dissertation offer the
following addendum to Rushin’s (2017) claim: The intervention era as described Rushin (2017)
is over, and a new era of federal intervention has begun – the era of collaborative reform, and
deferral to state-level control. The final case of § 14141 initiated against municipal police is also
the first case of § 14141-inspired oversight at the state-level. Hence, the case against Chicago
represents this new era in police oversight and reform.
The Law Enforcement Misconduct Statute 42 U.S.C. 14141 rose to agenda status in a
classic Kingdonian way – a problem was identified through a focusing event, accompaniment
preexisted that event, solutions existed in the policy soup and were pushed by entrepreneurs, and
the orientation of the political stream allowed for the law’s inclusion in the passage of one of the
most consequential criminal justice bills in U.S. history. Section 14141 was applied by the DOJ
through 24 years of American history by forces of disjointed incrementalism, a deterrence
orientation, and the multiple streams framework that influence organizational decision-making. It
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is too early to say definitively what led to § 14141’s demise, or rather its metamorphosis, but it
does appear at this point, as Kingdon would suggest, that administrative turnover in the political
stream exerted the greatest influence on the agenda, and in the case of § 14141 against municipal
police, by all appearances it was the significant variable that caused it to change.
Study Limitations
There were five significant limitations in this study that require recognition. First,
although established protocols were adhered to for the qualitative thematic analysis, the reliance
on a single coder presents challenges for the reliability of interpretation. As well, human error
presents certain validity and reliability constraints, however, to protect against both I took great
care to adhere to established protocols, and sought to maintain the highest levels of
trustworthiness. Yet, interpretive thematic analysis research, as conceived by Braun and Clarke,
(2006) is best suited to the interpretation of the researcher (Braun & Clarke, 2016), whereas
others argue that interpretive thematic analysis is best conducted with more than one researcher
(Boyatzis, 1998). Which argument has greater validity is up for debate, however, the limitations
of solo interpretive research must still be recognized and acknowledged.
The second limitation involved both the research design and findings letters. I am
referring to both of these as the second limitation since they are interdependent and should be
critiqued accordingly. In this design, the main dependent variable was the investigative outcome
– one that differentiated a finding of unconstitutional policing, and constitutional but problematic
policing. This differentiation is important for the purposes of understanding the specifics,
nuances, and contours of unconstitutional policing. What this design did not allow for was a
comparison between police departments under §14141 action, and other police departments that
have never been under § 14141 consideration. A study design that allows for a comparison
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between §14141 police agencies, and others, could be a study conceptualized as that between
proper and improper policing. The limitation here came down to DOJ issued findings letters.
Municipal police agencies that have never been the subject of a §14141 action, have never had
an investigation conducted by the DOJ, nor a publicly issued findings letter detailing
organizational dysfunctions. Herein is the limitation, without the §14141 investigation, there is
no assessment of a police agency’s policies, procedures, practices, and systems to analyze in the
binary outcome.
A third limitation involves classifying the variety of DOJ investigative outcomes of a
finding of a pattern or practice of unconstitutional policing into one category. That is, the
investigative outcome “negotiated settlement” subsumes a variety of § 14141 investigative
conclusions involving; MOA’s, consent decrees, legal agreements, etc. Although the DOJ
broadly classifies these § 14141 actions as reform agreements (DOJ, 2017a), and other scholars
subsume these outcomes as consent decrees (Walker, 2017), the DOJ chose to engage different
municipal police departments into different types of agreements and that each agreement, while
consistent with a finding of a pattern or practice of unconstitutional policing, may provide unique
insight into organizational practices and the preferred remedies for those practices. For example;
might a MOA have produced greater cooperation between the municipal police agency and the
DOJ compared to a consent decree? Similarly; do different types of negotiated settlements
produce different long-term outcomes? Since the multitude in types of negotiated settlements
was not analyzed in this study, it does, however, provide a possible area for future research.
An additional limitation related to the design and findings letters, but intertwined with the
theoretical framework, relates to conclusions regarding the influence of the variable Presidential
party. Since the N = 33 § 14141 investigations represent just under half of all DOJ actions
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throughout the life-course of the law, attributing unconstitutional policing decisions to a political
party offers an incomplete analysis. When only considering municipal police, specific § 14141
actions had to be excluded from analysis as justified by methodological decisions and established
criteria. As such, the political influence on a determination of unconstitutional policing made
against municipal police has been accurately analyzed and properly attributed, however, this is
only after a decision has been made to enter into a type of reform agreement. Consider, many
municipal police agencies were the subject of a § 14141 investigation that did not result in any
findings by the DOJ, (i.e. no affirmative outcome-negotiated settlement nor technical assistance),
this may have influenced the results and interpretation of the influence of the variable
Presidential party. To more accurately identify the influences of the variable Presidential party
on a § 14141 outcome, all § 14141 investigations could be tested against three types of
investigative outcomes, including those investigations that were discontinued by the DOJ
without issuing any findings instead of just the two affirmative outcomes in this study design.
Finally, the fifth limitation involved the study population proper, that is, only municipal
police. Although municipal police make up the overwhelming majority of local police agencies
in the U.S. (BJS, 2015), there is still quite a diversity of law enforcement agencies, structures and
jurisdictions that were not included in this research; examples include: State police, county
police, Sherriff’s, federal police, and any number of other law enforcement agencies to which the
DOJ has jurisdiction. Because of the diversity in both size and structure of law enforcement
agencies in the United States, focusing on municipal police limited the number of cases for
analysis, thereby constraining the quantitative modeling and analysis. This however, does
provide another avenue of many for possible future research.
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Future Research
If we are entering into a new era in federal intervention as posited in the conclusion, there
are great opportunities for future research in how § 14141 is applied at the state level, in the
national shift towards collaborative policing, and how implementation of this new paradigm of
intervention functions to forestall unconstitutional policing practices. What becomes of this new
era, and how it will play out is an area ripe for academic, and practitioner study. As this era
continues to emerge, scholars can move into studying the next phase of § 14141, namely that of
outcomes, and how they compare across different levels of governmental intervention with
municipal police. A future researcher might seek to answer the following question: Which level
of government intervention, federal or state, is responsible for the most successful long-term
outcomes for municipal police?
As well, there are other questions that remain unanswered from this dissertation. Related
to the concept of disjointed incrementalism; through my research I have posited that the length of
an investigation, and number and type of findings, may reflect a previously unaccounted for
variable – cooperation between organizations. A line of inquiry can explore this phenomenon as
cooperation between municipal police, and state-level enforcement authorities may have
implications just as it did between federal and municipal jurisdictions.
From the MS framework, two lines of inquiry are foreseeable. First, the influence of
“spillovers” and the “clustering” effect can be explored on two levels in the fourth era of federal
intervention. That is, since Illinois has adopted a policy of state-level intervention under the §
14141 model: Will other states follow? Also, what will be the implications of a state intervention
for other within-state police agencies? Second, further analysis of the relationship between
elements in the political stream, that is, administrative turnover and the national mood are left
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unresolved here, as well in the broader literature. This is another line of inquiry worth pursuing,
particularly, how the combination of elements in the political stream apply, or do not apply, for
state-level investigation, intervention, and enforcement.
Methodologically, the embedded design that was used for this dissertation – thematic
analysis, followed by theoretically supported quantitative analysis, can be used as a template to
analyze municipal police agencies that are engaged in voluntary collaborative policing reforms
with the DOJ, and compare those to municipal police departments that have been subject of §
14141-like intervention at the state-level. This is not dissimilar to comparing municipal police
departments by investigative outcome, but for the voluntariness of the police agency in the
collaborative reform model.
Finally, the model proposed in this study to forestall patterns or practices of
unconstitutional policing, the SIRR model, can be expanded upon to include a wider-variety of
police agencies, not just municipal police. Additionally, this model can be tested to determine the
effectiveness of forestalling unconstitutional policing across different types of police agencies,
and the applicability of the variables in the model. A future researcher might ask the question:
How does the SIRR model forestall unconstitutional policing across different structures of police
organizations?
If it is accepted that the relationship between the police and federal intervention has
entered into a fourth era, the previously described lines of inquiry will expand our knowledge of
policing, oversight, research methods, and the integration of criminological and public policy
theory, while serving to assist municipal police agencies to be better functioning organizations
that meet their missions within the guidelines set forth by applicable law, and most importantly,
the Constitution.
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Appendices
Appendix A: Municipal police agencies in the study population

Table A
N = 33 Municipal Police Agencies Ordered by Investigation Date.
Municipal Police Department

State

Pittsburgh Bureau of Police
Los Angeles Police Department
Steubenville Police Department
Columbus Division of Police
Washington Metro D.C. Police
Cleveland Division of Police
Detroit Police Department
Cincinnati Division of Police
Schenectady Police Department
Miami Police Department
Portland Police Department
Alabaster Police Department
Bakersfield Police Department
Beacon Police Department
Warren Police Department
Easton Police Department
Austin Police Department
Yonkers Police Department
Lorain Police Department
Harvey Police Department
Inglewood Police Department
New Orleans Police Department
Seattle Police Department
Newark Police Department
Portland Police Bureau
Miami Police Department
Meridian Police Department
Missoula Police Department
Albuquerque Police Department
Cleveland Division of Police
Ferguson Police Department
Baltimore City Police Department
Chicago Police Department

PA
CA
OH
OH
DCb
OH
MI
OH
NY
FL
ME
AL
CA
NY
OH
PA
TX
NY
OH
IL
CA
LA
WA
NJ
OR
FL
MS
MT
NM
OH
MO
MD
IL

Investigation
Start: MonthYear
April-96
July-96
September-96
March-98
February-99
August-00
December-00
May-01
April-02
May-02
May-02
March-03
June-03
August-04
December-04
October-05
May-07
August-07
November-08
November-08
March-09
May-10
March-11
May-11
June-11
November-11
December-11
May-12
November-12
March-13
September-14
May-15
December-15

Findings Letter
Issued: MonthYear
January-97
May-00
June-97
October-99
June-01
June-03
June-02
October-01
March-03
March-03
March-03
November-04
April-04
June-05
March-06
January-10
December-08
June-09
January-12
May-12
December-09
March-11
December-11
July-14
September-12
July-13
August-12
May-13
April-14
December-14
March-15
August-16
January-17

Investigative
Outcomea
Neg Set
Neg Set
Neg Set
Neg Set
Neg Set
Neg Set
Neg Set
Neg Set
TAL
TAL
TAL
TAL
TAL
Neg Set
Neg Set
Neg Set
TAL
Neg Set
TAL
TAL
TAL
Neg Set
Neg Set
Neg Set
Neg Set
Neg Set
Neg Set
Neg Set
Neg Set
Neg Set
Neg Set
Neg Set
Neg Set

Note. Ordered by investigation date. a “Neg Set” refers to negotiated settlement, and “TAL” refers to technical
assistance letter. b The municipality of Washington D.C. is in a federal district, not a state.
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Appendix B: Preliminary coding framework with triangulation

Table B
Preliminary coding framework with code description and triangulation.
Preliminary
Code

Exemplar Extract

Description of Code

Code
Triangulation

Accountability
system

…result in significant part from a
lack of accountability and review
systems within the NPD. The NPD
has neither a functioning early
warning system nor an effective
internal affairs structure.

Refers to police
agency’s system of
accountability and
review; not specific
accountability for an
individual officer.

Walker (2017)
Childress (2015)
Rushin (2017)

…the manual has not been
comprehensively updated since
early 2002.

Refers to failures to
update policies and
procedures, post new
procedures, etc.

Professional
experience

Discriminatory policing;
enforcement by intent,
design, or outcome
disfavors a specific
protected group

Childress (2015)

Administrative
failure

Biased based
policing

Communication
failure

Community
policing

Complaint
deficiencies

We also have concerns that
officers’ interactions with
women victims of sexual assault
and with transgender individuals
display unlawful gender bias.

…insufficient communication and
cooperation with its law
enforcement and community
partners regarding their
response to reports of sexual
assault

Problems associated
with transmission of
critical information
either internally or
externally

Professional
experience

Community policing must be a
core philosophy that is infused
throughout the Department’s
policing strategies and tactics.

Community
involvement in police
decision-making,
problem-orientated
policing strategies

Douglass (2017)

CDP’s civilian complaint system,
as a whole, is disorganized and
ineffective. CDP was only able to
produce a fraction of the case

Describes deficiencies in
policies, procedures,
practices, and systems
specific to the civilian

Rushin (2017)
Walker (2017)
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Appendix B: Preliminary coding framework with triangulation

Table B
Preliminary coding framework with code description and triangulation.
Preliminary
Code

Conditions of
ambiguity

Culture

Deficient formal
authority

Exemplar Extract

Description of Code

files we requested, and the files
produced were often incomplete
and lacked basic information
about dispositions and
outcomes. CDP does not have
systems in place to track its
performance or decision-making
regarding civilian complaints.

complaint making
process; not the
investigation of those
complaints.

…we observed that there was no
consistent understanding of the
department’s community
policing program within the
ranks. Even commanders had
inconsistent understandings of
the agency’s program.

Describes actions,
policies and procedures
where there is a lack of
clarity or understanding
regarding a given topic,
leading to officer
confusion and
uncertainty

…the Division must undergo a
cultural shift at all levels to
change an “us-against-them”
mentality we too often observed
and to truly integrate and
inculcate community oriented
policing principles into the daily
work and management of the
Division.

…downsized ICS has insufficient
authority and stature to perform
its function effectively.

Discipline

Refers to broadly
established norms of
behavior, uncodified
and informal

Refers to the real or
imagined perception
that a unit/division
within a police
department lacks the
formal authority to take
specific action in a given
scenario

Code
Triangulation

Professional
experience

Rushin (2017)
Walker (2017)
Professional
experience

Professional
experience

Childress (2015)
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Table B
Preliminary coding framework with code description and triangulation.
Preliminary
Code

Exemplar Extract

Description of Code

The NPD has no set presumptive
penalties for particular
violations. As a result, the Trial
Board can impose the same
punishment for an officer’s
failure to report to work on time
as for the officer’s use of
excessive force against a civilian.

Formal authority of a
police department to
manage, correct or
discipline its members.
Can be individualized or
referring to a system

Code
Triangulation
Walker (2017)
Rushin (2017)

Equipment and
technology
deficiencies

Not all of CDP’s zone cars have
computers and, of those that do,
the computers do not all reliably
work. Even the MDCs that do
work properly do not give
officers access to CAD or CDP’s
Records Management System.

References to deficient
equipment, or lack of
sufficient and necessary
equipment to perform
basic police function

Professional
experience

Fail to adhere to
best practices

This practice is out of the norm
for police departments across
the country, and the NPD’s
leadership acknowledged that it
is inappropriate and may
discourage complainants from
coming forward.

References to a police
department’s practices
not in keeping with
established standards of
well-run police
organizations and/or
widely recognized by
professional groups

Walker (2017)

Individual
accountability

…lack of name plates poses a
potential impediment to the
accurate identification of YPD
employees involved in alleged
misconduct.

Practices that prevent
individual officers from
being held accountable
for their actions, but not
system-based

Professional
experience

Information
management

BPD also fails to collect data on a
range of law enforcement
actions, and even when it
collects data, fails to store it in

Failure to enable a
system to collect and
store data efficiently
and appropriately
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Rushin (2017)
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Table B
Preliminary coding framework with code description and triangulation.
Preliminary
Code

Exemplar Extract

Description of Code

Code
Triangulation

Deficiencies related to
the investigation of
complaints of
misconduct made
against officers; not
shortcomings of the
complaint process

Childress (2015)
Rushin (2017)
Walker (2017)

systems that are capable of
effective tracking and analysis.

Internal
investigation
deficiencies

Our review also revealed some
disturbing lapses and omissions
by MPD investigators.

Intervention
system-deficient

CDP does not use an adequate
early intervention system to help
identify risky and problematic
trends in officer behavior before
a pattern or practice of
misconduct arises, such as the
pattern or practice of excessive
force that we found here.

Knowledge
deficit

…misunderstanding of critical
principles of consent and
incapacitation that are often at
the center of these sensitive
sexual assault investigations.

References to an
adequate system that
allows for police
management to
monitor, track, and
assess police officer
behavior to prevent
misconduct

Childress (2015)
Rushin (2017)
Walker (2017)

Police officers, or entire
police departments that
are ignorant of general
and/or specific police
functions

Rushin (2017)
Professional
experience

Management
failure

Officers report that they receive
little supervision, guidance, and
support from the Division,
essentially leaving them to
determine for themselves how to
perform their difficult and
dangerous jobs.

Problems associated
with higher-than front
line supervision that
have a detrimental
effect on police
performance; not
supervision failure

Walker (2017)
Rushin (2017)

Official
misconduct

…tamper with evidence and/or
witnesses, falsify official reports
and filings.

Unlawful and/or
criminal activity in the
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Table B
Preliminary coding framework with code description and triangulation.
Preliminary
Code

Exemplar Extract

Organizational
conflict

…officers are still expected to
negotiate their compensation
with the Detail employer and
officers who coordinate Details
still wield inordinate influence
including, in some instances,
over their superiors

Organizational
orientation

BPD’s legacy of zero tolerance
enforcement continues to drive
its policing in certain Baltimore
neighborhoods and leads to
unconstitutional stops, searches,
and arrests. Many BPD
supervisors instruct officers to
make frequent stops and
arrests—even for minor offenses
and with minimal or no
suspicion—without sufficient
consideration of whether this
enforcement strategy promotes
public safety and community
trust or conforms to
constitutional standards.

Organizational
review and
auditing

BPD has conducted virtually no
analysis of its own data to ensure
that its enforcement activities
are non-discriminatory, and the
Department misclassifies or
otherwise fails to investigate
specific complaints of racial bias.

Description of Code
performance of duty;
differentiated from
constitutional violations
or non-criminal
misconduct
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When systems and/or
processes allow for
conflicts of interest

When a police
organization has geared
itself towards
performing activities in
a specific way in
furtherance of a goal,
though this goal leads to
misconduct.

The practice of
reviewing internal
mechanisms and
processes for efficiency
and effectiveness.

Code
Triangulation

Professional
experience

Rushin (2017)
Walker (2017)
Douglass (2017)

Childress (2015)
Rushin (2017)
Walker (2017)
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Table B
Preliminary coding framework with code description and triangulation.
Preliminary
Code

Exemplar Extract

Description of Code

Oversight
deficiencies

The Department also lacks
adequate civilian oversight—its
Civilian Review Board is
hampered by inadequate
resources, and the agency’s
internal affairs and disciplinary
process lacks transparency.

Refers to faulty
processes with external
review of police
misconduct.

Policy and legal
inconsistencies

Policy
deficiencies

Prisoners

NPD has misunderstood or
misapplied the distinction
between criminal and
administrative investigations and
abdicated its independent
responsibility to conduct an
administrative investigation to
determine whether officerinvolved shootings violate NPD
policy or present officer safety
concerns.

Refers to situations in
which findings indicate
that the police agency
does not follow its own
policies in practice, or is
operating outside of its
legal mandate

EPD does not have a written
policy or procedure that
prescribes what the
Commanders or Chief should
review in making their
determination regarding the
appropriateness of the force.

Policies and rules that
have specific
deficiencies,
insufficiencies,
inadequacies, or are
non-existent.

The Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment
guarantees a pretrial detainee
the right to receive adequate
medical care, and that right is
violated if officials are
deliberately indifferent to the
detainee’s serious medical
needs.

Refers to deficient
practices involving
prisoners concerning
medical care, transport,
incapacitation, shelter,
holding time; not policy
specific
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Code
Triangulation

Walker (2017)
Rushin (2017)

Douglass (2017)
Professional
experience

Childress (2015)
Rushin (2017)
Walker (2017)

Childress (2015)
Professional
experience
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Table B
Preliminary coding framework with code description and triangulation.
Preliminary
Code

Exemplar Extract

Description of Code

Code
Triangulation

Recruitment

…failure to prioritize the
recruitment of high-quality
candidates contributes to the
chronic, Department-wide
problems we observed.

Refers to deficient
practices related to
hiring candidates to be
police officers; does not
refer to internal
recruitment for
positions

Douglass (2017)
Professional
experience

Research and
development

We recommend that the
department conduct a staffing
study to determine how many
officers would need to be added
to the Team, as well as how
many patrol officers would need
to be trained and certified, to
ensure that someone with the
appropriate skills is always
available in all parts of the city.

Describes conditions
that warrant a police
department to conduct
self-study and/or learn
from changing external
environment

Professional
experience

Resource
inadequacy

We concluded that OPS was
understaffed; investigators were
not provided with the guidance
and resources necessary to do
their jobs effectively;
investigations were untimely;
civilians’ access to the complaint
process was limited; and some
complaints that should have
been investigated were not.
More than ten years later, these
problems remain and, in some
cases, have worsened. Current
deficiencies in the complaint
process include impossibly high
caseloads for investigators.

Search and
seizure

…improper seizures of persons,
including making police stops
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Refers to police
organizations, or
divisions/units within
police organizations
that have deficiencies in
manpower or funding;
not lack of authority

Douglass (2017)
Rushin (2017)
Walker (2017)

Childress (2015)
Rushin (2017)
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Table B
Preliminary coding framework with code description and triangulation.
Preliminary
Code

Exemplar Extract

Description of Code

made based on reasonable
suspicion and making arrests
without probable cause; seizures
of property not based on
probable cause; and improper
searches of persons and property
with insufficient cause.

Lack of constitutional
authority to perform a
stop and frisk or arrest.
Lack of sufficient
reasonable suspicion
and/or probable cause.
Differentiated from
unjustified arrests
wherein cause is
falsified

Special
populations

APD’s policies, training, and
supervision are insufficient to
ensure that officers encountering
people with mental illness or in
distress do so in a manner that
respects their rights and is safe
for all involved.

Specialized units

Accusations of theft and
corruption are most often
leveled against officers in
specialized units—particularly
the various narcotics, gang, and
street crimes units

Standards for
assignment

Inadequate screening procedures
allow officers with multiple theft
complaints to be assigned to a
specialized unit or transferred to
another specialized unit while
continuing to accumulate
integrity-related complaints.
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Describes deficient
practices to vulnerable
populations, particularly
the mental ill, and
juveniles

Refers to deficiencies
specific to sub
organizational
enforcement and
response unitsnarcotics, special
enforcement, SWAT,
etc.

Describes deficiencies
related to transfer or
promotion to a unit or
assignment for which
the officer is
unprepared or
unqualified

Code
Triangulation
Walker (2017)

Childress (2015)
Rushin (2017)
Walker (2017)

Professional
experience

Professional
experience
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Table B
Preliminary coding framework with code description and triangulation.
Preliminary
Code

Exemplar Extract

Stress and wellbeing

Policing is a high-stress
profession. Law enforcement
officers often are called upon to
deal with violence or crises as
problem solvers, and they often
are witnesses to human tragedy.
In Chicago, this stress is
particularly acute, for several
reasons. Increasing levels of gun
violence and neighborhood
conditions take their toll on
officers as well as residents.

Supervision
deficiencies

…supervisors often fail to meet
their responsibility to provide
oversight of the use of force by
individual officers.

Describes the failure of
front-line supervisors to
complete task-specific
responsibilities

Childress (2015)
Rushin (2017)
Walker (2017)

Tactical
deficiencies

We found that officers engage in
tactically unsound and
unnecessary foot pursuits, and
that these foot pursuits too often
end with officers unreasonably
shooting someone—including
unarmed individuals.

Refers to the use of
physical restraints, use
of weapons, and means
of control by officers
that are deficient.

Walker (2017)
Professional
experience

Training
deficiencies

CDP does not have effective
mechanisms in place to ensure
that its officers have received
training that is adequate in its
content, quality, and quantity.

Description of Code
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Refers to officer health
both physical and
emotional; systems
within police
departments that allow
for officer assistance;
police officer working
conditions that
contribute to stress and
burnout

Describes conditions of
training both at the
academy and in-service
level, that fail to
appropriately address
officer’s needs. Can be a
system, assessment,

Code
Triangulation

Professional
experience

Walker (2017)
Rushin (2017)
Professional
experience
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Table B
Preliminary coding framework with code description and triangulation.
Preliminary
Code

Exemplar Extract

Unjustified
arrests

…conversations with FPD
officers, one officer admitted
that when he conducts a traffic
stop, he asks for identification
from all passengers as a matter
of course. If any refuses, he
considers that to be “furtive and
aggressive” conduct and cites—
and typically arrests.

Arrests that are made
without probable cause;
differentiate from
search and seizure in
that misconduct and
falsification are
presumed

Childress (2015)

UOF-deficiencies

CPD policy requires officers to
report force but, in practice,
officers are not required to
provide detail about the force
they used that is sufficient for an
adequate review, and most
officer force is not reviewed or
investigated.

Refers to policies,
practices and systems
that contribute to
unreasonable,
unnecessary, or
excessive use of force
against a person

Childress (2015)
Rushin (2017)
Walker (2017)
Professional
experience

Description of Code
needs, review, or
individualized deficiency

253

Code
Triangulation

Appendix C: Final theme and subtheme codebook

Table C
Theme and subtheme codebook with descriptions and examples.
Theme

Conditions of
ambiguity

Institutionalization

-

-

Description

Example from data (DOJ
Investigation)

-

Lack of clarity, appropriate
direction or guidance in
matters related to policy,
procedure, protocol or
reporting. Individual and
group confusion, and
contradiction in responsibility
or action leading to a lack of
understand of required police
duties or functionality.

The use of force policy has
changed, but the policy in place
at the time of our investigation
was confusing, at times
conflicted with the law, and did
not provide sufficient guidance
to officers. Indeed, many
officers reported to us that they
did not understand the policy
and, more generally, did not
understand what level of force
they were permitted to use
under what circumstances
(Cleveland, 2014).

-

When an organization
increasingly bases its
approach to customers or
clients on what best serves
the comfort or preference of
employees (O’Hara, 2012).

-

Decisions and investigations
specifically favoring
employees in police actions
over the impartiality of an
investigation.

specially-trained investigators
who are charged with
conducting unbiased reviews of
officers’ use of deadly force
admitted to us that they
conduct their investigations
with the goal of casting the
accused officer in the most
positive light possible
(Cleveland, 2014)

A municipal police
organization that has the
necessary and appropriate
policies, but does not follow

While Chief Jackson
implemented new department
policies when he joined FPD in
2010, including on use-of-force

Subtheme

Internal
partiality

Misaligned
policy and
practice
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Table C
Theme and subtheme codebook with descriptions and examples.
Theme

Subtheme

Description
them, or routinely ignores
policies as a matter of widelyaccepted practice.

Lack of
professional
currency

-

Failing to have established or
maintain and adhere to
acceptable standards in
systems, procedures, policies,
& practices.

-

…the NPD has failed to
appropriately train its
investigators. NPD command
staff and officers, IA
investigators, and Integrity
Compliance Officers (“ICO”)
consistently reported that
investigative experience has not
been required to become an
investigator (Newark, 2014)

…so much of the department’s
training program is not
documented, it was difficult for
us—as it is for the department
itself—to fully evaluate most of
the training that officers receive
(Albuquerque, 2014).

-

Deficient
selection
criteria

Selection and appointment of
personnel to agency positions
in which they were not
qualified, trained, prepared,
or disqualified but assigned.

-

Failure to
maintain
established
standards in
systems,
practices,
and policies

Deficiencies with internal
control systems, common
police practices,
communication failures, and
training. Police agencies that
are capable of adhering to
professional standards but do
not do so.

-

Failure to
adhere to
best
practices

Example from data (DOJ
Investigation)
reporting and review, these
policies are routinely ignored
(Ferguson, 2015).

Practices and policies that are
not in keeping with generally
accepted professional
standards.
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This practice is out of the norm
for police departments across
the country, and the NPD’s
leadership acknowledged that it
is inappropriate and may
discourage complainants from
coming forward.
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Table C
Theme and subtheme codebook with descriptions and examples.
Theme

Example from data (DOJ
Investigation)
(Newark, 2014)

Subtheme

Description

-

Failure of accountability
within the chain-ofcommand; leadership
indifference to institutional
problems, not providing the
organization the support and
guidance as necessary and
appropriate. Generalized lack
of investment of proper and
appropriate police services by
leadership.

Commanders seem to take no
notice of, much less hold
accountable, supervisors who
approve egregious uses of force
without question, conduct
obviously flawed investigations,
sign off on clearly deficient
arrest reports, or who simply do
not supervise
(New Orleans, 2011).

-

Organizational outlook and
enduring legacy. Widespread
and endorsed strategies;
outlook and practices geared
towards a specific end. Can
be legitimate means for
illegitimate ends.

-

-

Focus on
enforcement,
activity, and
arrests

Law enforcement priority is
to fight crime, but in doing so,
adhere to illegitimate means.

Ferguson’s law enforcement
practices are shaped by the
City’s focus on revenue rather
than by public safety needs.
This emphasis on revenue has
compromised the institutional
character of Ferguson’s police
department, contributing to a
pattern of unconstitutional
policing
(Ferguson, 2015).

-

Prevailing
cultural view

Dominant way of thinking
within the organization.

…longstanding deficiencies that
have allowed a culture of
indifference to constitutional

Leadership and
management
failure

Organizational
orientation and
culture
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Table C
Theme and subtheme codebook with descriptions and examples.
Theme

Example from data (DOJ
Investigation)
policing and insularity to
develop within the department.
(Albuquerque, 2014).

Subtheme

Description

-

Short term thinking,
insularity. Not recognizing
risk (Catino, 2013).

-

Adaptation
failure

Failing to adapt to changing
external conditions in an
appropriate manner to the
point of detriment to the
police organization and
community.

In light of the diversity of the
Yonkers community, we also
recommend that any warnings
issued to individuals prior to the
deployment of the K-9 Unit be
issued in Spanish, as well as in
English (Yonkers, 2009).

Conflicts of
interest

Practices that are in
opposition to the interest and
autonomy of a police agency
or a police officer’s duties.

MPD policy requires officers to
automatically arrest a student
whenever school officials or
staff indicate that they would
like to press charges (Meridian,
2012).

-

Deficient
interaction
with external
organizations

Failure to effectively
communicate with
organizations outside the
agency, community groups,
oversight bodies, and partner
agencies, leading to
deficiencies in operations,
performance, or
accountability.

WPD should hold community
outreach meetings. The
meetings should be an open
forum for all citizens to discuss
issues with the WPD
(Warren, 2006).

-

Research,
planning, and
resource
allocation

Failing to use, collect or
analyze information for the
betterment of the police
department. Fail to research

Organizational
myopia

-

-

257

We recommend that the
department conduct a staffing
study to determine how many
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Table C
Theme and subtheme codebook with descriptions and examples.
Theme

Subtheme

Description
and learn, review or allocate
resources in an efficient and
effective manner.

Routinized
misconduct

-

-

-

Example from data (DOJ
Investigation)
officers would need to be
added to the Team, as well as
how many patrol officers would
need to be trained and
certified, to ensure that
someone with the appropriate
skills is always available in all
parts of the city (Albuquerque,
2014).

-

Misconduct, malfeasance,
and otherwise criminal
conduct committed by
officers as a matter of routine
within a police agency.

-

Abuse of
authority

Using police authority in an
intentionally abusive,
unnecessary, or excessive
manner, or using force as
retaliation and/or
punishment.

Officers use force against
individuals, including persons in
handcuffs, in circumstances that
appeared not only unnecessary
but deliberately retaliatory
(New Orleans, 2011).

Biased-based
policing

Cultural
deviation

Policing practices that are
motivated by bias towards
any particular class of
persons. Bias can be
intentional or have a
differential impact.

When elements of the
organization increasingly
operate according to their
own standards, with little
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in case reports with video
recordings of the same
interviews further suggested to
us that MPD's sexual assault
investigations are at times
compromised by an
investigator's unwarranted
gender-based assumptions and
stereotypes about women.
(Missoula, 2013).
NPD has been aware for several
years that theft by some of its
officers is a serious problem.
The Special Investigations Unit

Appendix C: Final theme and subtheme codebook

Table C
Theme and subtheme codebook with descriptions and examples.
Theme

Subtheme

Description
regard for the larger
organization and its rules. Or
violation of laws and criminal
activity by subgroups of
officers (O’Hara, 2012).

-

Tactical discretion,
weapon
competency, and
equipment
inadequacies

-

-

Example from data (DOJ
Investigation)
and IA have conducted several
reviews of officers with high
numbers of theft complain
(Newark, 2014).

Unjustified
enforcement
actions

Police action; arrests, search
and seizure, without the
necessary legal justification.

Many of the victims of excessive
force, false arrest or charges,
and/or an improper search are,
at the time
when the misconduct occurs,
carrying out some ordinary,
routine daily activity (either not
violating the law or committing
some minor infraction).
(Columbus, 1999).

-

Inappropriate use of
discretion in tactical
situations, improper use of
weapons, and inadequacies in
police-issued equipment.

-

Inappropriate
tactical
discretion

Not adhering to a force
continuum; using tactical
discretion inappropriately,
and unnecessarily. Legally
justified, but reasonable use
of force for a given situation.

Equipment
inadequacies

Inadequate, improper usage
of, or insufficient equipment
for modern police
functionality.
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Officers frequently use
takedown procedures in ways
that unnecessarily increase the
harm to the person. Finally,
officers escalate situations in
which force could have been
avoided had they instead used
de-escalation measures.
(Albuquerque, 2014).
…other basic equipment is
either outdated or nonexistent.
For instance, officers lack
effective zone car computers,
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Table C
Theme and subtheme codebook with descriptions and examples.
Theme

-

Subtheme

Weapon
competency

Description

Incompetent use of weapons
or tools.
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Example from data (DOJ
Investigation)
called Mobile Data Computers.
(Cleveland, 2014).
…recognized deficiencies such
as poor marksmanship,
shooting from too great a
distance, failure to follow
perimeter protocol, and firing at
a moving vehicle. (Miami, 2013)

Appendix D: Significant relationships; IV by IV
Table D
Phi coefficients for significant relationships, IV by IV.
% nonwhite

Size

Pop.

Res.

Focus.
events

Indicat.

Feed.

Use of
force

Stop,
search,
arrest

Response
to special
pops.

Civilian
complaint

Internal
discipline

Presidential
party

National
mood

More
than
one.

1

.389*

.389*

.344*

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-.385*

-

-

Size

.389*

1

-

.344*

-

-

-

-

-

-

.407*

.420*

-.385*

-

-

Population

.389*

-

1

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

Resources

.344*

.344*

-

1

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

Focusing
event

-

-

-

-

1

-

.449**

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

Indicators

-

-

-

-

-

1

-

.454**

-

-

.879***

.401*

-

-

-

Feedback

-

-

-

-

.449**

-

1

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

.454**

-

1

-

-

.528**

.352*

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

1

.440*

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

.440*

1

-

-

-.481**

-

.489**

-

.407*

-

-

-

.879***

-

.528**

-

-

1

.489**

-

-

-

-

.420*

-

-

-

.401*

.352*

-

-

.489**

1

-340*

-

-

% nonwhite
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Use of
force
Stop,
search,
arrest
Response
to special
pops.
Civilian
complaint
Internal
discipline

-
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Table D
Phi coefficients for significant relationships, IV by IV.

Pres. party
National
mood

% nonwhite

Size

Pop.

Res.

Focus.
events

Indicat.

Feed.

Use of
force

Stop,
search,
arrest

Response
to special
pops.

Civilian
complaint

Internal
discipline

Presidential
party

National
mood

More
than
one.

-.385*

-.385*

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-.481**

-

-.340*

1

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

1

-

-

-.489**

-

-

-

-

1

-

-

-

-

-
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More than
one in
state
Note. (-) Not reported since p > .05. Bolded coefficients, ϕ > .50
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001

-

-

-

-

-

Appendix E: Phi coefficients; IVs by themes
Table E
Phi coefficients: Independent variables by themes.
Conditions
of
ambiguity

Institutionalization

Lack of
professional
currency

Leadership &
management
failure

Organizational
orientation &
culture

Organizational
myopia

Routinized
misconduct

Tactical
discretion,
etc.

% non-white

-.06

.12

-.16

.10

.42*

.36*

.14

.19

Resources

.18

.05

.16

.14

.26

.12

.11

.23

Size

.20

.12

.19

.10

.42*

.04

.39*

.05

Population

-.18

.12

-.16

.10

.15

-.27

.14

.05

Focusing event

-.06

-.05

.19

.10

.01

.20

.14

.19

Indicators

.56**

-.18

.42*

.22

.26

.24

-.17

.55**

Feedback

-.05

.03

.23

.06

.18

-.30

.16

.31

Use of force

.41*

-.13

.56**

.29

.19

.12

-.26

.56**

.08

.21

-.13

.31

.32

.30

.29

.01

-.08

.14

-.23

.45**

.67***

.19

.35*

-.13

Civilian complaint

.49**

-.16

.48**

.15

.23

.07

-.11

.44*

Internal discipline

.22

.19

.34*

.03

.15

.14

-.12

.26

Presidential party

.35*

-.18

.14

.01

-.22

-.10

-.49**

.31

National mood

.55**

.18

-.14

-.26

-.20

.26

-.39*

.27

.21

-.08

-.30

-.25

-.32

-.06

Variable
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Search, seizure, &
arrest
Response to special
populations

More than one in
-.14
-.19
state
Note: Significant coefficients bolded for acuity.
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001

Appendix F: Variables and themes
Table F
Relating Variables to Themes.
Relevant Variables
Percent non-white ≥ 54%
Percent non-white < 54%
Resources ≥ 2.8 sworn per
population
Resources < 2.8 sworn per
population

Related theme:
Primarya
Organizational
orientation & culture
Lack of professional
currency
Organizational
orientation & culture

Related theme:
Secondarya
Organizational myopia
Conditions of ambiguity
Tactical discretion, etc.

Institutionalization

Routinized Misconduct

Size ≥ 500 sworn employees

Organizational
orientation & culture

Routinized misconduct

Size < 500 sworn employees

Organizational myopia

Tactical discretion, etc.

Population ≥ 250k

Organizational
orientation & culture

Routinized misconduct

Population < 250k

Organizational myopia

Conditions of ambiguity

Focusing event

Organizational myopia

Tactical discretion, etc.

Indicators – deficient EIS

Conditions of ambiguity

Tactical discretion, etc.

Feedback

Tactical discretion, etc.

Lack of professional
currency

Use of force
Search, seizure, & arrest
Response to special
populations
Civilian complaint system
Internal discipline

Lack of professional
currency
Organizational
orientation & culture
Organizational
orientation & culture
Conditions of ambiguity
Lack of professional
currency

Tactical discretion, etc.
Leadership &
management failure
Leadership &
management failure
Lack of professional
currency
Tactical discretion, etc.

Related theme:
Tertiarya
Tactical discretion,
etc.
Leadership &
management failure
Conditions of
ambiguity
Organizational myopia
Conditions of
ambiguity
Leadership &
management failure
Institutionalization
Lack of professional
currency
Lack of professional
currency
Lack of professional
currency
Organizational
orientation & culture
Conditions of
ambiguity
Organizational myopia
Routinized misconduct
Tactical discretion,
etc.
Conditions of
ambiguity

Presidential party - Democrat

Routinized misconduct

Presidential party Republican

Organizational orientation
& culture

Conditions of ambiguity

Tactical discretion, etc.

Lack of professional
currency

National mood – positive

Conditions of ambiguity

Tactical discretion, etc.

Organizational myopia

Organizational
orientation & culture
Lack of professional
Leadership &
More than one in state
Tactical discretion, etc.
currency
management failure
Note. Thematic order was determined by the phi coefficient strength of association. aSignificant phi correlations
are italicized.
National mood - negative

Routinized misconduct
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Leadership &
management failure

Institutionalization

Appendix G: Matrix of Hypotheses
Table G
Matrix of Hypotheses
Hypotheses
H1
H2
H3
H4
H5
H6
H7
H8
H9
H10
H11
H12
H13
H14

Hypotheses - As Stated

Results

Thematic findings will differ between municipal police agencies
under negotiated settlement, and those under technical assistance.
Municipal police agencies under negotiated settlement will have
more scaled subtheme findings than those under technical
assistance.
Second-generation output will be significantly longer than firstgeneration output.
First-generation § 14141 investigations will have lasted longer than
second-generation investigations.
The length of an investigation will be negatively associated with the
number of DOJ scaled findings, controlling for the size of a police
department.

Partially
confirmed

DOJ’s investigative findings will differ over time.
Environmental and organizational characteristics will differ between
police agencies found to engage in unconstitutional policing, and
police agencies without such findings.
Municipal police agency resources will be negatively associated with
the number of scaled findings, controlling for the size of a police
department.
Municipal police agencies experiencing a focusing event are more
likely to have been found to engage in unconstitutional policing than
those that have not experienced a focusing event.
Municipal police agencies found to have deficient intervention
systems will be more likely to engage in unconstitutional policing
than municipal police departments without such deficiencies.
Municipal police agencies with focusing events are more likely to
have accompaniment in the form of feedback, than police agencies
without focusing events.
Municipal police agencies under negotiated settlement will have a
greater number of policy deficiencies than those under technical
assistance.
The number of deficient policies will be positively associated with the
number of thematic findings.
The number of observed § 14141 investigations occurring during the
tenure of each president will differ from expected observations.

Confirmed
Confirmed
Rejected
Partially
confirmed
Confirmed
Partially
confirmed
Rejected
Rejected
Rejected
Confirmed
Confirmed
Confirmed
Rejected

H15

Investigative outcomes will differ between political parties.

Confirmed

He

Organizational and environmental characteristics for municipal
police will differ between first and second-generation investigations.

Partially
confirmed
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AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL STATEMENT
I was born Jason William Ostrowe on May 22nd, 1975 in Syosset, New York – the
immediate shadow of New York City. My upbringing was middle-class and typical of many
families from the 1970s and 1980s experiencing the tumult of a divorced household. With my
parents separating when I was just an infant – I grew up like so many others from that
generation; sometimes a latch-key kid, other times within a stepfamily. My mother, who was my
primary caretaker throughout both my childhood and young adulthood, was a high-school
graduate and worked in jobs that did not require a college education or specialized skill. My
father, like his brother and father before him, were police officers in the NYPD. Although my
immediate family was small and we lived modestly, we never suffered for a lack of the important
things. This was due to my mother’s tireless enthusiasm for life, and love for her children.
From as early as I can recall, I was always invigorated by learning and new experiences. I
remember quite well as a young child being fascinated by all the information in encyclopedias,
spending hours upon hours reading them through, absorbing what I could – the knowledge made
me feel alive. Learning was my proclivity, and I was fortunate to grow up in an environment
where it was nurtured.
As a young boy and adolescent, when adults would ask what I wanted to be when I grew
up, much to my mother’s chagrin, I would answer, “a police officer”. In retrospect, this career
choice had more to do with modeling than my own best course – of which: Can anyone really
know at such an age? Choosing a career isn’t easy for an adult, much less a child. But what I’ve
always known is that I was never motivated by the acquisition of wealth or taken by the spirit of
entrepreneurship; my tendencies and aspirations were towards personal development, fulfillment,
and being part of something important.
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As a young adult entering college, I dedicated myself to personal and academic
excellence; I aspired to the highest levels of achievement attainable. My motivation sprang from
a lifetime of academic underachievement – embarrassingly so, and a desire to actualize the
thoughtful, intelligent, and accomplished person residing in me. I realized this goal for the first
time as an undergraduate, having been recognized for outstanding academic achievement by my
program.
It was during this time that I decided to pursue a career in policing. This did not come
easily, and although I have a family history in the field, it was not ordained. For years I was
between pursuing a police or teaching career, having always had a passion for history, public
policy, politics, law, and science. My decision at age 20 to major in public justice and
psychology sent me on the path which I am just now completing. In retrospect, this decision had
more to do with the aspiration to be part of something meaningful and important, my family
connection to the career, and the extrinsic stability that comes with a career as a civil service
employee. All safe choices.
So, in 1999 at the age of 24 and a year out of college, I was hired by the NYPD; it was a
proud moment, and made me feel connected to my father and his father, who I never really
knew, and the fulfillment of entering into a career with meaning. My experience in policing as a
new officer was similar to that of the many thousands who came before me, then the events of
9/11 happened. I was on-duty in Manhattan during that day, and lived and worked through the
chaos that ensued for months on end. This event dramatically changed many people’s lives, as
well, it set me on both a career and academic trajectory that I did not envision.
After a few short years as an officer, I began to crave the intellectual stimulation and
learning that had fueled me my whole life. As fate would have it, the events of 9/11 ushered in a
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new era not just in policing, but in higher education, and it was in 2003 that John Jay College
began offering a graduate program in police studies for law enforcement officers – this program
was in part a response to 9/11.
I took the program on with great enthusiasm, yet still a police officer, attending classes
on weekends, completing it in 2006, and subsequently enrolling in John Jay’s Master of Public
Administration program. At that same time, I was accepted to become an academic instructor in
the NYPD Police Academy. I knew I wanted to teach – that feeling never left – and had longterm plans to do so as second career. So, I thought what better opportunity to gain some
experience in the classroom.
I excelled in teaching, and enjoyed it immensely. The skills necessary to be a quality
teacher all came very easily – planning, structure, organization, reading, understanding,
communicating, etc., but most needed are passion and interest, in which I possessed in
abundance. It was during this time I realized that I wanted to become a college professor, and
thus began that journey.
Taking graduate level classes on Saturdays, after a week working at the police academy
required a certain level of sacrifice and dedication, but I did it without complaint, and found
great satisfaction in the process. The motivation that I brought to my undergraduate career still
abided, and with it, I finished the degree in 2011, earning the program award for highest overall
GPA – a perfect 4.0.
During that same time, I began making plans to work toward a PhD, and used my
connections in the police department for assignment as a policy analyst in the Office of
Management Analysis and Planning. There, I gained valuable policy analysis experience, and
leveraged my educational achievements and career experience to enroll in the Criminal Justice
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PhD program at the CUNY Graduate Center, specializing in policy, oversight, and
administration. I began the program in 2012, and attended part-time while still employed as a
New York City Police Officer.
The PhD program from the outset was a grind; graduate studies at the master’s and
doctoral level differentiate the consumer from the producer, this took me some time to realize,
the difference is a leap, and profoundly more challenging. I often felt adrift and floundering in
the PhD program, I frequently considered discontinuing. But for many reasons, whether to prove
to myself, accomplish something meaningful, feed my need for knowledge and learning, or
simply to see it through, I continued-on while still a police officer.
I left the NYPD in 2015 to pursue other opportunities and continue my doctoral studies,
which at that point became untenable to maintain. Through fits and starts, I was able to
successfully transition to career in higher education, realizing a long-held dream of becoming a
college professor.
I was hired as full-time faculty at BMCC in 2016, a hairs-breath away from the WTC
site, and the only institution of higher education that sustained damage on 9/11. With this change
in career came opportunity. I approached my doctoral studies with renewed vigor and
determination. And in late 2016, began development of my proposal. I knew it had to have
certain core elements: originality, access to data, an analytical plan, and a topic that could add
value to the literature. In the course of my studies I was introduced to John Kingdon’s multiple
streams framework, and became fascinated with how it could be applied to explain various types
of public policy and organizational decision-making. With my background in policing, teaching,
and policy analysis; a study of how a law is applied to police departments by the Department of
Justice seemed a natural fit. This was my Eureka moment.
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My proposal went to committee and was approved in May 2018; thus, I went all-in
completing my dissertation. From June through December I navigated the demands of family
life, full-time employment, and researching and writing a dissertation. This required balance,
planning, and time-management, but also, support, none more than from my wife. I finished my
manuscript on December 15th, 2018, and felt that I had done something quite special. I received
news in early March 2019 that my dissertation was accepted with minor revisions, my defense
was then scheduled for May.
Completing a dissertation is not easy, nor should it be. I know of no one who suggests
otherwise. It is a rarefied achievement, and with it should come great satisfaction. When people
remark about how they could never do it, I offer the following analogy: Completing a
dissertation is similar to running a marathon – you don’t have to be the best athlete, but athletic
enough, and with years of dedication, commitment, persistence, and timing, you’ll successfully
complete those 26.2 miles. Likewise, completing a dissertation requires a certain level of
competence, but more important, the student must possess the extraordinary dedication,
commitment, persistence, and timing to successfully navigate the many bumps, diversions, and
challenges in the road to completion – its own 26.2-mile path of discovery.
My struggles throughout this journey were numerous but not unique, yet, they were all
mine to own and overcome. I managed to navigate the PhD process and see it successfully
through while so many others give up along the way for any number of reasons – job, family,
other priorities, lack of commitment, and all of life’s vicissitudes.
This dissertation was 20-plus years in the making, beginning as that college kid
introspectively weighing career choices. I have many people to thank for their love, support,
guidance, and encouragement along the way. While I recognize them for helping to make this
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accomplishment possible, ultimately, my 20-plus year journey is one of self-actualization. The
person I always knew I was; thoughtful, intelligent, and accomplished, I never gave up on, and
for that, I am most proud.
May the next 20-year journey be as fulfilling as the last.

Jason W. Ostrowe
May 3rd, 2019
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